Parliamentary Democracy and Legislative Supremacy in Pakistan: A Case Study of the Punjab Assembly

Introduction

Democracy – in its genuine conception – is a system of government rooted in the sovereignty of the people and the rule of law. Abraham Lincoln’s famous formulation of democracy as “government of the people, by the people, for the people” encapsulates the core idea: that the authority of governance emanates from the collective will of the people through their chosen representatives. In a true democracy, the legislature (parliament or assemblies) occupies a central position as the embodiment of the people’s will. It is the legislature that makes laws, authorizes governance, and holds the executive accountable. This paper explores the concept of democracy and examines why, under a parliamentary system, the legislature is supreme over other branches of government. It contrasts parliamentary and presidential democracies, then delves into Pakistan’s parliamentary democratic framework under the 1973 Constitution – highlighting its checkered history of interruptions and the ongoing tug-of-war between the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary.

Crucially, we analyze the constitutional provisions of Pakistan (especially Articles 1 through 7 and other relevant articles) that establish Parliament and the provincial assemblies as repositories of sovereign authority. We explain that all executive and judicial powers flow from and remain subordinate to the law (the Constitution and statutes) which is enacted by the legislature. No other organ can claim sanctity above the legislature’s law-making power. In particular, using the Provincial Assembly of the Punjab as a case study, we expose how legislative powers are being usurped or eroded – by the federal government, by the provincial executive (Chief Minister and bureaucracy through the Chief Secretary and the Punjab Rules of Business 2011), and by judicial overreach. We examine instances such as federal interference in provincial domains, the use (and misuse) of delegated legislation, and the superior courts stepping into the legislative sphere via expansive interpretations or suo motu rulings.

Ultimately, this article argues that Parliament (and by extension, the provincial assemblies) are constitutionally supreme. We draw on constitutional text and principles to show that Pakistan’s governance scheme is meant to be parliamentary with legislative supremacy, notwithstanding the doctrine of separation of powers and checks and balances. After diagnosing the challenges to legislative authority in Pakistan – with emphasis on Punjab – we propose recommendations and reforms. The paper’s objective is singular: to establish that all powers belong primarily to the legislature (as the people’s representative) and to chart out how the Punjab Assembly can reclaim its constitutional mandate as the custodian of the people’s power. The discussion is presented in strong legal and human terms, yet in an accessible manner, with zero plagiarism and full attribution to sources in footnotes for verifiability.

Concept of Democracy and the Primacy of the Legislature

Democracy at its heart means rule by the people. Political sovereignty rests with the citizens, who exercise it either directly or (more commonly) indirectly through elected representatives. In a democratic state, the government’s legitimacy arises from the consent of the governed. Certain fundamental principles characterize a genuine democracy:

• Free and Fair Elections: The people must be able to choose and change their representatives at regular intervals in an environment free of coercion.
• Rule of Law: Laws (not individual rulers’ whims) govern the state, and all citizens and officials are subject to and equal before these laws.
• Separation of Powers and Checks and Balances: Typically, government power is divided among branches (legislative, executive, judicial) to prevent concentration of power. Each branch checks the others, but their roles are distinct.
• Protection of Fundamental Rights: True democracy protects freedoms such as speech, association, religion, and ensures minority rights against the “tyranny of the majority.”
• Accountability and Representation: Those in power must remain answerable to the people’s representatives (and ultimately to the electorate). Policies should reflect the public interest, and governance should be transparent.

Within this framework, the legislature plays a pivotal role. The legislative body – whether called a Parliament, Congress, Assembly, or another name – is the institution through which the people’s representatives deliberate and decide upon laws and public policy. In a famous legal articulation of parliamentary authority, the English jurist A.V. Dicey described parliamentary sovereignty as meaning that Parliament has “the right to make or unmake any law whatever” and no person or body can override or set aside the law of Parliament. While Pakistan’s system, unlike the U.K., is constrained by a written Constitution (so ultimate sovereignty resides in the Constitution itself), the Constitution explicitly locates state authority in the hands of the people and their elected legislature. The Objectives Resolution – now a substantive part of the Constitution per Article 2A – declares that “sovereignty over the entire Universe belongs to Almighty Allah alone, and the authority which He has delegated to the State of Pakistan, through its people […] is a sacred trust”. It continues to affirm the will of the people to establish an order where “the State shall exercise its powers and authority through the chosen representatives of the people”. This foundational principle means that all state power (executive, legislative, or judicial) is to be wielded in accordance with the mandate of the people’s representatives.

The legislature, therefore, is not just one branch among equals; it is the primary vehicle for the exercise of popular sovereignty. The executive branch (government) in a democracy is accountable to the legislature and derives its authority from laws that the legislature enacts. The judiciary’s role is to interpret and uphold the constitution and laws – not to create law or policy of its own – and it too is subject to the laws passed by the legislature, except where those laws conflict with the higher law of the Constitution. In essence, a democratic constitution establishes a framework in which legislation (the act of law-making by elected representatives) is the source of authority for all governing actions.

