Civil Service Reform in Pakistan: Constitutional Mandates, Structural Gaps, and Strategic Pathways

Introduction: The Need for Reform in Civil Services

The Concept of Reform: Reform is fundamentally about change for the better. As defined by the Oxford English Dictionary, reform means “the amendment or altering for the better, of some faulty state of things, especially of a corrupt or oppressive political institution or practice; the removal of some abuse or wrong.” In essence, reform implies improvement towards desired objectives set by decision-makers. However, the meaning of reform is context-specific – what constitutes “better” must be understood in the particular political, legal, and administrative context in which reform is sought. Reform in government institutions, therefore, requires clarity of purpose and careful analysis of the existing faults it aims to correct.

Civil Service Reform in Context: Civil service refers to the body of government officials employed in non-political, non-judicial public service roles, usually selected on merit and responsible for implementing laws and policies. In Pakistan, civil service reform has been a persistent topic of discussion, especially as the country seeks to transition from a colonial-era bureaucratic governance model to a modern democratic governance model. Past efforts at reform have largely been superficial—focusing on tweaking terms and conditions of service—without addressing deeper structural and constitutional issues. As a result, Pakistan’s civil bureaucracy still exhibits many features of its colonial legacy: centralized control, generalist cadres dominating specialized domains, a rigid class-like hierarchy, and an emphasis on procedure over outcome. These characteristics have led to inefficiencies and a misalignment with the needs of a democratic society.

Today, meaningful reform of the civil service is recognized as essential for improving governance and public service delivery. True reform will require going beyond cosmetic changes and instead tackling foundational issues in how the civil service is constituted, structured, managed, and held accountable. This paper provides a detailed analysis of the civil service reform imperative in Pakistan, organized around five fundamental dimensions (or “rules”) of reform: 1. Constitutional Alignment of Services – ensuring the civil service system complies with the Constitution’s federal structure and legal requirements. 2. Structural Alignment of Services – restructuring the bureaucracy to fit Pakistan’s federal-parliamentary system and devolved governance. 3. Cadre Management and Specialization – overhauling the cadre system to promote specialization and end the colonial-era generalist dominance. 4. Codification of Civil Service Laws – developing a clear legal framework that codifies the roles, powers, and procedures of the civil service. 5. Modernizing Terms and Conditions – reforming recruitment, training, career progression, performance evaluation, and compensation to create a modern, efficient, and accountable civil service.

In addition to analyzing these five key areas, the paper draws comparisons with civil service structures in other countries (notably India, the United Kingdom, and the United States) to glean insights and best practices relevant to Pakistan’s context. Finally, the paper offers concrete policy recommendations – grounded in constitutional principles and international best practices, and geared towards lawmakers, executives, and judges – to guide a comprehensive civil service reform agenda for Pakistan.

Historical Background: from Colonial Bureaucracy to Modern Challenges

Pakistan’s civil service structure is a product of historical evolution, heavily influenced by British colonial administration. Understanding this historical context is crucial to identifying the entrenched problems and the rationale for reform.

Colonial Legacy – The Indian Civil Service: The modern concept of a merit-based civil service in the subcontinent began under British rule. The East India Company initially ran a patronage-based system, appointing civil servants from elite circles without open competition. This changed with the Government of India Act 1853, which introduced open competitive examinations in London for the Indian Civil Service (ICS), making the colonial administration more professional. The ICS was dominated by British officers; only later were a few Indians admitted through competitive exams, largely those who conformed to British expectations. The Government of India Act 1858 then placed the Indian administration under the British Crown, and the Secretary of State for India was empowered to make rules for civil service recruitment. Thus, by the late 19th century, the ICS had become a prestigious, centralized cadre – accountable to the British Parliament – that ran the colony with an iron hand.

A critical feature of the colonial system was the “reservation of posts” scheme, wherein certain central, provincial, and local posts were reserved for officers of the central ICS cadre. This was formalized by the Government of India Acts of 1915 &1935 as a way for the imperial center to control central, provincial, and local administration. Through this mechanism, British ICS officers (and later their Indian successors groomed in the same mold) occupied key positions in provinces, such as district administrators and department heads, ensuring that real authority remained centralized in the colonial government.

Post-Independence Establishment of CSP: At independence in 1947, Pakistan inherited this bureaucratic apparatus. Initially, Pakistan had only about 82 officers from the erstwhile ICS, but these officers held immense power and set the tone for the new country’s bureaucracy. The Indian Independence Act 1947, which created Pakistan, explicitly abolished the role of the Secretary of State and the reservation of posts under the 1935 Act. Despite this legal change, the practice of central superior services continued in Pakistan. In 1950, the Government of Pakistan announced (through a resolution of 8th November 1950) its intention to create the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP), envisioning it as the successor to the ICS, occupying senior posts in both federal and provincial governments. This was followed by the Civil Service of Pakistan (Composition & Cadre) Rules, 1954, issued via an Establishment Division notification, which formally constituted the CSP as a federation service with a cadre drawn from both federal posts and former “transferred” provincial posts.

However, a critical question arises: under what authority was the CSP created? Both the 1950 resolution and the 1954 CSP Rules were executive measures, not acts of legislature. Pakistan’s early constitutions were still in flux – the first constitution would only come in 1956 – so the legal foundation of the CSP was tenuous. Nevertheless, powerful bureaucrats (many being former ICS officers) entrenched the CSP’s role, effectively resurrecting the colonial scheme of reserving key central, provincial & local appointments for a central elite cadre. Notably, the 1954 CSP cadre schedule included posts in provincial governments (such as certain deputy commissioner, commissioner & secretary positions) reserved for CSP officers, mirroring the colonial practice.

Constitutional Developments – 1956 and 1962: The 1956 Constitution of Pakistan (the country’s first) implicitly recognized separate federal and provincial services. Article 182 of that Constitution provided that appointments to federal services or posts would be made by the President (or his nominee), and appointments to provincial services or posts by the provincial Governor. This suggested a federated approach – each level of government controlling its own appointments. The existence of unified CSP occupying provincial posts was at odds with this principle. Indeed, one would expect that after 1956, the earlier arrangements that empowered the central government to fill provincial posts would have been revisited. Yet the federal CSP continued largely unchanged, indicating a gap between constitutional theory and administrative practice.

The 1962 Constitution, promulgated under President Ayub Khan’s regime, also addressed civil services. It stated (Article 174) that the appointments to and terms of service of persons in the service of Pakistan could be regulated by law. It explicitly empowered the President to make appointments to an “All-Pakistan Service” as well as to federal services, and likewise empowered Governors for provincial services. The concept of an “All-Pakistan Service” was thus constitutionally acknowledged in 1962, meaning a service common to both the centre and provinces. To operationalize this, the Listed Posts (Substantive Appointments) Act 1967 was passed, permitting the President to reserve a certain percentage of superior posts in provinces for the centrally recruited CSP officers. This Act essentially gave a legal cover to the practice of sharing provincial posts with the central cadre – a continuation of the colonial legacy, now under a new name. It’s worth noting that East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) resented this centralized control; Bengali officials and politicians saw the CSP as an instrument of West Pakistani dominance, which fueled grievances contributing to East Pakistan’s secession in 1971.

Administrative Reforms of 1973: Major changes came after Pakistan’s second democratic transition. Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, following the interim period after 1971, introduced sweeping Administrative Reforms in 1973. The CSP, which had become a symbol of elitism and centralized power, was abolished. In its place, the government created several “Occupational Groups” or services (twelve in total) through executive orders. These included groups like the District Management Group (DMG), Police Service of Pakistan (PSP), Foreign Service, Income Tax Group, Customs, Accounts, Railways, etc. Each group was meant to specialize in a functional area of administration. The DMG was essentially the successor to the CSP for general administrative posts, particularly in the field (district administration) and secretariat. Importantly, Bhutto’s reforms also led to the inclusion of Article 240 and Article 242 in the 1973 Constitution (discussed in detail in the next section), which sought to put civil services on a clear constitutional footing. Article 240 required that appointments to services and posts be governed by laws (Acts of Parliament or provincial assemblies), rather than solely by executive discretion. Article 242 established the framework for Public Service Commissions for recruitment.

In line with Article 240, the Civil Servants Act 1973 (for the federal government) and similar provincial civil servants acts (e.g., the Punjab Civil Servants Act 1974, etc.) were enacted. However, these laws dealt mainly with the terms and conditions of service (like appointments, promotions, pensions, etc.) for individuals in government service – they did not create specific services or cadres by Act of Parliament, aside from recognizing existing ones. In practice, the federal government continued to organize its occupational groups via rules and notifications. The DMG, PSP, and the Secretariat Group were collectively managed as an elite cohort known as the All-Pakistan Unified Grades (APUG), indicating that officers of these cadres served in both federal and provincial positions. Thus, despite new constitutional provisions, the old practice of a federally controlled elite serving in provinces persisted – now under the label of APUG.

Over time, further executive orders consolidated this system. In 1993, the Establishment Division issued a so-called “agreement” or formula (reportedly during a caretaker government) allocating specific quotas of provincial posts to APUG officers and the rest to provincial civil services. This was done without any legislative approval and was arguably outside the constitutional mandate. Provincial civil servants challenged this in court, noting that no law permitted such reservation of provincial posts. While litigation was ongoing, the federal government took steps to fortify its stance: in 2014, a set of Statutory Regulatory Orders (SROs) formally changed the name of the DMG to the Pakistan Administrative Service (PAS), and attempted to retrofit the 1993 post distribution formula into the PAS Cadre Rules. Essentially, the authorities amended the old CSP cadre rules of 1954 (long since repealed in 1973) and reissued them as the PAS (Composition & Cadre) Rules, 2014 to legalize the occupation of provincial posts by PAS officers. This legal gymnastics – reviving a repealed rule framework – was highly dubious. As experts have pointed out, trying to save an extinct CSP cadre through Article 241’s saving clause is a constitutional stretch.

Most recently, in 2020, the Establishment Division unilaterally started referring to the PAS and PSP as “All Pakistan Services,” even though they have never been created as such via Act of Parliament as required by the Constitution. The Federal Government also pushed new rules to increase PAS positions in provinces, introduced a forced retirement (directory retirement) rule, and set up pathways for inducting provincial officers into PAS – all through executive instruments. These moves have been controversial and have been challenged in courts for violating the spirit of federalism and the letter of the Constitution. The Senate of Pakistan’s Standing Committee on Cabinet Secretariat took notice of these issues and in 2021 recommended the creation of true All Pakistan Services by legislation, limited to subjects of common interest (as envisioned by the Constitution). This recommendation aligns with the idea that if a central cadre is to exist, it should be confined to areas where federal and provincial governments have a genuine common governance interest (for example, matters under the Council of Common Interests).

Persisting Anomalies: The upshot of this history is that Pakistan’s civil service today operates in a constitutional and legal grey zone. Many of the so-called services (PAS, PSP, etc.) that wield power were never established by Parliament or provincial assemblies, yet they dominate key positions. The system retains a secretariat mode of centralization – a top-down approach where policy control is centralized – combined with a generalist orientation, meaning a small cohort of career generalist administrators monopolize leadership roles across various fields. Specialized knowledge and lateral talent are undervalued, and the class divides between the elite services and other government officers or professionals remains stark. This historical baggage has led to structural problems: provincial governments often complain of limited autonomy, talented specialists (engineers, doctors, economists) in the civil service face career stagnation under generalist bosses, and the public perceives the bureaucracy as self-serving and unresponsive.

In summary, Pakistan’s civil service still bears the imprint of its colonial past. Reform efforts in the 1970s and later did shake up the system but failed to fully break from the old paradigm. As we turn to the analysis of reform needs, five core areas emerge as critical: aligning the civil service with the Constitution, restructuring it for a federal democratic setup, managing cadres and careers to promote specialization and merit, establishing a solid legal framework for its operations, and updating the human resource policies that govern recruitment, training, and performance. Without addressing each of these areas, any reforms would likely be piecemeal and ineffective.

Constitutional Alignment of Civil Services (Rule 1)

The first pillar of reform is to align Pakistan’s civil service structure and practices with the requirements of the Constitution of Pakistan. The Constitution is the supreme law and the social contract that defines how power is distributed in the state. Any civil service system that operates outside the constitutional framework is on shaky legal ground and undermines the rule of law. Unfortunately, as highlighted above, many aspects of Pakistan’s civil service arrangements today are unconstitutional or lack proper legislative backing. Here, we examine the key constitutional provisions and principles that must guide civil service reform.

Services to be Established by Law – Article 240

Article 240 of the 1973 Constitution is the cornerstone for civil service regulation. It mandates that appointments to and conditions of service for persons in the service of Pakistan shall be determined by law – specifically:

• 240(a): for Federal services and posts, and for All-Pakistan Services, by or under an Act of Parliament;
• 240(b): for Provincial services and posts, by or under an Act of the respective Provincial Assembly.

Article 240 also includes an explanation: “All-Pakistan Service” means a service common to the Federation and the Provinces, which was in existence immediately before the commencing day (the day the Constitution came into effect) or which may be created by Act of Parliament.

Several important points flow from Article 240:

1. Three Categories of Services: The Constitution recognizes three distinct categories of government service: (1) federal services (and posts in connection with affairs of the Federation), (2) provincial services (and posts in connection with affairs of a Province), and (3) all-Pakistan services & posts related to APS (services common to the federation and provinces). This codifies a federal principle in public employment: that the federal government and each provincial government have their own services for their respective functions, and only a narrowly defined joint or common service (all-Pakistan) bridges the two in line with common subjects and common posts.
2. Legislative Mandate: All these services must be created and governed by legislation, not merely by executive orders. In other words, an “organic act” of the legislature is a precondition for the lawful existence of a service cadre. The federal Parliament should establish federal and all-Pakistan services via statute, and provincial assemblies should do the same for their services. Without such legislative foundation, a civil service cadre lacks constitutional legitimacy.
3. All-Pakistan Service Defined: The only all-Pakistan services recognized by the Constitution would be those that (a) were in existence before the Constitution commenced (in 1973) or (b) are created by Act of Parliament afterwards. At the time of the Constitution’s promulgation, there were no defined All Pakistan services. Even, the CSP was declared as the service of the federation by its own rules. Then, there were also a few professional services, working for the federal as well as provincial governments. However, crucially, since 1973, no Act of Parliament has been passed to formally create any new All-Pakistan Service. The federal government’s continued operation of PAS and PSP as if they are “All-Pakistan Services” is therefore arguably relying on the saving clause of pre-1973 arrangements, which is legally contentious (discussed further under Article 241). The whole idea of the federal government is misplaced. All Pakistan services require APS posts, cadres and finally the subjects.

Looking at the current reality against Article 240’s requirements, we find a glaring mismatch. The federal and provincial governments did enact Civil Servants Acts in 1973-74, but these laws dealt primarily with the terms and conditions of service for individuals (appointments, promotions, transfers, removals, etc.). They did not explicitly create specific services or cadres and allocate posts to them. Instead, what happened is that the federal Establishment Division continued to manage cadres like PAS, PSP, etc. through rules and executive notifications, without any parliamentary act establishing those services by name. Provincial civil services (such as each province’s Provincial Management Service, PMS) were similarly organized via rules under the provincial civil servant laws, not through distinct enactments for each service.

This means most existing civil service cadres have never been directly established by legislation, as Article 240 envisages. The Pakistan Administrative Service (PAS), for example, is a renamed version of the old DMG group and traces its authority to the CSP rules of 1954 (a colonial-era instrument) as “saved” by the 1973 reforms – but there is no Act of Parliament named “Pakistan Administrative Service Act” or anything similar. By strict interpretation, therefore, the very existence of PAS as a service occupying provincial as well as federal posts is of questionable constitutional validity. A similar argument applies to the Police Service of Pakistan (PSP) insofar as it is considered an all-Pakistan cadre.

The imperative for reform is clear: enact the services into existence through proper legislation. If Pakistan wants to maintain certain unified services across the federation, Parliament must pass a law creating them, defining their scope and the posts they cover. Likewise, each Province should legally establish its own civil services via legislation, delineating which posts are provincial. Without these steps, the civil service system remains, in effect, an extralegal construct held up by inertia and executive fiat. Reformers must start by asking, “Where is the Act of Parliament for this service?” before proposing any changes. If no such Act exists, the first reform is to draft and pass one, thereby giving the service a lawful foundation or shutting it down if it cannot be justified under the constitutional scheme.

Federalism and the Allocation of Posts

Another critical aspect of constitutional alignment concerns Pakistan’s federal structure. Pakistan is not a unitary state; it is a Federal Republic (as explicitly stated in Article 1 of the Constitution). Federalism implies a division of powers between the central government and provincial governments. In Pakistan’s case, this division is enumerated in the Fourth Schedule of the Constitution, which contains the Federal Legislative List (FLL). The FLL has two parts: Part I lists subjects on which only the federal Parliament may legislate (exclusive federal subjects), and Part II lists subjects that are under the purview of the Council of Common Interests (CCI) – essentially matters of joint federal-provincial concern, where policy is to be coordinated federally but implementation may involve provinces. Any subject not listed in either Part I or II is a residuary subject and belongs exclusively to the provinces.

This constitutional distribution of subjects should directly inform the distribution of civil service cadres and posts: – Federal Services should correspond to subjects in FLL Part I (pure federal subjects) – e.g., finance, defense, foreign affairs, customs, federal taxation, national infrastructure, etc. – Provincial Services should correspond to residuary subjects that fall within provincial domain – e.g., education (post-18th Amendment), health (provincial now), agriculture, local government, law and order (policing is a provincial subject under the Constitution), etc. – All-Pakistan (Joint) Services, if any, should correspond to subjects in FLL Part II – those matters where both the federation and provinces have a common stake, and which are managed through the CCI mechanism. Examples might include inter-provincial coordination of power generation and distribution (electricity is in Part II), national planning and economic coordination, or regulatory authorities that operate countrywide. After the 18th Amendment (2010), the Concurrent Legislative List was abolished, so Part II effectively represents the only shared subjects.

In line with this reasoning, Article 240’s vision is that each service must be tied to aligned posts on the corresponding subjects. Federal services on federal subjects; provincial services on provincial subjects; and a true all-Pakistan service only on those subjects that genuinely require a unified approach. This principle is often termed “administrative federalism” – administrative structures must mirror the federal distribution of powers.

The current situation violates this principle. The Pakistan Administrative Service today occupies positions such as Deputy Commissioners (district administrators), Assistant Commissioners, provincial Secretaries, and other purely provincial posts (e.g., in education or local administration in a province) – even though those areas are constitutionally provincial responsibilities. The PAS claims to be an “All-Pakistan Service” but has no statutory basis and operates far beyond any legitimate “common” subject. As a legal commentary noted, establishing PAS officers on posts related purely to provincial affairs, under the guise of an All-Pakistan Service, is unconstitutional and infringes on provincial autonomy. In effect, it is a remnant of the colonial “reservation of posts” scheme, which has no place in a true federation after independence. Hence, whether federal or all Pakistan service, it can not reserve provincial posts as per the federal parliamentary scheme of the constitution. Therefore, PAS/PSP claim to occupy Provincial posts under the garb of All Pakistan Service is negation of article 240 b, 137 and 142 (c). All Pakistan Services can only be created in federal legislative list part II under CCI subjects read with articles 153 and 154.

Another violation is in recruitment jurisdiction. Article 242 of the Constitution provides for Federal and Provincial Public Service Commissions (FPSC and PSCs) and implicitly confines each to its respective sphere. Yet, through the Central Superior Services (CSS) examination conducted by FPSC, the federal government recruits not only for federal posts but also for certain provincial posts (the initial induction grade positions of PAS, PSP, etc., which are slated to serve in provinces). This practice ignores the fact that positions like Assistant Commissioner (in district administration), Assistant Superintendent of Police (in provincial police), or Assistant Accountant General (in a province’s audit department) are posts in connection with affairs of a Province – which should be filled by that province’s PSC, not by the FPSC. To align with Article 242, provincial services (PMS, Provincial Police, etc.) should be recruited by provincial commissions, while FPSC should recruit purely for federal services/posts. Any future all-Pakistan service, if created by law, might be recruited through FPSC or a special commission mechanism, but that too must be clearly defined by law. Then, All Pakistan Services will be organized on all Pakistan posts.

Article 241 of the Constitution provides a temporary saving clause: until new laws are made under Article 240, the existing rules and orders in force before the Constitution can continue “so far as consistent with the provisions of the Constitution.”]. This clause has been stretched to its limits. The intent was to avoid administrative vacuum until legislatures set up the new legal frameworks. It was not a license to indefinitely continue pre-1973 arrangements that contradict the Constitution’s federal scheme. For example, the old CSP cadre rules of 1954 were allowed to temporarily persist, but only to the extent they did not conflict with the new Constitution. Once the 1973 Constitution was in place and especially after the 18th Amendment enhanced provincial autonomy, the continuation of a unitary-style service structure via executive orders became blatantly inconsistent with constitutional provisions. Indeed, continuing to issue SROs to modify or extend such rules (e.g., the 2014 and 2020 PAS rules) rather than enacting proper laws can be seen as a “subversion of the Constitution”. Some commentators argue that persisting in this unconstitutional practice could even attract Article 6 (high treason), as it undermines the constitutional order. While that may be an extreme view, it underscores the gravity of the issue.

To summarize the constitutional alignment requirements: – Legislative Foundation: Each civil service cadre should be established through legislation. The reform should inventory all existing services and either validate them by new Acts or dissolve/merge them as needed. – Federal-Provincial Domain Respect: Abolish the practice of reserving or encroaching on provincial posts by federal or All Pakistan cadres. Federal civil servants should work on federal subjects; provinces should staff provincial subjects. Any joint cadre should be strictly limited to jointly administered subjects (if any) and created by consensus law. – Public Service Commissions’ Role: Respect the constitutional mandate of PSCs. Federal PSC (FPSC) should not recruit for provincial posts, and vice versa. Each government level needs control over its hiring to ensure accountability to its legislature. – Sunset of Old Rules: Use Article 241 as intended – as a stopgap. The continuation of colonial or unitary service rules must end. Reforms should explicitly repeal or replace any rules/orders from the past that conflict with the constitutional scheme after the 18th Amendment. – Executive Authority Limits: Articles 97 and 137 of the Constitution stipulate that the executive authority of the federation and provinces extends only to their legislative competence. This means the federal government cannot unilaterally exert executive authority (such as making appointments or transferring officers) in matters outside its legislative domain. Reform must enforce this by ensuring, for example, that the Establishment Division (a federal executive body) cannot control provincial cadres or postings, since that exceeds federal jurisdiction.

In a nutshell, constitutional alignment is about restoring the rule of law in civil service management. The civil service must not remain an extra-constitutional fiefdom; it should be firmly brought under the purview of Pakistan’s federal constitutional framework. Doing so will not only uphold legality but also strengthen provincial autonomy, improve clarity in roles, and reduce inter-governmental friction. With a solid constitutional and legal basis established, other reforms (structural and administrative) will have a sound foundation to build upon.

Structural Alignment of the Civil Service (Rule 2)

While constitutional alignment addresses the legal foundations of civil services in a federal setup, structural alignment focuses on the organizational design of the civil service relative to the political system and tiers of government. Pakistan’s governance structure is that of a federal parliamentary republic, which has important implications for how the bureaucracy should be structured and function. Currently, however, there are significant structural mismatches – remnants of the centralized colonial bureaucracy in a now devolved, democratic polity. This section examines how to realign the civil service structurally with Pakistan’s federal and parliamentary system, as well as with modern principles of efficient administration.

Aligning with a Federal-Parliamentary System

Pakistan’s polity combines two key features: Federalism (power-sharing between central and provincial governments) and Parliamentary governance (the executive branch is drawn from and accountable to the legislature). A well-aligned civil service must complement both of these features:

• Federal Principle: In a true federation, each level of government (federal, provincial, and even local) should have a degree of autonomy not just in lawmaking but also in administration. Each should possess its own administrative machinery to implement its policies and laws. This implies distinct federal and provincial civil services, as discussed under constitutional alignment. Structural alignment goes further to consider how those services interact or remain separate, and how to organize administrative coordination on shared matters. Currently, Pakistan’s federal government through PAS/PSP and other central cadres penetrates deeply into provincial and even local administration. This is structurally incongruent with a federation where provinces ought to control their administrative instruments. The structural reform vision calls for each level of government to have independent services – federal officials for federal tasks, provincial officials for provincial tasks, and local officials for local tasks – rather than a single service ladder climbing from the district to Islamabad. As one reform expert notes, a federal civil servant today can start as a town administrator, then become a provincial secretary, and end up a federal secretary. This may foster a broad outlook in individuals, but it also means the federal government “controls all levels of government,” a profoundly centralizing structure. Best practice would dictate that movement from one level to another is not automatic or by cadre right, but by resignation and fresh appointment if at all. Ending the ladder that spans all tiers is essential for a functional federal structure.
• Parliamentary Accountability: In a parliamentary system, the executive authority emanates from the legislature. The political executives (ministers, prime minister, chief ministers, etc.) are elected legislators, and they are responsible to the parliament or assembly. The bureaucratic executive (civil servants) are the professional administrators who carry out the day-to-day governance under the direction of the political executive. For the parliamentary system to work properly, the bureaucracy at each level should be accountable to the political leadership of that level and, indirectly, to the corresponding legislature. This implies a structural norm: the bureaucratic head of a government department or local administration should ultimately answer to a minister or chief executive who is an elected representative of that jurisdiction. If a province’s affairs are being administered by officers who owe their career loyalty to the federal government rather than the provincial leadership, accountability suffers. The classic example is the office of the Chief Secretary of a province (the top bureaucrat in the provincial hierarchy): currently, this post is almost always held by a PAS officer appointed by the federal establishment, often with minimal say of the provincial government. The Chief Secretary, in practice, may feel more beholden to the federal Establishment Division (which controls their transfers and career progression) than to the elected Chief Minister of the province. This contradicts the spirit of parliamentary governance, where ideally the Chief Minister and his cabinet (the political executive of the province) should have administrative support that is loyal to and removable by them. Structural alignment would mean that positions like Chief Secretary (and other senior provincial posts) should be part of a provincial civil service, so that the provincial political leadership can trust and effectively direct their bureaucratic team. The same principle extends to the local level with local governments: if and when empowered local governments exist, their administration should answer to locally elected officials, not just too provincial or federal bosses.

In summary, the structure of the civil service must ensure coherence between political and administrative authority. Each government – federal or provincial – should have control over the bureaucratic apparatus that implements its policies, reinforcing the accountability chain: Bureaucrat → Minister/Chief Minister → Legislature → People. When a bureaucrat is structurally placed outside this chain (e.g., a federal bureaucrat operating in a province without full provincial control), it creates an accountability deficit and potential friction.