Parliamentary vs. Presidential Democracies: A Comparison

There are different models through which democracies organize the relationship between the legislative and executive powers. The two classic forms are parliamentary and presidential systems. Understanding their differences will contextualize why Pakistan’s Constitution chose the parliamentary route and how that affects the supremacy of the legislature.

• Parliamentary Democracy: In a parliamentary system, the executive is drawn from the legislature and is accountable to it. Typically, the head of government (Prime Minister or Chief Minister at the provincial level) is a member of the parliament/assembly who commands the confidence of the majority in that legislature. The executive and legislative branches are thus intertwined – a “fusion of powers” rather than a strict separation. The government remains in office only so long as it retains parliamentary support; it can fall by a vote of no-confidence. This induces a close alignment of policy between the legislature and executive and makes the executive continuously answerable to the legislature (through mechanisms like Question Hour, debates, and committees). The ceremonial head of state (e.g. a President in many parliamentary republics, or the Monarch in the U.K.) usually has limited powers, and real executive authority is exercised by the Prime Minister and cabinet who are collectively responsible to Parliament. In such systems, it is often said that the legislature is supreme (as in the U.K.) because the government’s legitimacy and legal authority flow from parliamentary confidence and statutory law. For example, in the British tradition, all ministers (including the Prime Minister) must be Members of Parliament, and Parliament can theoretically make or unmake any law – there is no veto by another branch, though political checks exist.
• Presidential Democracy: In a presidential system, the executive (President) is usually elected separately from the legislature and holds office for a fixed term independent of the legislature’s confidence. This model features a clearer separation of powers – the President is not a member of the legislature and often cannot be easily removed by it (except through impeachment for serious misconduct). The President typically has constitutionally defined executive powers and is both head of state and head of government (for example, the United States model). The legislature in turn has its own fixed term and powers, often including the sole authority to legislate and power of the purse, while the President may have a limited veto power over legislation. Because each branch has its own electoral mandate, a presidential system is sometimes called a system of “dual legitimacy” – the executive does not owe its existence to the legislature, and vice versa[5]. This can create a stronger system of checks and balances: the legislature scrutinizes the executive, but the executive can also check the legislature (e.g., via veto or certain appointments). However, it also means the executive is less directly under legislative control on a day-to-day basis.
• Hybrid/Semi-Presidential Systems: Some countries (e.g. France, Russia) have a blend, with both a President and a Prime Minister. These “semi-presidential” systems feature a directly elected President along with a Prime Minister accountable to the legislature. Executive power is shared or divided in complex ways. Pakistan in 1956 tried a parliamentary system, in 1962 adopted a modified presidential system, and since 1973 has a parliamentary system, though at times (e.g., under certain constitutional amendments or military regimes) it acquired semi-presidential characteristics (such as a powerful President with reserve powers to dissolve the legislature, like under the Eighth Amendment).

Implications for Legislative Supremacy: In a parliamentary system, because the executive is an emanation of the legislature (the Cabinet is effectively a committee of Parliament in theory), legislative supremacy is more pronounced. Laws are made by Parliament and executed by a government that Parliament can dismiss. There is a “mutual dependence” between legislature and executive in parliamentary regimes – the government needs the legislature’s support to survive, and the legislature relies on the government to implement laws and policy. By contrast, in a presidential system, there is “mutual independence” of tenure – the President does not need legislative confidence to remain in office, and the legislature cannot be dissolved early by the President. As a result, the legislature’s supremacy is constitutionally limited by an independently elected executive. Each model has its pros and cons: parliamentary systems can ensure swift law-making and alignment between law-makers and implementers, but risk executive dominance if the ruling party has a strong majority (the executive can effectively control the legislature). Presidential systems can provide stronger checks and more stable executive tenure, but risk deadlock between legislature and executive or excessive concentration of power in one person.

Pakistan’s Constitution of 1973 opted for a parliamentary democracy at both federal and provincial levels. The Prime Minister is elected by the National Assembly (the lower house of Parliament), and the Chief Ministers are elected by their respective Provincial Assemblies (Article 130 of the Constitution for provinces). The President of Pakistan is a ceremonial head of state elected by Parliament and provincial assemblies, not an executive president (especially after the 18th Amendment curtailed the President’s powers to dissolve assemblies). Thus, Pakistan’s system is designed such that executive authority “primarily emanates out of the legislative branch”. The framers believed that the elected legislature, being the mouthpiece of the people’s will, should have primacy in governance – with the executive answerable to it and the judiciary ensuring all remain within constitutional bounds.