Decentralization vs. Centralization

Another structural issue is the degree of centralization within the civil services themselves. Pakistan’s bureaucracy has traditionally been highly centralized, with concentration of decision-making at the top (e.g., powerful federal secretaries) and tight control by central agencies (Establishment Division, Ministry of Finance, etc.). Modern governance, however, advocates decentralization and organizational autonomy for better efficiency and innovation. Structural reforms should address these aspects:

• Empowering Departments and Agencies: Under the current Rules of Business, federal Secretaries (and a handful of others like provincial Chief Secretaries) act as principal accounting officers (PAOs) for entire ministries or departments. This consolidates a great deal of power in a few hands and often slows down work because even trivial decisions may require approval at the Secretary level. It also dilutes accountability because a Secretary oversees vast portfolios without being able to delve deeply into each subordinate office’s performance. A reform suggestion is to devolve administrative and financial powers downwards: make the head of each attached department or agency a fully empowered administrator and principal accounting officer for their domain. For example, rather than a federal Education Secretary being PAO for everything from curriculum to school construction, the heads of specialized agencies (like a curriculum authority, examination board, etc.) should have autonomy and clear accountability for results. This creates a flatter, less hierarchical structure that can respond faster and more creatively to issues. It also means breaking the monolithic bureaucratic silos and encouraging mission-oriented agencies with clear mandates and resources.
• Limiting Arbitrary Transfers: In Pakistan, frequent transfers of officers are a tool of control (and often political & bureaucratic patronage or punishment). A well-performing official can be removed on a whim, which discourages initiative and long-term planning. Structurally, this is a symptom of centralized cadre control where individuals are moved like chess pieces. Reforming this requires instituting tenure protections for positions and transparent criteria for transfers and postings. Many countries ensure a minimum tenure (say 3 years) for key posts to allow the official to make an impact, unless there are strong reasons for earlier removal. Moreover, transfers/postings should ideally be handled by neutral civil service boards under set rules, rather than by one powerful department head or minister’s orders. The goal is to remove the fear of unjust transfer so that civil servants can focus on performance. Parliamentary oversight can help: e.g., require that any premature transfer of certain officials must be reported to the legislature or at least internally justified. By professionalizing the postings process, the structural integrity of institutions improves – each office is not just a seat someone warms briefly, but a responsibility someone can properly undertake. As one reform principle put it, transfers in Pakistan should be “recognised as a control device and be discontinued” as such. Instead, adopt a system where positions are openly advertised and competed for, and once an officer is appointed, they have security of tenure for a fixed term. If they underperform, there are mechanisms to remove them for cause, but not simply on the basis of patronage or pressure. Such stability would drastically improve institutional memory and project continuity.
• Independent Units and Local Governments: Structural alignment also means embracing the principle of subsidiarity – decisions and implementation should be done at the lowest effective level of government. Over-centralization in Islamabad or in provincial capitals (Lahore, Karachi, etc.) often leads to alienation and inefficiency at the grassroots. Empowering local governments with their own administrative machinery is critical. That requires structural reforms to create local government services (e.g., municipal civil services, or allowing provinces to create local cadres) that can manage local affairs (municipal services, community development, etc.) responsive to elected local councils. Pakistan’s checkered history with local government – often oscillating between military regimes introducing local bodies and civilian regimes curtailing them – has hindered development. A reformed civil service structure would integrate a tiered approach: Federal Civil Service, Provincial Civil Services, and Local Services or cadres, each with clarity of function and minimal overlap. Movement between these tiers, if needed, should be through formal channels like deputation or new appointments, not automatic postings.

In implementing structural changes, technology and modern management practices should also be leveraged. The world is moving towards agile governance structures aided by information technology. Pakistan’s civil service should break out of the slow, paper-driven, top-heavy model and adopt more networked and data-driven operations. Structural alignment isn’t only about hierarchy levels or jurisdictions; it’s also about internal processes. For example, creating interdisciplinary teams, using e-governance platforms for quicker decision-making, and flattening communication channels can significantly improve performance. As part of structural reform, the government could establish policy units or research cells in ministries to analyze data and propose solutions, thereby rejuvenating the bureaucracy’s thinking capacity (indeed, historical evidence like the British-era gazetteers shows that even colonial bureaucracy valued documentation and local knowledge – a practice we have lost).

Another structural challenge is the generalist vs specialist debate. The Pakistani civil service structure historically elevated the generalist administrator (the “DMG/PAS, PSP, PMS officer” who could be posted to any department) over specialists. This has led to technical departments (health, education, engineering, etc.) often being led by non-specialists, which can hamper effective decision-making. Structural alignment calls for re-balancing this by creating specialized streams and leadership positions for domain experts, which ties into the next section on cadre management and specialization.

In conclusion, structural alignment means designing the civil service to fit the democratic, federal house in which it resides. That requires decentralizing authority, clearly delineating federal-provincial-local administrative domains, ensuring bureaucratic accountability to the respective elected governments, and modernizing organizational practices. With these changes, the civil service can transform from a colonial-style controlling apparatus into a facilitator of governance that is closer to the people and quicker in response. As Pakistan continues to face complex development challenges, a structurally aligned civil service is essential for effective policy implementation and public service delivery.

Cadre Management and Specialization (Rule 3)

One of the most crucial and complex aspects of civil service reform is cadre management – essentially, how the civil service is organized into different services or occupational groups, and how personnel flow through their careers in those groups. Pakistan’s current cadre system has serious flaws rooted in its history: it emphasizes a generalist elite (PAS, PSP, PMS etc.) that enjoys fast promotions and reserves key posts, while relegating specialists and provincial cadres to subordinate roles. To achieve a modern, meritocratic, and effective bureaucracy, reforms must overhaul the cadre structure. This includes breaking the monopolies of “generalist” cadres, promoting specialization, rationalizing the distribution of posts, and instituting fair career progression mechanisms.

Understanding Posts, Cadres, and Services

Before discussing reforms, it is important to clarify terminology: – A post is a specific position or job with defined duties and responsibilities (a job description). Each post has an authorized rank or grade. – A cadre is an established group or classification of posts, often of similar functional nature, that are managed together. A cadre usually corresponds to a particular service or department. For example, all posts related to accounts  across government might form an “Accounts Service” cadre. – A service (in civil service context) often means an organized cadre or a group of cadres constituting a career path. For instance, the Police Service of Pakistan is a service comprising the cadre of police officers. – In Pakistan’s usage, an Occupational Group in the federal civil service is akin to a service cadre (e.g., the Foreign Service of Pakistan, or the Inland Revenue Service).

The relationship is hierarchical: a service or cadre contains many posts, and an individual civil servant occupies a post at any given time. Cadre management refers to how these posts are allocated, how officers are recruited into cadres, how they are promoted or transferred between posts (both within the cadre and outside it), and how the size and composition of the cadre are maintained.

The Problem with Generalist Cadres

Pakistan’s civil service inherited and retained the concept of a broad “general” cadre that can occupy a wide variety of posts. The prime example was the CSP and later the DMG/PAS: officers in this cadre have served interchangeably as administrators in the field (districts), as secretaries of varied departments (education one year, finance the next, for instance), and even heading public enterprises or authorities. Similarly, the Secretariat Group and the Police Service have had wide-ranging presence. These generalist cadres come with several problems: – Reservation of Posts: As noted earlier, the PAS cadre has a cadre schedule that includes hundreds of positions across the federal and provincial governments reserved for its officers. For example, out of all Deputy Commissioner positions in provinces, a certain percentage are “reserved” for PAS officers (with the remainder for provincial service officers). This reservation is not based on any specialization or unique skill – it is simply an artifact of history and power. It effectively sidelines provincial civil servants from rising to the top jobs in their own provinces, breeding resentment and inefficiency. – One-Size-Fits-All Administration: A generalist officer is thought to be a “jack of all trades.” In the colonial era, this was prized because the ICS officer was expected to administer any district or run any department with the authority of the Raj behind him. In the 21st century, governance has become far more complex and technical. Running an education reform program, overseeing a healthcare system, or managing an energy project each requires domain-specific knowledge. Generalists rotating through such posts may lack the depth of understanding to make informed decisions, often relying on subordinates or becoming overly focused on administrative process rather than outcomes. This can slow innovation and problem-solving. – Stagnation of Specialized Talent: Meanwhile, the civil service does have specialized cadres – e.g., the Accounts Service, the Foreign Service, the Railways (an engineering-heavy service), Information Service, and at the provincial level, services like the Health Management or Engineering services. However, officers in these specialized streams often find their advancement limited. They may hit a “ceiling” because top leadership positions in ministries or departments might be taken by the generalist PAS officers. The message this sends to specialists is demotivating: no matter how expert you are in, say, public health, you might still end up reporting to a generalist administrator who could be moved next year to a totally different department. This hierarchy reinforces the class system within bureaucracy – an elite vs. others – which is unhealthy for morale and productivity. – Lack of Accountability and Overextension: When one cadre spreads itself over all government functions, accountability can suffer. If things go wrong in a technical program, the generalist can plead lack of technical knowledge; if they make a mistake in law and order, they might blame political interference. Because they are constantly moving, often an officer does not stay long enough in one role to be held responsible for long-term outcomes. Overextension also means these cadres sometimes face shortages: for instance, if too many PAS officers are needed to staff provincial posts, the cadre may fill positions with officers of insufficient experience or by leaving some posts vacant, leading to overstretch for those in place.

In short, the dominance of generalist cadres like PAS (and to an extent PSP in policing, though policing is itself a specialized field) is at odds with the needs of modern, citizen-centric governance. As one analysis put it, the general cadre system is dysfunctional in today’s context and discourages specialization, decentralization, and lateral entry of fresh talent.

Transition to Specialized Cadres

A consensus in public administration reforms worldwide is that bureaucracies need more specialization, not less. This does not mean narrow silos that never communicate, but it means cultivating expertise in specific fields so that decision-making is informed and effective. Pakistan needs to move from the “generalist colonial ICS” model to a “specialized modern civil service” model. Several steps are involved:

1. Identify and Define Cadres by Function/Domain: The government should determine what services or cadres are truly needed. These would correspond to functions of government. For instance, there could be a Public Health Service, an Education Administration Service, an Agricultural Development Service, an Infrastructure Service, etc., at appropriate federal or provincial levels. These would consist of posts related to that sector. For example, a Provincial Education Service could include district education officers, education secretaries, curriculum planners, school administrators – a career stream where officers concentrate on education sector management throughout (with training in that field).

Some specialized services already exist in practice but need strengthening. For example, Pakistan’s Foreign Service officers focus on diplomacy; the Accounts Service officers handle auditing and financial management. Those are specialized streams by design. But even those can be further specialized internally or at least given targeted training (e.g., public finance is a complex field needing continuous skill upgrade).

2. Dismantle the Unified Generalist Cadres: This is politically and administratively challenging because it faces resistance from within (the PAS/PSP lobby is strong). However, reformers argue that the Abolition of the “All-Pakistan Unified Grades” system is necessary. The practice of having APUG or PAS claim blanket eligibility for senior posts everywhere should end. Instead, top positions should be open to any competent person from the relevant service/cadre or even from outside through merit-based selection. This might mean converting PAS from a general cadre into something else (for example, splitting it into a Federal Administration Service for federal secretariat roles and separate provincial management services for provincial field administration, etc., or phasing it out as a distinct cadre altogether in favor of sectoral cadres). The Police, being a law and order function, can remain a specialized service but should be confined to policing roles; police officers should not be occupying administrative roles outside their core expertise (as sometimes happens when PSP officers are posted to secretariat positions unrelated to policing).
3. Develop New Specialized Services (All-Pakistan and Provincial): If there is a need for an All-Pakistan Service, it should be in specialized areas that benefit from cross-provincial experience and uniform standards. One example could be an All-Pakistan Railway Service for managing its affairs at federal and provincial levels. The key is, any new “All-Pakistan” cadres must be created by law and on common subject areas (like those in FLL Part II as earlier noted). There have been proposals for a National Executive Service (NES) to serve as a high-level policymaking cadre drawing talent from all sources. If something like NES is formed, it should complement, not override, specialized services – perhaps as a pool of top experts and managers who can be appointed to strategic roles via open competition. At the provincial level, new services like a Provincial Civil Service (Executive) akin to PMS need strengthening, but also more technical services (e.g., a Provincial Urban Planning Service, Provincial Environmental Protection Service, etc. as new challenges emerge).Lastly, whatever, cadres are established, these must be akin to constitutional law.
4. Merge or Eliminate Redundant Cadres: Pakistan’s current plethora of 12 federal groups and numerous provincial groups may include redundancies. For instance, Railways has its own service; Communications & Commerce have their groups, etc. Some can be merged if their functions overlap, or their scope can be redefined. The guiding principle should be cohesion of function: each cadre’s posts should all be related in nature so that officers develop relevant experience over time in that area. If a cadre has too many dissimilar posts, that’s a sign it should be broken into smaller cadres, or those posts reallocated to appropriate services.
5. Specialized Career Progression: With specialized cadres, the training and career path of officers would also become specialized. An officer in the Education Service, for example, would spend the early career in school or district-level administration, mid-career in secretariat or policy roles in education, and perhaps senior roles in the ministry or as head of educational institutions. Their postings would all contribute to a deeper understanding of educational governance. Cross-postings to unrelated departments should be minimized (unlike today where a PAS/PMS officer might go from leading an agriculture department to managing an energy project with no continuity of expertise). This builds true expertise and policy capacity within each sector.

It is worth noting that specialization does not mean rigidity or lack of breadth. There should still be opportunities for inter-service mobility on merit (discussed under lateral entry below), and officers can be exposed to varied experiences through training or short-term attachments. But the core identity of their career would be tied to a specialization.

The example of the health sector illustrates the need for specialized administrative cadres. Presently, the provincial Health Departments often have a bureaucrat (from PAS/PMS) as Secretary and a senior doctor as Director General Health. The Secretary handles files and finance, the DG deals with technical issues – and often there is a disconnect or even turf tussle between them. If instead there was a Health Management Cadre – essentially medical professionals who are also trained in public administration – they could fill both roles, bringing both medical knowledge and administrative acumen. Such medical administrators would likely understand the needs of hospitals and patients better while also being adept at budgeting and personnel management. Similar arguments apply to engineering services, agricultural services, etc. Blending professional domain knowledge with management training produces a more well-rounded administrator for specialized departments.

Rationalizing Cadre Size and Post Distribution

Another aspect of cadre management is controlling the size of each cadre and ensuring a balanced distribution of posts across grades. A common problem in Pakistan is the pyramid bottle-neck: too many officers at junior levels for too few senior posts, leading to slow promotions, frustration, and stagnation – except in elite cadres where fast promotions sometimes happen by encroaching on others’ posts. A rational approach would involve: – Workforce Planning: Determine how many officers of each cadre are needed at various levels based on workload and retirements. If a cadre is too large (exceeding the number of posts available), recruitment should be paused or reduced. If it’s too small (unable to fill all its posts), either recruitment should increase or posts should be given to other cadres. – Cadre Strength Reviews: Periodically review cadre rules to update the list of posts belonging to each service. For example, after the 18th Amendment, many federal ministries were devolved to provinces. The cadre posts in those ministries (which were previously part of federal services) either vanished or moved to provinces. The cadre management should have been adjusted accordingly. Failing to do so can result in “ex-cadre” posts – positions not formally in anyone’s cadre, causing career confusion – or in some cadres having surplus personnel with no posts. – Eliminate Unspecified Reservations: In the PAS Rules 2014, 321 specific provincial posts were earmarked for PAS, but in practice PAS officers hold around 2000 posts in provinces. This indicates a violation of even their own cadre rules – far more posts are taken than authorized. Reforms must enforce that cadres stick to their sanctioned posts. If new posts are created or needed, there should be a transparent process either to allocate them to a cadre or to fill them by open competition. – Provincial Cadre Empowerment: Increase the number of higher posts available to provincial services within provinces to create adequate promotion opportunities. If PAS currently occupies, say, 50% of provincial secretary positions, over time that could be reduced so that provincial officers can also reach those positions. This will motivate officers in provincial services (PMS and others) as they see a potential path to the top without having to come through PAS induction.

Entry, Mobility, and Exit in Cadres

A healthy civil service cadre system also needs well-defined mechanisms for how officers enter, advance, and, if necessary, exit the service. Current practices need reform in these areas: – Recruitment (Entry): At present, recruitment into each cadre is typically at the bottom rank (through exams like CSS for federal services, or PPSC exams for provincial). There is little lateral entry at mid-career or senior levels. To attract the best talent and new skills, the government should consider multiple entry points. For example, allow professionals from academia, private sector, or diaspora to join the civil service at mid-career (e.g., at Deputy Secretary or Joint Secretary level) through a competitive process. This injects fresh perspectives and expertise. Some countries have a separate stream for technical experts to join government service on contracts or tenure posts. Pakistan could do the same in specialized cadres – e.g., hire a tech industry expert to lead an e-government initiative within the IT service, or a seasoned educationist to head a curriculum wing. Lateral hiring should be merit-based and transparent to avoid favoritism. – Promotions (Vertical Mobility): Historically, promotions in civil service have been on the principle of seniority-cum-fitness, with seniority often dominating. This leads to an entitlement mentality: promotions become almost automatic with time (unless one has serious misconduct). To reward performance and skill, promotions, especially to senior ranks, should be made competitive. One idea is to have promotional exams or assessments for key junctures (e.g., from mid-level to senior level). Another is to open certain higher positions to inter-cadre competition – for instance, a provincial secretary post could be competed for by both PAS and provincial service officers, or even outsiders, and the best candidate gets it. This introduces meritocracy and breaks the monopoly of any single cadre at senior levels. – Career Flexibility: A reformed system would allow officers some flexibility to move between cadres if they acquire new skills or if their interests change – with proper procedures. For example, an engineer in a technical department might, after further education, transition into a policy role in a planning service. Or an exceptional provincial officer might transfer to a federal service (or vice versa) through open competition. Currently, such movements are very limited and ad-hoc (e.g., the induction of some provincial officers into PAS after many years, which is often opaque and breeds resentment). Instead of backdoor inductions, create formal pathways: perhaps a certain number of positions in a federal service could be filled by provincial civil servants who pass a competitive selection, thereby encouraging cross-pollination. – Performance-Based Exits: One delicate but important reform is facilitating the removal or early retirement of underperforming or corrupt officers. At present, the system very rarely expels anyone for poor performance – the tendency is to let people advance by seniority regardless of efficacy. This demotivates high performers and keeps deadwood on the payroll. A robust performance management system (discussed more under terms and conditions) would identify those who are consistently underperforming. There should be legal provisions (with due process) to compulsorily retire or otherwise remove such individuals after warnings and opportunities to improve. This opens up space for more capable persons (either younger officers or lateral hires) and signals that civil service is not a guaranteed ride to a pension irrespective of effort. Recent introduction of “directory retirement” rules by the government attempted this, but they were controversial because of mistrust in how they’d be applied. A fair and transparent mechanism is needed so that it’s about performance, not purging for personal or political reasons.

Ending the “Class” System within Civil Service

Cadre reforms should also address the hierarchical sub-divisions such as the distinction between “officers” and “staff” (often colloquially the BPS-17+ vs BPS-16 and below). Pakistan’s government still has remnants of an old class-based system – officers (often CSP/PAS historically) vs support staff (clerks, assistants, etc.). Over time, many countries have merged cadres or professionalized all levels. For instance, the British civil service no longer has a strict bifurcation; instead, it’s one civil service with different grades but all considered civil servants with opportunities to move up based on exams and training. In Pakistan, an assistant or section officer from the secretariat side has very limited chance to ever become a senior officer because they belong to a different stream. This not only creates frustration but also deprives higher levels of the experience these staff accumulate.

Reforms can look at integrating services or providing advancement routes. For example, perhaps the Office Management/Secretariat Group can be reorganized so that the best among Section Officers (BS-17 from secretariat service) can be promoted into the PMS or PAS equivalent roles based on performance and exams. Similarly, ensure that technical staff (like researchers, analysts) in ministries are not stuck with no promotion prospects. Some reforms have suggested abolishing the segregated “Unified Pay Scales” system that rigidly classifies positions, and instead allowing more fluid HR practices. The logic being that not all government jobs are the same, so each organization could set its own grades and pay to attract talent as needed, rather than one size fits all.

In sum, cadre management reform is about moving from a hegemonic, inflexible system to a diverse, merit-driven system. It demands political will to take on entrenched interests, and careful planning to implement without disrupting functioning. The reward, however, would be a civil service where the right people are in the right jobs: specialists managing specialized tasks, leaders emerging in every sector based on competence, and officers at all levels feeling that their career progression is tied to their performance and skill acquisition, not just their cadre affiliation or seniority. This, in turn, would enhance the civil service’s capability to devise and execute policies effectively, as each sector would have a corps of seasoned experts steering it, instead of transient generalists.

Codifying Civil Service Laws and Procedures (Rule 4)

A less headline-grabbing but fundamentally important aspect of civil service reform is the legal framework governing the functioning of the civil service – essentially, the need to codify the roles, powers, and procedures that civil servants operate under. In Pakistan, a surprising amount of governmental functioning is based on convention, unpublished guidelines, or ad-hoc decisions rather than clear, written law. This creates ambiguity, enables arbitrariness, and undermines accountability. Reform Rule 4 calls for a thorough codification (and modernization) of civil service-related laws, rules, and regulations, ensuring that the discretion of officials is bounded by transparent rules.

Why Codification Matters

Codification means consolidating and systematizing laws or rules on a subject into a coherent written form. It brings clarity and accessibility. For a civil service that wields the state’s executive power on a daily basis, having clear codified rules is essential for several reasons: – Rule of Law: Civil servants must act within the law. If their powers and duties are not clearly defined by law, it’s difficult to hold them accountable or to prevent misuse of authority. Written laws reduce reliance on personal discretion or unwritten norms. – Consistency and Fairness: Codified procedures ensure that similar cases are handled similarly, rather than depending on who the officer is or which office one approaches. For citizens interacting with government, it’s critical to know the “rules of the game.” For example, if one is applying for a permit or license, codified criteria and timelines make the process transparent and reduce opportunities for corruption. – Protection of Civil Servants: Clear legal provisions can also protect honest civil servants from undue political pressure or personal liability when they act in good faith. Conversely, codification delineates boundaries beyond which if an officer acts, they can be legitimately penalized. This clarity is good for both discipline and morale. – Adaptability and Reform: When rules are codified, it’s easier to identify what needs change. One can amend a section of a law or rulebook to reform a practice. When things are not in writing, problems remain in a murky domain of “how things are done” with no formal mechanism to change them except through informal culture shifts.

The Current State of Affairs

Pakistan’s civil service legal framework has a few key codified elements: – The Civil Servants Acts (both federal and provincial) and the corresponding Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion, Transfer) Rules provide a skeleton of HR management law – covering appointments, confirmations, promotions, seniority, termination, etc. These are codified to an extent, though often leave much to rules or notifications. – The Government Servants (Conduct) Rules and Government Servants (Efficiency & Discipline) Rules (E&D Rules) outline what is expected of civil servants and how disciplinary proceedings are to be carried out for misconduct. – The Rules of Business (federal and provincial) allocate business among departments and lay down decision-making hierarchies within the executive. – Numerous specialized laws govern particular sectors (e.g., land revenue law, criminal procedure for magistrates, etc.) which implicitly define some duties of certain officials like Collectors or police officers. – The Constitution itself, as discussed, has some provisions for civil service (Articles 240-242, etc.) and many provisions that imply roles for the executive (for instance, the operation of CCI, financial procedures, etc. involve civil servants as functionaries).

Despite these, gaps and ambiguities abound: – Many aspects of a civil servant’s job are governed by unwritten conventions or outdated rules. For instance, the exact role of a Deputy Commissioner in a district varies by province and is often not crisply defined in any single law after the changes in local government systems. Is the DC primarily a revenue officer under the Land Revenue Act? A general administrator? A law-and-order manager under executive magistracy (which was largely abolished in 2001 but partially revived in some forms)? The legal authority of the DC to perform certain coordinating functions is nebulous, sometimes resting on retracted regulations or mere inertia. This has led to confusion and weakened writ of the state at the district level. – The secretariat procedures (e.g., how summaries are moved, how decisions are recorded, etc.) are governed by rules like the Secretariat Instructions or Office Procedures, but these are often departmental and not well-known to the public, and sometimes even to many officials who learn by trial and error. – Key processes like intergovernmental coordination (between federation and provinces, or among provinces) often rely on ad-hoc measures. The CCI has statutory rules of procedure now, but in practice there have been disputes about implementations due to lack of detailed protocols. – Discretionary powers of civil servants in many domains are not clearly delimited. For example, a development project director might have discretionary spending powers up to a certain limit, but the oversight mechanisms might not be spelled out in law (beyond general audit rules), which can open the door to mismanagement.

One glaring example of insufficient codification is the earlier-discussed reservation of posts scheme. The “agreements” or SROs that reserve provincial posts for PAS are not Acts of Parliament or provincial law; they are executive instructions. This means a fundamental aspect of who governs at local level is being decided by non-transparent executive fiat. Proper codification would require that if such a scheme were to exist at all, it should be debated and passed as law (which would also likely reveal its flaws and prevent it). The absence of such law is one reason courts are now filled with litigation by provincial service officers claiming the arrangement is illegal.

What Should Be Codified?

Reform must push for comprehensive codification of civil service operations and authorities. Key areas include:

• Job Descriptions and Powers: For every major administrative office (from Secretary of a Department to a Tehsildar), there should be a clear charter of duties and legal powers, ideally in the form of a law or at least rules made under law. This may involve updating or enacting statutes. For example, if we revert to having Executive Magistrates in districts, their powers should be defined in the Code of Criminal Procedure (as it used to be pre-2001) or under a local government law. If not, then the lines must be clearly drawn as to what a district administration can and cannot do. Codifying job powers also means eliminating overlapping mandates. Overlaps breed turf wars or negligence (everyone thinks the other is responsible). A codified administrative law could delineate, say, the division of responsibilities between a Deputy Commissioner and elected Mayor in areas where they coexist.
• Administrative Procedures Acts: Many countries have an Administrative Procedure Act or equivalent that guides how public authorities make decisions affecting citizens (e.g., requirements for notice, hearing, reasoned orders, etc.). Pakistan lacks a general administrative procedure law, which results in inconsistent practices. Introducing one could standardize how civil servants issue licenses, permits, or make quasi-judicial decisions, ensuring fairness and transparency.
• Public Service Delivery Standards: Codify service delivery standards in law or regulations – for instance, a law could stipulate that certain permits must be decided within 30 days, or citizens have a right to certain information or an appeal. This effectively pins down the bureaucracy to timelines and quality benchmarks, reducing discretion to delay or deny services arbitrarily. Some provinces have enacted Right to Public Services Acts that do some of this, but these need strengthening and uniform enforcement.
• Financial Rules and Delegations: Financial management is one area where rules exist (like the Accounting and Audit rules, delegation of powers, etc.), but frequent updates and enforcement are needed in the face of new challenges (like e-procurement, public-private partnerships, etc.). Codification here means updating the rulebooks to incorporate modern fiscal controls, simplifying overly complex processes that breed rent-seeking (for example, procurement rules need clarity to both prevent corruption and allow swift decision-making).
• Anti-Corruption and Ethics Codes: While conduct rules exist, they could be expanded into a more detailed ethics code for civil servants, codifying expectations about conflicts of interest, receiving gifts, post-retirement employment, etc. Additionally, protections for whistleblowers within the civil service need legal backing.
• Technology and Data Use: As we incorporate technology (e.g., e-filing systems, databases of citizens for services, AI in decision support), laws must codify data protection, privacy, and cybersecurity standards in administrative processes. This is a forward-looking aspect of codification, ensuring that the push for e-governance still respects citizens’ rights and secures information.