Pakistan’s Parliamentary Democracy and Its Checkered History

The Islamic Republic of Pakistan emerged in 1947 and initially adopted, by inheritance, a parliamentary form of government (following the British Westminster tradition that was prevalent in undivided India). However, Pakistan’s political history has been far from smooth or continuously democratic. The journey has been checkered by periods of constitutional rule interrupted by martial law regimes, institutional clashes, and experimentation with different governance models. A brief historical overview will help set the stage:

• 1947–1956: After independence, Pakistan did not have its own constitution until 1956. It operated under the modified Government of India Act 1935 as an interim constitution. Governments were parliamentary in form (a Prime Minister and cabinet responsible to a Constituent Assembly), although the Governor-General (as representative of the British Crown and later as head of state of Pakistan) wielded significant powers. Early years saw instability, with the dismissal of governments by the Governor-General and ultimately the dismissal of the Constituent Assembly itself in 1954. Nonetheless, the notion of parliamentary supremacy was struggling to take root.
• 1956 Constitution: Pakistan’s first constitution (1956) established an Islamic Republic with a parliamentary system at the center and in provinces. There was a President (as head of state) but real executive power lay with the Prime Minister, who needed the confidence of the unicameral National Assembly. Unfortunately, this constitution was short-lived; it was abrogated in 1958 when the military, under General Ayub Khan, imposed martial law.
• 1962 Constitution: Ayub Khan’s regime introduced a new constitution in 1962 that departed from parliamentary democracy, instead instituting a presidential system. The President was the center of power (with wide discretion and not accountable to an assembly in the parliamentary sense). The legislature had limited authority, and a system of “Basic Democracies” (local bodies) was created for indirect elections. This undermined legislative supremacy as the President could legislate by ordinance and controlled many aspects of governance. In 1969, this constitution too was suspended by another military takeover (General Yahya Khan).
• 1973 Constitution: After a tumultuous period that included the secession of East Pakistan (Bangladesh) in 1971, Pakistan’s remaining political leadership approved the 1973 Constitution through a democratic process. The 1973 Constitution re-established a parliamentary federal republic. It vested all executive authority of the Federation in the office of the Prime Minister, who must be a member of Parliament and is collectively responsible (along with the Cabinet) to the Parliament (Article 91, Constitution of Pakistan 1973). It created a bicameral Parliament (Majlis-e-Shoora) consisting of the President, the National Assembly, and the Senate (Article 50). The National Assembly is directly elected and holds the bulk of legislative power, including control of money bills; the Senate (membership equally divided among provinces) provides provincial representation and can review and delay legislation (other than finance bills). At the provincial level, each province has a Governor (appointed by the federal President as representative of the federation) but more importantly an elected Provincial Assembly and a Chief Minister and cabinet responsible to that Assembly (Articles 106, 129-130). Thus, structurally, the 1973 Constitution firmly implanted the parliamentary model with sovereign legislative bodies at the center and in provinces.
• Checkered Trajectory (1977–2000s): Despite the constitutional framework, Pakistan’s democracy faced multiple disruptions. In 1977, an army coup (General Zia-ul-Haq) again dissolved the assemblies and imposed martial law. The Constitution was suspended and then selectively revived with amendments that skewed the balance of power (e.g., the Eighth Amendment in 1985 introduced Article 58(2)(b), giving the President power to dissolve the National Assembly in his discretion – a quasi-presidential feature). Throughout the late 1980s and 1990s, elected governments alternated but Presidents used 58(2)(b) several times to dissolve parliaments, demonstrating the fragility of legislative supremacy when extra-parliamentary actors assert themselves. The judiciary sometimes legitimized these dissolutions, other times reversed them, which added to an unpredictable constitutional milieu. In 1999, another coup (General Pervez Musharraf) ousted the elected government, and parliament was again rendered ineffective until elections in 2002 under a heavily amended constitution (including the Seventeenth Amendment which validated many Musharraf-era changes giving the President and military a strong hand, such as the National Security Council).
• Restoration and Strengthening of Parliament (2008–2010): The year 2008 saw a return to civilian rule, and an important reform followed in the shape of the Eighteenth Amendment (2010). This landmark amendment reversed many of the distortions introduced by past military regimes. Notably, it removed the President’s power to sack governments unilaterally (repealing Article 58(2)(b)), returning Pakistan to a more pure parliamentary form where the Prime Minister and his cabinet cannot be ousted by the President’s whims. It also gave more autonomy to provinces, abolishing the Concurrent Legislative List (so that subjects not in the Federal List now belong exclusively to provinces, reinforcing Article 142(c) on provincial legislative domain). The 18th Amendment explicitly affirmed Parliament’s supremacy by stating in Article 91 that the Prime Minister “shall be answerable to the National Assembly”. It also inserted Article 66(3) protecting parliamentary privileges and 19A granting a right to information, empowering citizens (and their representatives) to hold government accountable. Additionally, Article 6 (which declares abrogation of the Constitution to be high treason) was strengthened to discourage future coups.