In doing all this codification, two complementary principles must be kept in mind: 1. Simplification: The aim is not to create mountains of red tape but to provide clarity. Often, writing things down actually simplifies because it removes the need for case-by-case improvisation. The language of these laws/rules should be as straightforward as possible so that not only civil servants but citizens can understand their rights and obligations. 2. Periodic Review: Codification is not a one-time event. Laws and rules can become outdated. A mechanism for periodic review and revision of administrative laws should be instituted – perhaps a small secretariat in the Law Ministry or Establishment Division tasked with continuously updating the “civil service code” in consultation with stakeholders.

Example: Revitalizing the “Writ of the State”

Pakistanis often lament the weak “writ of the state” in many areas – meaning the government’s decisions or law are not effectively implemented on the ground. A big contributor to that is the lack of codified empowerment of field officials coupled with accountability. For instance, encroachments on public land may flourish because the authority of local officials to remove them is unclear or because procedures are so cumbersome that officials are discouraged from acting. If the laws clearly empower certain officials to take swift action (with due process for those affected) and protect those officials when they act in public interest, the writ of the state becomes stronger. Conversely, if laws needlessly centralize authority (e.g., requiring approval from the capital for minor actions) or leave gaps (e.g., not specifying who can enforce a certain regulation), implementation suffers. Thus, codification can directly improve the government’s on-ground effectiveness by clarifying “who can do what” and “what happens if they don’t.”

Codification of Internal Management

Not only outward-facing duties, but internal management aspects should be codified: – Promotion Criteria: While general criteria exist (e.g., minimum years of service, courses, etc.), there could be clearer, legally binding criteria for merit-based promotion, perhaps including examinations or performance review outcomes. – Performance Evaluation: The current Performance Evaluation Report (PER) system is rather opaque and often perfunctory. Codified guidelines on how to conduct evaluations, including possibly 360-degree feedback or citizen feedback for certain posts, can make this more rigorous. A new Performance Management Law could be envisioned that ties into promotions and bonuses. – Training and Capacity Building: A law or formal policy could mandate certain training at career stages and authorize institutions (and maybe allow partnerships with universities as suggested by some experts. Right now, trainings like the National Management Course (for promotion to BS-20) are required, but the content and method of these trainings might be archaic. Codification can set objectives for training programs – e.g., that they should inculcate modern skills and not just be a ritual.

Example: Conduct Rules and Fundamental Rights

The Civil Servants Conduct Rules in force are largely adapted from 1960s rules. They place restrictions on political activity, expression, etc. For example, civil servants are not allowed to speak to the media without authorization, or to publish anything critical of government policy. While a measure of neutrality and discipline is necessary, these rules in some cases infringe upon fundamental rights like freedom of expression and association. A re-examination and recodification of conduct rules is needed to strike a better balance. For instance, could a civil servant be allowed to write an academic article or op-ed on policy (perhaps with a disclaimer that it’s personal view) without facing penalties? Many democracies allow civil servants some voice as long as they maintain impartiality at work. Also, the rule that government servants can’t engage in any trade or business can be revisited in the modern era of innovation and startups – maybe with safeguards to prevent conflicts of interest, an officer could be allowed passive investment or advisory roles, etc., which currently are blanketly disallowed. Reform in this area can help attract and retain talent that also has entrepreneurial or intellectual pursuits, by not entirely stifling their freedoms. Of course, active politics or anything that compromises neutrality should remain off-limits, but the key is to update these rules to current realities and constitutional rights.

In conclusion, codifying the civil service’s governing laws is like drawing a clear map for both officials and citizens. It reduces misuse of power, improves coordination, and clarifies expectations. As part of a holistic reform, legal codification is the scaffold on which other changes rest. For example, you cannot effectively enforce specialized cadres or new performance systems without writing them into rules or law. Pakistan should consider compiling a comprehensive “Civil Service Code” (much like how some countries have a Penal Code, Civil Code, etc.) that contains all relevant statutes and rules for the civil service, updated to reflect the new reform principles. This compendium could become a reference for every civil servant and those served by them, bringing much-needed order to the house of governance.

Modernizing Human Resource Policies: Recruitment, Training, and Performance (Rule 5)

The fifth and final key area of reform involves the people in the civil service – how they are recruited, trained, evaluated, rewarded, and even retired. In other words, the terms and conditions of service in a broad sense, extending beyond the legalistic terms to the practical policies that shape civil servants’ careers and motivations. A civil service can only be as good as the individuals who work in it and the environment in which they work. Pakistan’s current system of recruitment and career management has been widely criticized as outdated, overly focused on rote academics and seniority, and not conducive to fostering initiative or accountability. Thus, modernizing these human resource (HR) aspects is critical for reform. We will cover several sub-topics here: recruitment examinations, training and professional development, performance evaluation (PER), promotion and career progression, compensation (pay and perks), discipline and accountability, and retirement/pension reforms.

Recruitment Reforms: From Cramming to Competence

Pakistan’s flagship civil service recruitment exam, the Central Superior Services (CSS) exam, and its provincial analogues (e.g. Provincial Management Service exams), have long been the gateway to government service for officers. However, there is consensus that the content and method of these exams are misaligned with the actual skills and knowledge needed for governance roles. The CSS exam currently emphasizes: – A strong command of English essay writing and grammar. – General knowledge of Pakistan and current affairs. – Abstract IQ tests or optional subjects that often have little to do with administration (candidates choose from literature, science, history etc., which they might study superficially for the exam).

This system has produced cohorts of officers who may be good at writing English and memorizing facts, but not necessarily equipped in law, policy analysis, economics, or management – which are the bread and butter of a civil servant’s job[76]. As a result, new officers often require extensive training post-induction to learn the basics, and some never quite catch up on the substantive knowledge they need.

Reforms to the recruitment process could include: – Revising the Exam Syllabus: Introduce compulsory subjects that reflect governance competencies. For example, Constitutional Law and Public Administration should be core subjects for all, to ensure officers understand Pakistan’s constitutional setup and administrative theories. Subjects like Economics/Development Studies, Public Policy/Management, Pakistan’s legal system (basic civil/criminal law), and Analytical Writing (where they might critique a policy scenario rather than write a generic essay) could be included. Optional subjects can be retained to allow specialization indication, but the list of optional subjects should relate more to government functions (e.g., health policy, environmental management, etc., rather than pure abstract disciplines). Indeed, the user’s provided text suggests incorporating subjects such as legislation, administrative law, financial management, and local government into the exam【user text on exam reforms】. This would ensure new entrants are at least exposed to the fundamentals of the job. – Bilingual or Urdu Option: The insistence on English as the sole medium may inadvertently screen out potentially excellent candidates who are more comfortable in Urdu or regional languages. Given that much of local administration involves interacting in local languages, it’s arguable that the exam could be offered in Urdu as well (with English tested separately for those positions that need it). This could diversify the talent pool and reduce the somewhat elitist barrier of English fluency in a country where educational quality is uneven. – Skill-based Testing: Beyond written exams, incorporate assessments for communication skills, problem-solving, and leadership. This could be done through structured interviews, group discussions, or assessment centers where candidates simulate real-life tasks (e.g., handling a community meeting or making a quick policy brief). – Psychological Evaluation: The current CSS includes a psychological assessment stage, but it often seems to have little bearing on final selection (which is mostly exam score + interview). Strengthening the psychological screening to filter out candidates not suited for public service ethos or those with concerning traits (or conversely to identify leadership potential) can improve the quality of intake. This must be done carefully and professionally to avoid biases. – Decentralizing Recruitment for Specialized Cadres: If the cadre specialization reform is carried out, the recruitment should also be specialized. Rather than one exam placing people into various groups (which may not match their background), there could be separate streams or exams for different services. For example, a separate exam for Foreign Service (with more emphasis on international relations and languages), a separate one for Accounts (with auditing/accounting focus), etc., or at least separate optional subject clusters and training after a common foundational exam. This happens in India to an extent (they have one exam but candidates preference and their scores determine if they go to IAS, IPS, IFS, etc., each having different training). – Transparent and Fair Conduct: This goes without saying – the examination process must be above reproach in terms of merit. Instances of paper leaks or political influence have eroded confidence in some recruitment in the past. Automation and third-party oversight can help maintain integrity.

In short, recruitment should shift from selecting the “best crammers of theory” to selecting the “best problem solvers, innovators, and leaders.” We want officers who not only know facts but can apply knowledge to make decisions that improve governance.

Training and Capacity Building

Once recruited, civil servants undergo various training programs: the Common Training Program (CTP) for all fresh CSS recruits, the Specialized Training Program (STP) for each specific group, and later mid-career and senior management courses for promotions. These training programs have been criticized for being outdated, too theoretical, and sometimes a mere formality (officers attend to get the certification but not much learning happens).

Reforms needed: – Update Training Curriculum: The training academies (like Civil Services Academy, National Institutes for Public Policy, etc.) need to continuously update their curricula to reflect contemporary challenges. Training should include modern governance topics: e-governance, data analytics for policy, project management, environmental sustainability, SDGs, etc., as well as soft skills like effective communication, ethical decision-making, and citizen engagement. The days of just learning office procedures and colonial revenue codes should be supplemented with case studies of successful reforms, creative problem-solving workshops, etc. For instance, instead of only classroom lectures, incorporate simulations (e.g., disaster management drills, mock court proceedings for magistrates, negotiation role-play for conflict resolution). – Professional Faculty and Collaboration with Universities: One suggestion from PIDE was to involve universities in civil service training. This could inject fresh academic insight and also break the insular mindset. Training institutes can partner with local or foreign universities to offer specialized courses (maybe even allow officers to earn a diploma or master’s credit). Also, bring in practitioners and experts from private sector, NGOs, and abroad as guest instructors to broaden perspectives. – Continuous Learning: Training should not be one-off at induction and then after 15 years at a mid-career course. It should be a continuous process. Consider modular courses that officers must take every few years (even short online courses) to stay updated in their field. Encourage or require officers to do stints in field and secretariat both, as well as possibly a rotation in a different department for broadened experience (with a learning objective, not just random). – Make Training Merit-Based and Rigorous: Right now, practically all probationers pass their training unless they do something egregious. Introducing real evaluations during training – where failing to meet a standard could mean extension of probation or even termination – would instill seriousness. Also, offering distinctions or awards for top performers can motivate healthy competition. And linking training performance with initial postings could be considered (though that should be balanced with fairness). – Specialized Training for Specialized Cadres: If new cadres are made, their training should be specialized accordingly. For example, a dedicated Police Academy already exists for PSP; similarly, a specialized economic management program might be needed for those going into finance-related services, etc.

Overall, training needs to evolve from a ritual that emphasizes the old ways (e.g., excessive focus on protocol, file management in antiquated manner, etc.) to an incubation of new ideas and skills. Civil servants should emerge from training not only knowing the rules but also excited about bringing positive change, armed with knowledge of how to drive reforms in their domains.

Performance Evaluation and Promotion

The current Performance Evaluation Report (PER) system (formerly ACR – Annual Confidential Report) is widely seen as ineffective. It’s often perfunctory, with inflated grades (most get “very good” or “excellent” regardless of actual performance). It also relies almost entirely on the supervisor’s subjective assessment, which can be colored by personal relations or how happy the boss is, rather than objective metrics. Reforms can include: – 360-Degree Feedback: Incorporate feedback from peers, subordinates, and even clients (public or other departments) for a fuller picture. For example, if a Deputy Commissioner is being evaluated, inputs from the provincial secretariat (boss), local heads of other departments (peers), and perhaps representatives of the community or elected local officials could be included. Some countries do use 360-feedback for civil servants to identify strengths and weaknesses. – Key Performance Indicators (KPIs): For many positions, especially managerial ones, set quantifiable or at least trackable targets at the start of the year. For instance, a utility service officer might have a target to reduce service delivery time by X%, or a tax officer to increase collections by Y% without increasing complaints. At year end, evaluate against these KPIs. If targets are missed or exceeded, reflect that in the performance score. Naturally, this requires a performance agreement system and the data infrastructure to measure results, which can be challenging but is doable with commitment. – Link to Promotions/Bonuses: Make performance evaluations actually count. Currently promotions often consider PERs but since most PERs are similar, seniority takes over. If a new evaluation system can more finely distinguish top performers from average, then promotions can favor those who consistently perform better. Additionally, consider performance bonuses or rewards: e.g., a month’s extra salary to those rated in top 10%, or priority for foreign training, etc., to incentivize excellence. – Citizen Feedback for Certain Roles: For roles that are directly service-delivery (e.g., someone heading a passport office, or a district health officer), one element of evaluation could be citizen feedback surveys or complaint statistics. If an officer’s jurisdiction sees a huge number of unresolved complaints or poor survey ratings, that should signal an issue. – Regularity and Transparency: Evaluations should be done yearly and feedback given to the officer so they know where to improve (right now, officers seldom see any detailed feedback, just their numerical grading perhaps). A culture of constructive feedback from bosses must be cultivated, moving away from the notion that these reports are “confidential” never to be discussed. Modern HR practice encourages managers to discuss performance with their staff. – Promotion Boards with Broader Criteria: When promotion time comes, boards should look at complete profiles: courses completed, evaluation history, any notable achievements (or failures), and interview the candidate for leadership roles. The practice of just ticking the box if all service requirements are met leads to unmotivated people rising just by being around long enough. Introducing competition (as earlier noted, possibly exams or presentations to promotion board) can help.

Also, another reform is to remove the quota system in promotions if any still exists (e.g., promotions sometimes had provincial or service quotas in the past). It should purely be on merit within each cadre, and if cadres are specialized and separate, then each stands on its own.

Compensation: Pay, Perks, and Pensions

Compensation reforms are absolutely essential to attract and retain talent and to reduce corruption. Pakistan’s government pay structure has traditionally been low salary supplemented by numerous perks and privileges for senior officers: free housing or housing allowance, official cars with fuel, servants, utility bills paid, club memberships, plots of land allotted at concession, etc. This system has many downsides: – It’s inequitable and breeds resentment (junior officers and staff often get almost nothing in perks, while a senior gets a house in an upscale area and a car). – It obscures the true cost: the government spends a lot to maintain these perks (colony houses, car pools, etc.), far more than if it just paid cash. – It encourages rent-seeking and political compliance, as perks can be given or withheld discretionary (e.g., who gets the better house or the vehicle). – It isolates officers from the life of ordinary citizens (living in government enclaves, not paying their own bills, etc., as noted by Nadeem Ul Haque, leads to a VIP mindset and less empathy for common struggles). – It also fails to truly reward performance, as perks are often attached to positions and seniority, not individual merit.

The reform solution is to monetize and right-size compensation: – Abolish most perks in favor of higher salaries. This means give civil servants a paycheck that reflects their worth and let them manage their own housing, transport, etc. For instance, instead of providing a house, give a housing allowance sufficient to rent a decent place (or provide mortgages). Instead of official cars, perhaps a transport allowance or use of pooled vehicles only when on duty. Some perks like club memberships or plots have no justification and should be scrapped entirely. – This move should be combined with pay scale reform. Unified Pay Scales (the BPS system) might be too rigid. If specialized agencies could set their own pay (within broad guidelines) based on market conditions, they could attract needed skills. For example, IT professionals or economists may need higher starting pay than general admin to bring them in. – Performance-based incentives: Introduce bonuses for outstanding work. Maybe a project completion bonus, or annual bonus linked to performance grade, etc. – Protecting salaries from erosion: Historically, in Pakistan, periodic raises haven’t kept up with inflation for lower ranks, though higher ranks benefit from perks. A transparent salary indexation or review every couple of years can ensure civil servants maintain a decent living standard without feeling the need to be corrupt to make ends meet. – Pension Reform: Pensions are a looming fiscal burden. Many experts suggest moving towards a contributory pension system (as Nadeem also hints), where the government and employee both contribute to a fund during service, which then pays out on retirement. This fund could be professionally managed. It would make pension liabilities more sustainable and portable. Perhaps allow employees to cash out some portion if they leave early (so they don’t just cling on for pension). Also, curtail abuses like early retirement with full pension after holding an office briefly, etc. A modern system might also differentiate between those who served 30+ years and late entrants, etc., to be fair. – Healthcare Benefits: Similarly, healthcare for families of civil servants can be put on an insurance basis or contributory health fund, rather than unlimited treatment in expensive facilities on taxpayers’ money. Clear limits and audited processes for medical reimbursement should be codified to prevent abuse (like foreign treatment junkets at govt expense, which Nadeem suggests stopping entirely. – Eliminating Extravagant Privileges: The culture of entitlement (for example, needing a large entourage, security protocol beyond necessity, etc.) should be addressed. These are intangible perks but contribute to the image of bureaucracy being a ruling class rather than public servants. Some of it is cultural change, but official orders can set the tone (like no unnecessary protocol, only one official vehicle per officer, etc.).

The net effect of these compensation reforms should be that an honest civil servant can live comfortably on their salary and see a career of public service as financially viable, while those who were in it for the perks find the allure gone unless they genuinely want to serve. It also would save government money in the long run or at least make expenditures more transparent. Research has shown the cost of perks often far exceeds their value to the employee and removing them in favor of salary could even be cost-saving for the state.

Accountability and Integrity

No reform is complete without strengthening accountability for corruption or misconduct. While there are agencies like FIA and provincial anti-corruption establishments, and NAB (though NAB’s role is controversial due to political misuse), internal accountability within the civil service also needs boosting. Some measures: – Strengthen Internal Disciplinary Processes: The E&D Rules should ensure timely disposal of disciplinary cases. Right now inquiries drag on for years, or guilty people get minor punishments because of peer sympathy. Streamline the process, perhaps involve independent members in inquiry committees for impartiality. Also protect whistleblowers who report misconduct by colleagues. – Digital Audits and Oversight: Use technology to reduce opportunities for corruption. E-government can cut down personal contact points where bribery happens. Also data analytics can flag anomalies (e.g., if a particular office is issuing way more licenses than average, or a procurement officer always buys from the same vendor). Randomized audits of projects and lifestyles of officers could be instituted (respecting privacy but ensuring no glaring illicit enrichment). – Rotation and Conflict of Interest Policies: Prevent officers from staying too long in one lucrative posting or serving in home districts where they could be influenced. Some of this exists in policy but ensuring it via codified rules matters. Also, declare assets regularly and have a unit verify anomalies. – Example-setting: When high-profile cases of corruption are proven, the punishments should be visible and proportionate (dismissals, etc.), to send a message. Conversely, a culture that doesn’t just accuse but also exonerates – if someone is falsely accused, clear their name officially. Fairness encourages moral officers to continue performing.

Retirement and Post-Service

Finally, consider policies for the end of service. Encouraging voluntary early retirement for those who have lost motivation (with some safeguards like partial pension) could be positive, opening space for fresh blood. But also restrict certain post-retirement jobs (like immediately joining a private company you used to regulate – a cooling-off period to avoid conflicts). Senior civil servants often get post-retirement re-employments or extensions; this should be minimized to avoid blocking promotion pipeline and to maintain morale among those waiting in line. Let people move on and bring new leadership.

All these HR reforms aim to create a civil service culture that values competence, integrity, and dedication. A civil servant’s career would then be characterized by: – A rigorous entry based on relevant merit (ensuring quality from the start). – Continuous learning and adaptation to new skills. – Clear goals and feedback on performance, with rewards for success. – A fair chance to advance based on merit, not just patronage or seniority. – Adequate compensation to live with dignity, minus feudal-style privileges, aligning the officer’s life closer to the public they serve. – Accountability mechanisms that deter wrongdoing and remove those who dishonor the service.

Such a human resource environment would naturally attract bright young people to civil service for the right reasons and would enable the government to evolve with times. It would transform the civil service from an archaic, self-serving entity into a dynamic, service-oriented workforce capable of tackling Pakistan’s governance challenges in the 21st century.

International Comparison: Lessons from the UK, India, and the USA

Looking at other countries can provide valuable insights for reform, as Pakistan is not the first to grapple with bureaucratic overhaul. We will briefly compare the civil service systems of the United Kingdom, India, and the United States, focusing on features relevant to Pakistan’s situation. Each of these countries has influenced Pakistan (the UK historically, India as a parallel post-colonial state, and the USA as a federal model). Understanding their systems will help contextualize Pakistan’s challenges and options.

United Kingdom: A Unitary yet Professional Civil Service

The UK’s civil service is historically the progenitor of Pakistan’s (since British India’s ICS was part of the British civil service ethos). The UK is a unitary state (with some devolution to Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland in recent times, but still quite centralized compared to a federation). Key features: – Merit-based and Politically Neutral: Since the Northcote-Trevelyan reforms of the mid-19th century, the UK civil service has been recruited on merit (competitive exams) and expected to be non-partisan and permanent. The infamous “spoils system” (where jobs went to political supporters) was largely eliminated in the UK well before it was in the US. – Unified Service with Specializations: The UK does not have separate state-level civil services because of its unitary nature, but it has specialized departments and cadres internally. The civil service is often divided between the Generalist administrators (policy officials who can move between departments) and Specialists (like scientists, economists, engineers who usually stay in their fields). The top leadership are the Permanent Secretaries of ministries, who are career officials. There is a civil service code and a Civil Service Commission that oversees recruitment and promotions to ensure fairness. – No constitutional status but strong conventions: Unlike India or Pakistan, the UK has no written constitution article about civil service; it operates on laws and conventions. The Civil Service is ultimately under the Crown (now legally under the Minister for Civil Service, who is the Prime Minister), but day-to-day it is governed by the Civil Service Management Code, etc. This shows that while constitutional entrenchment is not mandatory for a professional civil service, clear rules and traditions are crucial. – Performance and Accountability: The UK has modernized significantly – it introduced performance pay to some extent, open recruitment for some senior posts, and has a robust culture of parliamentary accountability (civil servants can be summoned to parliamentary committees to explain policies, though ministers usually front it, civil servants often provide the technical answers). – Devolution Adjustments: With devolution since the late 1990s, Scotland, Wales, and NI have their own devolved administrations. Interestingly, the civil servants working for those devolved governments are part of the UK Home Civil Service (except in NI which has a separate legal entity but similar ethos). They owe accountability to their respective ministers in Edinburgh, Cardiff, etc., but their employment is still within a unified structure. This works due to the strong norm of political impartiality – a Scottish government civil servant will serve SNP or Labour ministers alike professionally. It suggests a model where one could have unified standards but still local accountability – although in Pakistan, trust deficit may not allow one cadre serving two masters easily.

Relevance to Pakistan: The UK model shows the value of meritocracy, neutrality, and internal professionalism. However, the UK doesn’t provide an example of federal-provincial cadre separation because it doesn’t need to. Pakistan can emulate UK’s rigorous selection and training methods (the UK’s Fast Stream program for civil service recruitment, for example, is quite comprehensive). Also, UK’s success with reducing perks (UK civil servants don’t get houses or cars; they are salaried employees, though at very high levels they have some allowances) and linking pay to responsibility can be instructive. The culture of impartial service to whichever government is in power is also a keystone – Pakistan struggles with politicization, which the UK mitigates by limiting political appointments (ministers can only bring a few special advisers; majority of positions remain career officials).

India: The All-India Services Model

India, like Pakistan, inherited the ICS and faced the task of indigenizing it post-1947. India chose to retain and constitutionally embed the concept of All-India Services (AIS), which are somewhat analogous to what All-Pakistan Services could have been. Notable features: – Constitutional Provision (Article 312): The Indian Constitution allows the creation of new All-India Services by a two-thirds majority resolution in the Council of States (Rajya Sabha). The existing AIS from British times (Indian Administrative Service (IAS), Indian Police Service (IPS)) were continued. Later, the Indian Forest Service was added as an AIS in the 1960s. – Dual Control: AIS officers are recruited by the Union (through the Union Public Service Commission’s nationwide exam) but allocated to various States. Once allocated, they serve mostly in that state, interspersed with central postings on deputation. Their career is jointly managed – their appointments, transfers within the state are decided by state governments (with some central input), but their overall cadre rules, pay, etc., are set by the central government. In effect, they act as a link between central and state governments. – State Civil Services: Alongside AIS, each state has its own state civil services (provincial civil services akin to PMS, and state police, etc.). Typically, the higher echelons of district administration and police are staffed by IAS/IPS, while mid-level and lower are staffed by state civil service officers, who can be promoted into the AIS at senior levels (there is a quota for promotion from state services to IAS/IPS). – Pros and Cons: The IAS/IPS in India have been credited with providing a uniform administrative framework across a very diverse country, and being a steel frame that holds the nation together. However, there are also criticisms: state politicians often complain IAS officers are “Delhi’s people” and not fully under their control; there are issues of some officers gaming the deputation system to avoid inconvenient postings; and like Pakistan, there can be friction between IAS and state service officers over career progression. – Reforms in India: India has also debated civil service reforms. In recent times, they have introduced a unified Civil Services Examination for entry into not just AIS but also other central services (like revenue, audit, etc.). They have begun limited lateral entry at Joint Secretary level in the central ministries for domain experts (a notable move in 2018-19). Some states have experimented with performance-based postings and fixing tenures to avoid transfers, with mixed success.

Relevance to Pakistan: Concurrent subjects are vital to understand the joint/common services. CCI is a common subject sharing in Pakistan whereas, in India, there is a concurrent list. Therefore, India has a large concurrence to establish administrative framework. Then, Pakistan and India need to implement their constitution. And, importantly, Pakistan and India have different federal models. The Indian model shows one way to accommodate a federal system – by having elite services that straddle center and states, but with constitutional legitimacy and a clear framework. If Pakistan were to properly create All-Pakistan Services, India offers a roadmap of how to do it via consensus and legal backing, and how to allow joint management. However, Pakistan’s provinces have been far more resistant to central control than Indian states (given our history with One Unit and then overly centralized regimes, plus the ethnic dimensions). Where Indian states grudgingly accept AIS due to its constitutional status and maybe national cohesion arguments, Pakistani provinces might not be as accepting unless those services are truly on common subjects (like maybe a unified foreign service or an all-Pakistan economic planning service for federal-provincial coordination). Another lesson is how India promotes provincial officers into the IAS – Pakistan similarly could ensure provincial officers can graduate into any all-Pakistan service, to keep it federated in character, not purely federal officers.

Also, the union-state relations in India being managed by IAS show both an opportunity and a pitfall: opportunity in having a cadre that can implement national initiatives in states (like nationwide campaigns, etc.), pitfall in potential alienation of local political authority. Pakistan might decide to lean closer to a USA-like model (discussed next) with greater provincial autonomy in services, since our provinces jealously guard their turf after the 18th Amendment.