Despite these constitutional safeguards, Pakistan’s parliamentary democracy continues to face challenges. Political instability, executive dominance (at times the Prime Minister’s office has overshadowed Parliament, turning the legislature into a rubber stamp), and an assertive judiciary testing the limits of its role have all posed de facto limits on legislative supremacy. The history has been checkered in the sense that the formal supremacy of the legislature often bowed to informal power centers: military rulers, presidents wielding reserve powers, or even an over-mighty bureaucracy. The next sections will examine the constitutional basis for legislative supremacy, and then how in practice it is undermined, particularly zooming in on the dynamics in Punjab province.

Constitutional Foundations: Parliament and Provincial Assemblies as Supreme Law-Making Bodies

The Constitution of Pakistan 1973, as the supreme law, lays out the structure, powers, and limits of all state organs. It unambiguously vests the legislative power in elected bodies (Parliament at the federal level, and Assemblies at the provincial level) and circumscribes executive and judicial powers to ensure a balance tilted towards representative law-making. Several key constitutional provisions underscore that legislation is the source of all state authority:

• Article 50: Establishes the composition of the federal Parliament (Majlis-e-Shoora), which consists of the President of Pakistan, the National Assembly, and the Senate. This article emphasizes that law-making at the federal level is a joint act of the two Houses and the President (the President’s assent is required for bills, except as overridden in joint sitting or in certain cases). It symbolically places the President (head of state) as part of Parliament, reflecting that even the head of state is not above or outside the legislature in law-making.
• Articles 51–58: Define the composition and electoral rules for the National Assembly, including the allocation of general seats, women’s reserved seats, and non-Muslim seats (Article 51), tenure of the Assembly (5 years, Article 52), and the election and role of the Speaker (Article 53). Importantly, Article 54 empowers the President (on advice of the Prime Minister) to summon and prorogue the National Assembly, and it also allows a certain number of members to requisition the Assembly if needed. Article 55 sets the quorum and majority voting rules (simple majority of members present and voting generally decides questions). Article 58, before its amendment, contained the President’s discretionary dissolution power, but after the 18th Amendment, Article 58 now restricts dissolution to cases where the Prime Minister so advises (or, if a vote of no-confidence is passed and no alternative government is formed, the President may dissolve – but the age of arbitrary presidential dissolution is over). These provisions collectively ensure that the life and death of the National Assembly—and by extension the federal government—lie primarily in constitutional and legislative processes, not in extraneous hands.
• Articles 59–64: Concern the Senate, which is the upper house of Parliament representing the provinces (each province has equal representation, currently 23 general seats plus technocrat and women seats, etc.). The Senate’s existence (Article 59), election of its Chairman/Deputy (Article 60), tenure (staggered terms so that the Senate is a continuing body, Article 61), and qualifications/disqualifications of members (Articles 62 and 63) are defined here. The Senate cannot be dissolved by anyone (as it has a perpetual existence with rotating membership), signifying a safeguard that some part of the legislature always remains functional. Article 64 allows a member to resign and stipulates that either House may declare a seat vacant if a member is absent for 40 consecutive days without leave. These provisions are meant to maintain the integrity and continuity of the legislature.
• Articles 66–69: Enumerate the powers, privileges, and immunities of Parliament and its members, and crucially protect the internal proceedings of Parliament from outside interference. Article 66(1) guarantees freedom of speech in Parliament and immunity of members from any court proceedings for anything said or any vote cast in the Parliament. This is a key privilege inherited from British parliamentary practice (akin to Article 9 of the UK Bill of Rights 1689) and is vital for allowing candid debate without fear of legal reprisals. Article 66(2) further states that the powers, immunities and privileges of the Parliament and its members can be defined by law, and until so defined, they shall be those which were enjoyed by the National Assembly and its members at the commencement of the Constitution (in practice, a blend of British and previous Pakistani legislative privileges). Article 67 gives each House of Parliament the power to make its own Rules of Procedure for conducting business and maintaining order. Pursuant to this, the National Assembly and Senate have detailed rulebooks governing how bills are introduced, debates held, committees formed, etc. Article 68 provides that the conduct of judges of the superior courts shall not be discussed in Parliament, a self-imposed restraint to protect the judiciary’s dignity (except when a judge is being considered for removal by due process). Article 69 is especially significant – it bars the courts from inquiring into the validity of anything said or done in Parliament in the course of proceedings. In other words, parliamentary proceedings are beyond the jurisdiction of the courts, reinforcing the doctrine of separation of powers and the autonomy of the legislature. The combined effect of Articles 66 to 69 is to cement Parliament’s supremacy within its own domain: it is master of its internal proceedings and members must be free from intimidation or external pressure in discharging their legislative functions.
• Articles 70–77 (Legislative Procedure): These set out how federal laws are made. A Bill may originate in either the National Assembly or the Senate (except Money Bills which must start in the National Assembly). Article 70 outlines the process of passage in both Houses and the mechanism of resolving disagreements via a Joint Sitting of Parliament. Article 75 deals with the President’s assent: the President can return a non-money bill once for reconsideration, but if the Parliament passes it again (with or without amendments), it becomes law without further Presidential veto. Importantly, Money Bills (defined in Article 73) do not go to the Senate for voting (the Senate can only make recommendations) and the President cannot veto a Money Bill – reflecting the classical principle that the legislature’s power over finance is supreme (more on this under financial powers below). Article 77 explicitly states no tax can be levied except by or under the authority of Act of Parliament, embodying the maxim “no taxation without representation.” Although this is about federal taxes, by extension and convention provincial taxes too must be imposed by provincial law. These procedures highlight the centrality of the legislative process and that only Parliament can enact or authorize law – the executive cannot unilaterally create a law (it may draft and propose bills, or issue temporary Ordinances under Article 89 in emergencies, but permanent legislation must be approved by the legislature). Even Ordinances are short-lived unless approved by the Assembly, reinforcing legislative supremacy.
• Provincial Assemblies (Articles 106–112, 127, etc.): The Constitution mirrors many of the parliamentary provisions at the provincial level. Article 106 establishes each Provincial Assembly’s composition (with seats for non-Muslims and women as well). They are unicameral (single house) legislatures. Article 107 fixes the term at five years for an Assembly, same as National Assembly. Article 108 provides for a Speaker and Deputy Speaker for each Provincial Assembly. Article 109 gives the Governor (the province’s figurehead constitutional head) the power to summon or prorogue the Assembly and to dissolve it on the advice of the Chief Minister (or if a no-confidence process under Article 130 fails to produce a Chief Minister, similar to the federal provision). Article 127 applies many of the same privileges of Parliament to provincial assemblies – in fact it states that until the provincial legislature makes its own law on privileges, the privileges of a provincial assembly and its members are those of the National Assembly (so Articles 66, 67, 69 protections apply mutatis mutandis at the provincial level). This ensures provincial legislators too enjoy freedom of speech and immunity for their official acts, and their proceedings are protected from judicial interference. Additionally, Article 69’s spirit covers Provincial Assembly proceedings by virtue of the general constitutional principle and Section 3 of the provincial Assemblies’ Powers & Privileges Acts that each province enacts. Thus, a Provincial Assembly is the exclusive law-giver for provincial matters and is constitutionally shielded in doing so.
• Distribution of Legislative Powers (Articles 141–144 & Fourth Schedule): Pakistan is a federation, and the Constitution divides legislative competence between the federal Parliament and provincial assemblies. Article 141 says Parliament can make laws for the whole or any part of Pakistan, and a Provincial Assembly can make laws for the province. Article 142 then specifies subjects: (a) Parliament has exclusive power for items on the Federal Legislative List (which is in the Fourth Schedule, Part I) ; (b) both Parliament and provinces can legislate on criminal law, procedure, evidence etc (a kind of shared subject); (c) Provinces have exclusive power on any matter not enumerated in the Federal List (this essentially enshrines the principle of residuary powers lying with provinces); and (d) Parliament has exclusive power for areas not forming part of any province (like Federally Administered Territories). The Fourth Schedule lists two parts: Part I has subjects like defense, foreign affairs, currency, citizenship, etc – purely federal. Part II of the Federal List enumerates subjects that are also federal but of joint governance through the Council of Common Interests (e.g. railways, minerals, oil and natural gas, electricity, regulatory authorities, etc.). The significance of this scheme is that anything not explicitly in the federal domain belongs to provincial domain. This is crucial for our discussion on Punjab: for example, public order, police, health, education, agriculture, local government, etc., are all provincial subjects after the 18th Amendment (since the old Concurrent List was abolished). Therefore, only the Punjab Assembly (or other provincial assemblies) can legislate on these matters (Article 142(c)), and the federal Parliament cannot (and by extension, the federal government cannot regulate those by executive fiat either, as that would require a law which the Parliament lacks competence to pass). We will later examine an instance where the federal executive tried to regulate a provincial subject (district administration), raising a constitutional objection under this article.
• Executive Authority Subject to Law (Articles 97 & 137): As hinted earlier, the Constitution delineates executive power in relation to legislative power. Article 97 defines the “Extent of executive authority of the Federation” and clearly ties it to Parliament’s legislative competence: “Subject to the Constitution, the executive authority of the Federation shall extend to the matters with respect to which Parliament has power to make laws…”, with a proviso that the Federation’s executive authority in a province shall not extend to matters the Provincial Assembly has power to legislate upon (except as permitted by law or constitution). Similarly, Article 137 states “the executive authority of the province extends to the matters with respect to which the Provincial Assembly has power to make laws”. These provisions encapsulate a fundamental principle: executive power is not self-generated; it is delineated and confined by law. The government can only execute in domains where a democratically enacted law (or the Constitution itself) permits action. If there is no law on a subject, the executive’s power is in limbo – it may act under general administrative powers, but it cannot impose obligations or penalties on citizens or create institutions with binding authority without a legal basis. In simpler terms, no executive action can take away rights or impose duties unless supported by legislation. The Supreme Court of Pakistan in the landmark Mustafa Impex case (2016) stressed that all statutory rules and orders are forms of subordinate legislation and “the power to enact subordinate legislation has to be conferred by substantive law”. It further observed that rules of business (which the executive frames for its internal working) are merely “procedural modalities” and cannot confer substantive power that is not rooted in an act of the legislature. This reinforces that legislative authority is the fountainhead – if Parliament or a provincial assembly has not authorized something by law, the executive branch cannot simply assume that power through its own rules or notifications. We will apply this concept when discussing how certain executive rules in Punjab purported to create departments and powers without legislative Acts.
• Judicial Authority and the Role of Legislation: While the judiciary is independent, even its jurisdiction and powers come from the Constitution and laws. For instance, Article 175 establishes the Supreme Court and High Courts, but Parliament (and in some cases provincial assemblies for lower courts) can make laws regulating court procedures and the jurisdictions of subordinate judiciary. The superior courts have the power of judicial review (e.g., Article 184(3) for Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction on fundamental rights and Article 199 for High Courts’ writ jurisdiction), which means they can strike down executive actions or even laws that are repugnant to the Constitution. However, even this function of the judiciary – to interpret law – presupposes the existence of law made by the legislature (or the Constitution). Judges do not legislate; they interpret and apply the laws and fill in gaps where necessary through principles, but they must derive their decisions from some legal text or established law. In Pakistan’s context, the judiciary has sometimes been accused of overstepping (as we will discuss), but formally the Constitution does not give courts law-making power – that remains the preserve of legislatures. In fact, Article 189 declares that Supreme Court decisions are binding on all other courts (giving them de facto the weight of precedent), and Article 201 does similar for High Court decisions within provinces, but these articles do not elevate judgments to the status of statutes; they simply ensure consistency in legal interpretation. So even here, one can infer that a court judgment cannot override the express words of a statute – if Parliament disagrees with a judicial interpretation, it can amend the law to clarify its intent. This dynamic again highlights that legislative supremacy means the final word on what the law shall be is with the legislature (subject to constitutional basic structure, etc., in some theories, but Pakistan’s courts have not formally struck down amendments on that doctrine, except implying it in certain obiter dicta).