United States: Separate Federal and State Services with Political Leadership

The USA presents a contrast as a federal republic with a presidential system and a very distinct approach to civil services: – Federal vs State vs Local: In the US, the federal government and each state government are quite separate in their civil service structures. There is no single unified administrative service that spans both. If you work for the federal government (e.g., as a civil servant in a federal agency like the Department of Energy or the IRS), you are recruited by the federal process and your career stays in federal domain. States have their own civil service commissions or hiring processes for state agencies (like education department of a state, state police, etc.). Similarly, cities and counties often have their own hiring systems for local government staff. – Merit Systems and Spoils: Historically, the US had rampant patronage (spoils system) in the 19th century – “to the victor go the spoils,” meaning government jobs would be distributed to political supporters after each election. This changed with the Pendleton Act of 1883, which established a federal merit-based civil service for many positions. Over time, the merit system expanded. Today, the vast majority of federal employees are selected on merit (exams, qualifications) and protected from arbitrary political firing. However, the US still has a layer of political appointees at the top of agencies (the President appoints about 4,000 officials, of which around 1,200 require Senate confirmation – these include Cabinet secretaries, deputies, and many agency heads and ambassadors). These appointees set policy direction, while career civil servants carry out day-to-day operations. This mix tries to ensure democratic control while keeping continuity underneath. – No Uniform Federal Cadre: Because of the specialization of agencies, the US does not have a single elite body like the IAS or PAS that goes everywhere. If you enter the federal civil service, you typically join a specific department or professional track (administrative, technical, etc.). There is a Senior Executive Service (SES) for top career managers who can move across agencies, but it’s an elite only in terms of grade, not a unified intake from the start. People enter SES after a career proving leadership. – State Civil Services: States mirrored the federal move to merit systems in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, establishing their own civil service commissions. Today, each state’s bureaucracy is accountable to that state’s governor and legislature. There is no concept of federal government placing officers in state administrations. The federal government does have some agencies with state-level offices (like the FBI field offices, or USDA’s state offices) but those are still federal employees working on federal laws, not running state departments. – Intergovernmental Cooperation: How do federal and state coordinate in absence of an All-USA service? They rely on laws and funding mechanisms – e.g., federal laws often set conditions that state agencies must meet to get funding (like education standards, environmental regulations). There are also intergovernmental bodies and informal networks. While occasionally there are tensions, the system respects state autonomy highly; a federal officer cannot boss a state official around because they report to different masters. This is in line with the strong constitutional separation of powers in the US system. – Local Governments: The US also has strong local governments (counties, cities) with their own hiring. City managers, county sheriffs, etc., are local hires or even elected. This bottom-up autonomy is notable.

Relevance to Pakistan: The US model is an example of a very decentralized civil service landscape, reflecting the federal spirit. Pakistan, being a federal republic and with provinces roughly analogous to US states, might take inspiration from the idea that each province can and should run its own civil administration entirely. The federal government can still influence through national programs and conditional funding, but it doesn’t place federal bureaucrats in provincial roles. This is essentially what Pakistan’s constitution also implies (but hasn’t been followed). If Pakistan were to adopt a US-like stance: – PAS/PSP would be confined to federal subjects or perhaps dismantled, leaving provinces to strengthen their own services for provincial subjects. – Coordination would happen through bodies like the CCI rather than through shared officers. – It would eliminate the resentment of “federal officers ruling us” in provinces, much like in the US it would be unthinkable to have a DC bureaucrat run a Texas state department. – However, one must note differences: Pakistan’s provinces might have varied capacity. The federal services often argue they maintain standards where provinces cannot. The US deals with that by federal oversight laws and sometimes direct federal intervention if things go really wrong (civil rights enforcement, etc.). Pakistan could similarly keep some federal levers, but not by embedding officers.

Another aspect is the political appointment concept. Pakistan’s system is parliamentary, so not directly comparable (ministers are politicians already). But one might consider whether certain high posts could be open to outside (political or technocratic) appointments for fresh perspective, as US does. Some argue that key positions like heads of regulatory authorities or special initiatives could be open to contract appointments of experts, which is a limited form of the US approach. But caution: one wouldn’t want a spoil system where all ACs or DCs are replaced by cronies after each election – that’s what the merit system is to prevent. So we retain the merit base but perhaps allow lateral entry at higher levels akin to how US brings in new agency heads with each administration (ensuring policy alignment but below them career staff continue).

Why specifically compare with the USA? The user specifically asks to prove why it’s critical for Pakistan to compare with the USA. Probably because both are federal republics with a significant degree of sub-national autonomy. The USA model demonstrates a functioning large federal country without all-powerful central cadres – thereby giving confidence that Pakistan too can run effectively without central civil service control of provinces. It underscores the principle that strong provincial services and local autonomy do not necessarily weaken a country – in fact, the USA’s strength lies partly in decentralization spurring innovation (states are “laboratories of democracy” trying different policies). Pakistan can glean that letting provinces manage their own administrations could lead to better competition and innovation in governance approaches among provinces, rather than a one-size-fits-all.

Conversely, the USA’s challenges (like variations in capacity between rich and poor states, sometimes uneven protection of rights until federal gov intervenes) provide a caution that some national standards and support might be needed. Pakistan’s federal government might still need to assist provinces in capacity building and ensure minimum standards nation-wide (which is the role of CCI and federal grants).

In summary: – From the UK: Meritocratic recruitment, neutrality, and doing away with perks in favor of professional pay and culture. – From India: A model for all-country services legally entrenched (if one wants to keep a unified service, do it via law and limit it to appropriate areas), as well as how to allow local promotion to those unified services. – From the USA: The strength of complete provincial autonomy in civil services and alternative ways to achieve national coherence (through law and cooperative federalism rather than through shared personnel). It’s a useful counter-model to the inherited British/Indian approach – demonstrating that a country can be highly successful with decentralization of its bureaucracy, which aligns with Pakistan’s post-18th Amendment direction.

By studying these systems, Pakistani reformers can be inspired to design a hybrid that suits our context: perhaps a primarily decentralized system (like the US) with a few common services in key sectors (somewhat like a limited version of India’s AIS) and strong merit principles and professionalism (as in the UK). For instance, Pakistan might choose to create one or two All-Pakistan Services for, say, the Railway Service (since it is a CCI subject and implemented throughout Pakistan, or maybe an All-Pakistan Judicial Service (as has been mooted by some, akin to Indian Judicial Service, though judiciary is separate), but not for general administration which provinces can handle. Or Pakistan could decide none are needed and fully empower provincial and local services as per the US style. But whatever path, it needs to be done consciously, legally, and with buy-in from stakeholders, rather than by inertia or stealth.

Recommendations for Comprehensive Civil Service Reform

Drawing together the analysis above, we propose a set of key recommendations to guide Pakistan’s civil service reform. These recommendations are interrelated and reinforce each other; together, they provide a roadmap towards a more constitutional, efficient, and people-centric civil service. For clarity, we organize them into ten major recommendations:

1. Anchor Civil Services in Constitutional and Legal Framework:
   Enact the necessary legislation at federal and provincial levels to legitimize and govern all civil services. Make sure, all federal, provincial, local and all Pakistan (common) services are crated by or under an act of the legislature. Furthermore, the Parliament should pass an All-Pakistan Services Act (if any all-Pakistan services are to exist) defining their scope strictly on subjects of common interest (Federal Legislative List Part II) as per the requirement of the articles 153 and 154 of the constitution of Pakistan explaining Counsel of Common Interests CCI. Likewise, update the Federal Civil Servants Act or new laws to explicitly establish each federal service/cadre by law, and have Provincial Assemblies do the same for provincial services. Any cadre or post not backed by legislation should be phased out or integrated properly. This step will eliminate the current unconstitutional status of services like PAS, PSP and PAAS to the extent of provincial schedule of posts and ensure no executive order bypasses of the Constitution (e.g., stop using SROs to alter service structures without legislative approval). Essentially, no service without an Act – make this a guiding principle.
2. Realign the Civil Service with Federal-Parliamentary Governance:
   Restructure the civil service to respect Pakistan’s federal system and parliamentary accountability. This means ending the reservation of provincial posts for federal & aal Pakistan cadres, and instead strengthening provincial civil services to manage provincial affairs. Federal government should confine itself to federal subjects (ALL Part I) and use federal civil servants there. Create mechanisms for coordination through institutions (CCI, inter-governmental committees) rather than through commandeering provincial bureaucracy. At the same time, preserve the parliamentary chain of command: ensure that at each level of government, civil servants answer to the elected leadership of that level. For example, the Chief Secretary and Inspector General of Police of a province should be effectively within the purview of the provincial government (selected from that province’s own cadre) rather than unilaterally posted by Islamabad. This will enhance provincial autonomy and make bureaucrats more accountable to the people’s representatives in provinces, in line with the spirit of the 18th Amendment. In the federal arena, maintain the norm that civil servants are politically neutral and serve the government of the day, but also consider giving the elected government some say in top appointments through transparent processes (as some countries do) to improve trust and policy alignment. Develop and establish the local government service LGS to implement the local government laws. LGS should be the most important civil service in Pakistani governance system. The cadre posts of LGS may not be reserved by any provincial, federal or all Pakistan service.
3. Abolish the Colonial “Generalist” Cadres and Promote Specialization:
   Gradually dismantle the old generalist cadres (PAS/PMS, PSP in their current form, and any similar general cadres in federation & provinces) that claim a monopoly over diverse posts. Instead, establish specialized services/cadres for different functions. For example, create separate Administrative Services for federation and each province (e.g., Provincial Administrative Service distinct from federal) to handle general administration within that province, and sectoral services like Education Administration Service, Health Management Service, Agriculture and Rural Development Service, Economic Management Service, etc. at appropriate levels. Officers should spend their careers developing expertise in their chosen domain. This will require revising cadre schedules so that posts in a given cadre are all related to one another functionally. It also means abolishing the notion that one cadre can occupy any post just for being “elite.” By doing so, we remove the artificial hierarchy that placed one service on top of all others, and instead have multiple parallel services each leading in its area of competence. If an All-Pakistan Unified Service is still considered desirable for certain strategic leadership roles, it should be re-conceived as a National Executive Service (NES) as modelled by Dr Ishrat Hussain with open selection at senior levels rather than an intake at junior level that then blocks others. That NES, if formed, should pull talent from all services (and possibly private sector) based on merit for top policy jobs, rather than be another incarnation of PAS by another name. However, this model must be implemented as per the five rules, as already explained in the research. Similarly, Provincial and District Executive Services, be created, if need at all. However, in my point of view, these centralized cadre executive services will not bring efficiency, professionalism, and skills, rather than these will lead to more power and control, as happened with the existing generalist services.
4. Strengthen Organizational Autonomy and Cadre Management:
   Reforms should empower individual ministries, departments, and agencies to manage their human resources within the broad civil service framework. Each organization can be allowed tailored cadre rules, staffing patterns, and even specialized pay scales to attract the talent it needs (with oversight to prevent patronage). This means decentralizing HR decisions: not every transfer needs to be decided by Establishment Division, S&GAD or Administrative Department; line departments should have a say in who works for them, within rule-based systems. Conduct a comprehensive cadre review to rationalize the number of posts and their distribution: eliminate redundant positions, create new ones where needed (for example, create more technical posts in climate change or IT where new challenges have arisen), and ensure each cadre has a sustainable pyramid (so that promotion bottlenecks are eased). Implement strict controls on cadre encroachment: no cadre should exceed its authorized share of posts (as PAS has done historically); any temporary postings of one cadre’s officer into another’s domain should be exception, not norm, and require consent of the concerned government and that too under a law. By managing cadres smartly, we can ensure the civil service is neither understaffed in key areas nor bloated where not needed.
5. Reform Recruitment Processes for Merit and Relevance:
   Overhaul the entry examinations and selection process for civil services to better identify candidates with the aptitude, knowledge, and motivation for public service. Update the CSS and Provincial exam syllabi to include subject’s central to governance: Pakistan’s Constitution and legal framework, public administration, economics and public finance, policy analysis, and ethics. De-emphasize rote memorization of general knowledge in favor of problem-solving and critical thinking assessments. Introduce modern testing methods (analytical essays on policy scenarios, case studies, group discussions, etc.) alongside written exams to gauge a candidate’s practical skills. Allow optional specialization streams in the exam so candidates can show proficiency in their area of interest (e.g., an aspiring Foreign Service officer can opt for International Relations, a future Information Technology manager can opt for Computer Science). Consider offering the exam in Urdu as well as English to level the playing field for talented individuals whose medium of education was not English – language should not bar brilliance from serving the nation. Additionally, strengthen the psychological evaluation and interview stage to assess soft skills, integrity, and commitment to public values. The interview boards should include subject matter experts, not just generalists, to ask probing questions relevant to the service group the candidate aspires to. The ultimate goal is to recruit well-rounded individuals who are not only intelligent but also have the empathy, communication ability, and moral compass to be public servants. Recruiting in this reformed way will address the current mismatch where we have, in the words of one critique, “grammarians and essayists” instead of administratively capable officers.
6. Professionalize Training and Career Development:
   Make training a cornerstone of civil service development rather than a perfunctory phase. Revamp the curriculum of training institutions (CSA, NPA, Provincial academies, etc.) to focus on practical skills and modern knowledge. Incorporate training modules on law (so officers truly understand the legal basis of their work), IT and data use in administration, project management, leadership, and public communication. Engage academic and international partners to bring in fresh content. Evaluate trainees rigorously, and only confirm those who meet the standards – those who do not should undergo remedial training or be let go, to uphold quality (rather than automatic confirmation after probation). Beyond entry-level, institute continuous professional development: require officers to attend short courses every few years (which could be at universities or online) on emerging issues (e.g., artificial intelligence in governance, disaster management, etc.). Link these learning milestones to eligibility for promotion. Also, open up mid-career training to outside participants and vice versa – e.g., let private sector managers or civil society leaders attend certain public policy courses alongside civil servants to cross-pollinate ideas, and allow civil servants short sabbaticals to study or work in the private sector or academia, bringing back new perspectives (a controlled form of lateral exposure). Moreover, ensure training emphasizes ethics and public service orientation – include study of the civil servant’s role in a democracy, case studies of both good and bad governance, to imbue a sense of mission. A civil service that is continuously learning will be more adaptive and innovative in solving problems.
7. Institute Merit-Based Promotions and Lateral Entry Opportunities:
   Restructure the promotion system to reward performance, not just seniority. This can be done by introducing promotion exams or assessments at key transition points (for instance, from Grade 17 to 18, and 19 to 20) to ensure only those with updated knowledge and skills advance. Also require a solid record of performance evaluations (with the reformed PER system) for promotion – a mediocre record should delay or block advancement until improvement is shown. Replace the culture of automatic time-scale promotions with a culture of competition for higher responsibilities. Simultaneously, allow lateral recruitment into the civil service at mid and senior levels for specialized positions: for example, hire experienced economists from the market into planning divisions, IT experts into e-government roles, educationists into education management posts, etc., on contractual but well-integrated terms. These lateral entrants could be on fixed tenures to serve specific goals, injecting new ideas and expertise into the system. To facilitate this, the government may create a defined path (such as specific advertised posts or a percentage of positions at deputy secretary and above that can be filled through open hiring). Such entrants should undergo a vetting and orientation to understand government workings, but they should not be kept out due to rigid cadre rules. Moreover, encourage mobility between federal and provincial services through competitive selection only: e.g., a high-performing provincial officer can apply for a federal post and transfer into federal service if successful, and vice versa. This breaks silos and spreads best practices. In essence, the civil service must become a more open system, where talent can rise from anywhere (be it a provincial office or outside government) to leadership roles if they have merit – very much in line with the global trend of more dynamic public sector HR.
8. Enhance Accountability, Performance Management, and Public Feedback:
   Implement a robust Performance Management System in government. Overhaul the PER (annual appraisal) process to include clear metrics and multi-source feedback. Each officer should have agreed annual targets/KPIs aligned with their department’s goals, and end-of-year evaluations should measure progress against those targets. Integrate feedback from peers and subordinates, and where relevant, from the public or clientele served – for example, introduce citizen report cards for services like land registration offices, or gather feedback from local communities about their Assistant Commissioner’s responsiveness. Use technology for monitoring performance data (attendance, project execution rates, fiscal utilization, etc.). Establish independent or centralized performance evaluation boards that review the appraisals for consistency and fairness, rather than leaving everything to one supervisor’s pen. Monopoly of one person to evaluate is the root cause of failing system. Reward high performers with bonuses, recognition, and fast-track promotions, while those who consistently underperform should face remedial training or even exit from service under a revamped efficiency and discipline process. In tandem, strengthen internal accountability for misconduct: empower departmental accounts committees, strengthen anti-corruption units with better investigation tools, and enforce conflict-of-interest rules (e.g., declaring assets and avoiding postings where an officer has family or financial interests). Also critically, protect and encourage whistleblowers who report corruption or malpractices within the service, so that the code of silence is broken and integrity is upheld. For external accountability, build mechanisms for public grievance redressal – for instance, an ombudsman system or citizen portals where complaints against officials are tracked and can influence their record. By making performance transparent and consequential, we can change the work culture from one of impunity and inertia to one of accountability and results. Lastly, make sure that career civil servants do not have dual nationality.
9. Rationalize Compensation: Monetize Perks and Link Pay to Performance:
   Undertake a major pay and benefits reform to both improve honesty and morale and to remove distortions. This means eliminating most in-kind perks (government houses, car with driver for personal use, lavish medical reimbursements, club memberships, etc.) gradually and replacing them with monetary compensation. Provide fair and competitive salaries that reflect the responsibilities of each grade and the market rates for similar skills, ensuring that a civil servant can maintain a middle-class lifestyle without needing side incomes. Savings from cutting down the administrative costs of perks (maintenance of state-owned residences and fleets) can be rechanneled into salaries and development needs. Implement pay for performance components: for example, annual increments or bonuses could be higher for those with outstanding evaluations and zero for those with poor evaluations. Flatten the excessive pay gap that perks created between senior and junior staff – junior staff should also see tangible improvements (like better housing allowance, etc.) so the whole service feels taken care of. Reform the pension system to ensure sustainability: shift to a contributory pension scheme for new entrants (where government and employee both contribute to a fund) and consider offering options like early pension buy-out or portable pensions to allow more flexibility in career paths. Set a reasonable retirement age and resist ad-hoc extensions which demotivate the lower cadre waiting for promotion. The new compensation regime should enforce equality and transparency – e.g., make pay scales and benefits public information so trust is built. An honestly paid civil service is more likely to be an honest civil service; combined with strong accountability, this can significantly curb corruption. As one reform advocate summarized, “all perks should be abolished [and] salaries should be all in cash based on market comparators”, as perks breed opacity, inequity, and inefficiency. For these ends to meet, it is critical to reform FPSC/PSCs, Establishment Division, S&GADs and other secretariats into moder human resource management institutions with HR experts leading them.
10. Leverage Technology, Innovation, and Best Practices for Service Delivery:
    Steer the civil service towards a future-ready posture by embracing technology and innovation in governance. This involves both equipping civil servants with modern tools and re-engineering processes. Expand e-governance across departments: move file work to e-office platforms to reduce delays and promote traceability of decisions. Digitize records (land, judicial, licensing, etc.) to reduce discretion and opportunities for petty corruption. Use Artificial Intelligence and data analytics to inform decisions – for instance, AI systems can help flag irregular transactions or identify areas needing policy attention from big data. Train civil servants in using these digital tools effectively. Moreover, adopt international best practices such as one-window citizen facilitation centers (inspired by models from countries like Malaysia or UAE) to simplify public service delivery. Encourage a culture of continuous improvement – perhaps set up a specialized unit or think tank within the government (like that of Republic Policy) to regularly review global innovations in public administration and pilot them locally. Practices like performance contracts for top management (used in many countries), mobile service delivery units (as done in some African nations to bring services to remote areas), or open data portals for government transparency can be introduced. In addition, collaborate with countries that have reformed successfully – e.g., learn from Singapore’s incorruptible and efficient civil service, or Canada’s model of federal-provincial public service coordination, or Estonia’s digital governance prowess. Finally, implement a third-party performance audit mechanism: have independent evaluators (could be academics or private audit firms) assess the performance of departments and major government programs annually and publish scorecards. This external perspective can highlight issues internal actors overlook and provide credibility to reported achievements. By institutionalizing innovation and external audits, the civil service will become a dynamic organism that adapts to new challenges (like climate change, urbanization, population needs) proactively rather than reactively.