To summarize, the constitutional text provides a robust framework for legislative supremacy: Parliament and the provincial assemblies are the primary law-making authorities, their members and proceedings enjoy special protections, and all executive power is defined and bounded by the laws those legislatures make. The executive cannot act without or against legislation; the judiciary cannot interfere in the legislative domain or question legislative procedures (Articles 68-69), nor can it legislate from the bench. The Constitution even enshrines the principle that any attempt to subvert this constitutional order (for example, a coup or unconstitutional takeover) is an act of high treason (Article 6). This indicates the framers’ intent to safeguard the supremacy of the Constitution and the democratic institutions created by it – foremost of which is the legislature as the voice of the people.

With this constitutional backdrop, one would expect Pakistan’s governance to be firmly under parliamentary control. However, the reality has often diverged from the ideal. In practice, challenges to parliamentary supremacy have arisen from multiple fronts – the executive branch itself (both political leadership and civil bureaucracy) and the judiciary – sometimes undermining the legislature’s authority or bypassing it. We now turn to these challenges, with a focus on how they manifest in the contemporary Pakistani context, especially concerning the Punjab Assembly’s powers.

Challenges to Legislative Supremacy in Pakistan: Executive Encroachment and Judicial Overreach

Despite the clear constitutional provisions outlined above, the practical landscape in Pakistan shows persistent challenges to the supremacy of the legislature. These challenges come mainly from two quarters: (1) the Executive (both the political executive – i.e., government leaders – and the permanent executive bureaucracy), and (2) the Judiciary (through expansive interpretations or direct intervention in matters arguably outside judicial purview). The result has been a dilution, at times, of the legislature’s effective power and a distortion of the separation of powers.

Executive Encroachment on Legislative Authority

In a parliamentary system like Pakistan’s, one might assume the executive would naturally be compliant to the legislature’s will, since the government is formed by the majority in the legislature. However, several factors have allowed the executive to encroach upon or diminish legislative authority in Pakistan:

1. Concentration of Power in the Political Executive: Within Pakistan’s political culture, once a Prime Minister or Chief Minister enjoys a stable majority, they often dominate the legislative agenda to the point that Parliament or Assembly becomes a rubber stamp. Ruling party legislators, bound by party discipline (especially under Article 63A which disqualifies floor-crossing), rarely deviate from the executive’s line. This weakens the legislature’s role as a forum of independent deliberation and oversight. Instead, the executive effectively uses the legislature to legitimize decisions already taken elsewhere. For example, budgets and key bills are sometimes passed with minimal debate at the behest of the government, undermining the spirit of legislative scrutiny over policy. While this is a political more than a legal encroachment, it means the executive’s preferences trump the legislature’s initiative. In extreme cases, Chief Ministers or Prime Ministers have disregarded the assembly’s importance entirely – calling sessions only to fulfill constitutional formalities and issuing ordinances or executive orders for matters ideally requiring debate. Hence, mostly, the prime ministers and the chief ministers are the leaders of the political party, and therefore, commands both legislature and executive.
2. Abuse of Ordinance Power: The executive can legislate temporarily through Ordinances when the legislature is not in session (Article 89 for President’s ordinances, Article 128 for Governor’s ordinances in provinces). This power is meant for emergencies, but historically it has been misused to bypass the legislature. During periods when the ruling party fears opposition in Parliament or simply finds it expedient, it may promulgate a slew of ordinances, essentially decrees, which take effect immediately without legislative approval. Although ordinances lapse after 90 or 120 days unless ratified by the assembly, they can be re-promulgated. This practice was particularly rampant under certain regimes, effectively sidelining Parliament’s legislative role. The superior courts eventually clamped down on ordinance re-promulgation (e.g., the Supreme Court’s judgment in Pakistan Lawyers Forum case (PLD 2005 SC 719) declared continuous re-promulgation without placing before the legislature as a fraud on the Constitution). Nonetheless, ordinance-making remains a tool of executive encroachment when abused.
3. Federal Executive vs Provincial Legislature – Jurisdictional Overreach: Pakistan’s federal government at times encroaches on matters reserved for provincial assemblies. Article 97’s proviso prohibits the federal executive from extending into provincial matters without legal sanction. However, recently we have seen instances like a federal notification purporting to regulate district administration in provinces – a matter squarely in the provincial domain (administration of districts and local government is not on the Federal Legislative List, hence falls under Article 142(c) for provinces). Such a notification by a federal ministry violates the legislative authority of provincial assemblies, in this case the Punjab Assembly, which alone can make laws for local/district administration. This kind of federal encroachment is unconstitutional unless done via proper channels (e.g., a CCI decision followed by legislation, or if a province consents under Article 144 for Parliament to legislate on a provincial matter – none of which happened for the notification in question). The federal government’s action, in essence, tried to usurp the Punjab Assembly’s legislative competence, undermining the concept of provincial autonomy and legislative supremacy enshrined in the Constitution.
4. The Dominance of the Bureaucracy (Permanent Executive): A less formally recognized but potent challenge is the role of the civil bureaucracy. Pakistan’s bureaucracy – especially the elite cadres of the Pakistan Administrative Service (PAS, formerly DMG), Police Service (PSP), etc. – often operate in a manner that sidelines elected institutions. Many bureaucratic practices are holdovers from the colonial era, when administrators wielded wide discretionary powers with little public accountability. In the parliamentary era, this continues under the surface. Bureaucrats are supposed to implement laws passed by the legislature, but they frequently end up making quasi-legislative decisions through rules, regulations, and departmental orders. The problem is acute in provinces where senior officials (like the Chief Secretary, Secretaries of departments, etc.) enjoy security of tenure and backing from the federal establishment, making provincial ministers or committees sometimes unable to rein them in. The bureaucracy’s influence can dilute legislative oversight – for example, bureaucrats might delay or refuse to provide information to Assembly committees, or implement laws in ways that alter the intent of the legislature. They might also draft laws with clauses that give excessive rule-making power to the executive, effectively leaving the real substance to be determined by themselves post-enactment (delegated legislation, discussed separately below). In Punjab, as we will detail, the office of the Chief Secretary – historically a colonial institution – has become a power center that can even override provincial legislative intent, especially when backed by federal authority (since the Chief Secretary is traditionally an officer from the federal PAS cadre posted to the province, not hired or controlled by the provincial assembly). One observer noted that “the civilian bureaucracy rules Pakistan” to a large extent, implying that decisions are often taken by bureaucrats rather than elected representatives. This obviously conflicts with democratic governance, where bureaucracy should be subordinate to the law and to the directives of elected officials.
5. Executive Influence on or Evasion of Legislative Oversight Mechanisms: In parliamentary democracies, committees are a key tool for legislatures to oversee executive action. In Pakistan, Public Accounts Committees, standing committees on various ministries, etc., exist on paper and often do useful work. However, the executive can and has minimized their effectiveness at times. For years, the government may delay the formation of committees, or ruling party members in committees may shield officials from tough questioning. Inquiry reports may not be acted upon. All of this results in weaker legislative control and more unchecked executive freedom, which can stray into the legislative realm when officials start setting policies that ought to be set by law.

A concrete case that illustrates executive encroachment in Punjab is the use of the Punjab Government Rules of Business, 2011 to effectively create governance structures without legislative input. We now examine that as a focal example, because it ties together political executive decisions, bureaucratic dominance, and sidelining of the provincial assembly’s role.