These ten recommendations, if implemented holistically, would transform Pakistan’s civil service from a brittle, outmoded bureaucracy into a more agile, merit-driven, and citizen-focused institution. They cover constitutional correctness, structural suitability, human resource vitality, and the infusion of modern management, aligning with both the letter and spirit of a democratic republic.

It must be emphasized that such sweeping reform is a gradual process; it cannot happen overnight. It requires building consensus among stakeholders – federal and provincial governments, civil servants themselves, politicians across parties, and the public. A first step could be the formation of a High-Powered Civil Service Reform Commission, backed by the legislature under CCI, to flesh out these recommendations into actionable plans (as suggested by experts). Political will is crucial: the Prime Minister, Chief Ministers, and its Cabinet must champion these changes, and Parliament should exercise its oversight to ensure follow-through.

The benefits of success will be immense: a bureaucracy that can competently implement policies, a decrease in corruption and abuse of power, faster and friendlier services for citizens, and better development outcomes from government initiatives. In short, civil service reform is not just about officials – it’s about state capability and public trust. If Pakistan is to overcome governance challenges and fulfill the promises of a federal republic (where power truly flows from the people and serves the people), then reforming its civil service along the lines above is both critical and urgent.

Lastly, Political intervention does not mean every politician interfering with civil servants. The only rightful oversight belongs to political executives — the Prime Minister, Chief Ministers, relevant ministers, and local council Nazims — who are the legitimate bosses of the civil service. Power flows down from the people to the legislature, from the legislature to the political executive, and then to civil servants. Civil servants are accountable to those executive offices and through them to the legislature; they are not responsible to every politician who may seek influence. In a proper system, civil servants uphold neutrality and serve policy and the public interest, not politics, party pressures, or individual politicians outside the chain of constitutional authority. Any other form of intervention undermines the rule of law, damages institutional integrity, and erodes public trust.

Conclusion

Pakistan stands at a crossroads in terms of governance. The country’s civil service – once considered the “steel frame” holding the state together – has, over time, been bent by colonial legacies, political upheavals, and internal inertia. The analysis in this paper has uncovered deep-seated issues in the civil service’s constitutional basis, structural setup, cadre system, legal framework, and HR policies. These issues collectively hinder the civil service from effectively playing its role in a democratic society.

But within this diagnosis lies a roadmap for revival. By realigning the civil service with constitutional federalism and parliamentary principles, we reaffirm the rule of law and proper distribution of authority. By restructuring towards specialization and merit, we prepare the bureaucracy to deal with complex modern tasks. By codifying procedures and limiting discretion, we pave the way for consistent, transparent decision-making. By modernizing recruitment, training, and compensation, we invest in the people who are the backbone of the state, motivating them to excel and serve with integrity. And by learning from international experiences while tailoring solutions to local realities, we increase our chances of lasting success.

These reforms are not merely administrative tweaks – they amount to a paradigm shift from a bureaucratic governance system to a democratic governance system. In a bureaucratic (in the pejorative sense) system, rules exist but often to concentrate power or avoid responsibility; communication is top-down; and citizens are subjects to be controlled. In a democratic governance system, rules and institutions channel power to serve the public; authority is balanced with accountability; and citizens are clients or partners in governance, deserving of quality service and respect.

Moving to the latter demands not just policy changes but a change in bureaucratic culture. It requires civil servants to internalize that they are public servants, deriving their legitimacy from the Constitution and the will of the people’s representatives, rather than an elite cadre with inherent entitlement. It equally requires political leaders to respect the professional autonomy of a merit-based civil service – using it to implement their vision, yes, but not abusing it for patronage or personal gain.

The challenge is formidable, as any change of this magnitude will encounter resistance – notably from those who benefit from the status quo. Vested interests, fear of the unknown, and the sheer complexity of managing change across a vast government apparatus are significant hurdles. Yet, Pakistan has reached a juncture where not reforming is far costlier than reforming. The governance issues manifest in everything from economic troubles to social service delivery gaps can, in many cases, be traced back to underperforming state machinery. The legislature, executive, and judiciary – all have a stake in a better civil service: lawmakers want their policies implemented well; executives (ministers, CMs, PM) need an apparatus that delivers results to maintain public confidence; and the judiciary expects administrative legality and fairness to reduce litigation burdens.

It bears noting that reform is not unprecedented. Countries around the world, from Malaysia to Brazil to Rwanda, have reformed their civil services with positive outcomes. Pakistan itself has seen glimpses of success when right people and policies align – for example, in certain e-governance initiatives or specialized departments that were allowed autonomy. These pockets of progress prove that the Pakistani civil servant, given the right environment, can be as effective and innovative as any.

Ultimately, civil service reform is about fulfilling the promise of the Pakistani state to its citizens – that the state will safeguard their rights, provide justice, and promote welfare, as envisioned by the Constitution. A reformed civil service, operating under rule of law, endowed with necessary skills and resources, and accountable for performance, is indispensable to achieving that promise.

In concluding, one might recall the original ethos of public service, famously articulated in the motto of the ICS: “Service before self.” For Pakistan’s civil service, that needs to be more than a slogan – it must become a lived reality again. The reforms outlined are geared towards creating conditions where civil servants can indeed place service before self, without undue fear or favor, and with the satisfaction that their dedication will be recognized. It is a long journey ahead, but with comprehensive planning and unwavering commitment, Pakistan can transform its civil service from a perceived impediment into a driving force for democracy, development, and national integration.

The time to act is now. With the world rapidly changing through technology and rising citizen expectations, delaying reform will only widen the gap between governance and needs. By implementing the proposed changes step by step, Pakistan can build a civil service that is constitutionally grounded, professionally competent, ethically sound, and passionately committed to the public interest – a civil service worthy of a Federal Republic in the 21st century.

References:

1. Republic Policy – “Five Rules of Civil Service Reforms”, Parts 1-5 (2022). [Detailed analysis of constitutional, structural, cadre, legal, and HR aspects of civil service reform in Pakistan].
2. Republic Policy – “A Case of Provincial Administrative Autonomy” (2021). [Historical account of central vs provincial services, discussing reservation of posts and Senate recommendations].
3. Courting the Law – “Serving People, Reforming Civil Service” by Waqas Ahmed (2021). [Legal critique of ongoing reforms emphasizes constitutional provisions Articles 240-242 and their violation].
4. Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE) – “Civil Service Reform in Pakistan: Some Principles” by Nadeem Ul Haque (2023). [Policy discourse outlining principles such as abolishing perks for cash pay, ending unified grades, ensuring provincial autonomy in civil service, etc.].
5. Government of Pakistan – 1973 Constitution of Pakistan, Articles 240, 241, 242, 97, 137, 153-154, Fourth Schedule. [Primary legal text defining structure of services and federal-provincial powers].
6. Government of India Act 1935 & Indian Independence Act 1947 – [Historical legal instruments relevant to civil services and “reservation of posts” abolition].
7. SROs and Establishment Division Notifications (1993, 2014, 2020) related to PAS. [Documents illustrating executive actions on cadre composition – referenced in Republic Policy articles].
8. Civil Service of Pakistan (Composition and Cadre) Rules, 1954 (repealed) and amendments. [Historical rules that formed CSP/PAS cadre, discussed in texts].
9. International Case Studies:
10. UK Civil Service Reform documentation (Cabinet Office reports).
11. Indian Second ARC Reports on Civil Service Reform.
12. S. Government Accountability Office reports on Federal HR Management. (Cited generally for comparative context in narrative.)