Case Study – Punjab Government Rules of Business 2011: Procedural Tool or Legislative Bypass?

Every government has Rules of Business – procedural rules made under constitutional provisions (Article 99 for the Federation, Article 139 for a Province) to allocate business among departments and regulate decision-making processes. These rules are meant to be internal guidelines for efficient administration; they are not meant to serve as substitutes for statutes or to create substantive law. Article 139 of Pakistan’s Constitution empowers the Governor of a province (on advice of the Chief Minister) to make rules for the allocation and transaction of the provincial government’s business. Accordingly, Punjab – like other provinces – has framed the Punjab Government Rules of Business, 2011 (henceforth RoB 2011).

The issue at hand is that RoB 2011 has been used (or misused) to do things that arguably require legislation by the Punjab Assembly. For example, the creation of new departments, reorganization of administrative structures, appointment of certain officers, and conferral of functions have been accomplished via executive orders under the Rules of Business, rather than through Acts of the Assembly. Let’s break down why this is problematic:

• Creating Departments and Posts Without Statute: The 1973 Constitution (as amended) makes no mention of specific provincial departments – it was expected the assemblies would create whatever departments they need via legislation or allow the government some flexibility to organize itself under the broad contours of existing laws. However, Punjab over time has grown a large number of departments (Health, Education, Agriculture, etc., including new ones as needs arose) often by executive notification. The Rules of Business provide a list of departments and allocate subjects to each. But if one asks, under what law is, say, the “Services & General Administration Department (S&GAD)” constituted and empowered? The answer often is: none, except the Rules of Business itself and decades-old practice. A recent analysis by Republic Policy Think Tank noted that “Punjab’s departments created under Rules of Business lack constitutional legitimacy. Only statutory backing through provincial assembly laws can secure the integrity of Punjab’s governance system.” In other words, every department should ideally be created by an Act of the Provincial Assembly defining its functions, hierarchy, and powers. Otherwise, the department (run by bureaucrats) does not owe its existence or accountability to the people’s representatives – it is a creature of executive convenience. The Constitutional Legitimacy of Departments in Punjab has thus been called into question on grounds that many have no legislative mandate. The executive, by relying on RoB 2011, essentially bypassed the Assembly in determining how the provincial government is structured. This is a constitutional anomaly because Article 142(c) gives the Punjab Assembly exclusive power to legislate on provincial matters (which include the organization of the provincial government itself). Moreover, Article 240(b) requires that appointments to and conditions of service of persons in connection with affairs of the province be determined by or under an Act of the provincial assembly. If departments and new posts are set up just by executive order, arguably the spirit of Article 240(b) is violated – as no Act authorized those specific offices or their terms of reference.
• Role of the Chief Secretary and Departmental Secretaries: The Rules of Business also delineate the authority of the Chief Secretary (the top bureaucrat of the province, traditionally a federally-appointed officer) and other Secretaries. In Punjab, Rule 10 of RoB 2011 and others give Secretaries powers to dispose of certain matters and even, in practice, to frame rules or take quasi-regulatory decisions. For instance, departmental Secretaries have been known to issue notifications that effectively set policy (like the case where a secretary changed advertisement fee rates in local councils, which gave rise to litigation). Critics argue that the “colonial office of Chief Secretary” is detrimental to democratic governance because it centralizes control in a non-elected official who often takes directions from federal establishment rather than the provincial legislature or even the provincial cabinet. The Chief Secretary in Punjab chairs important committees, controls transfers and postings of officials, and can influence what information or summaries reach the Chief Minister and cabinet. Essentially, if the Chief Secretary’s position is misused, he can become a viceroy-like figure, undermining both the Cabinet’s collective functioning and the Assembly’s oversight. The question of who appoints the Chief Secretary is also a constitutional grey area – by tradition it is done by the federal government (Establishment Division) posting an officer to Punjab as CS, often in consultation with the provincial CM but not always with provincial assent. A recent viewpoint contends that “the Chief Minister and the Punjab Assembly hold the exclusive prerogative to appoint the Chief Secretary” and that a federal appointment of the CS without provincial approval is against the spirit of federalism and provincial autonomy. While the Constitution’s Article 240 permits an All-Pakistan Service and by convention PAS officers can serve in provinces, nothing in the Constitution explicitly gives Islamabad the right to impose a particular Chief Secretary on a province without the provincial government’s consent. Thus, one can argue any such posting should require the confidence of the provincial executive which in turn is accountable to the Assembly. If not, it’s another lever of the federal executive encroaching on provincial matters (and by extension undermining the provincial legislature’s control over the provincial administration).
• Rules of Business vs. Statute – Legal Status: The Supreme Court in Mustafa Impex (2016) illuminated the status of Rules of Business. It held that these rules, whether federal or provincial, are constitutionally sanctioned (Art. 99 or 139) but only as subsidiary rules for internal management. They cannot override or substitute statutory requirements. Justice Saqib Nisar in that judgment noted that any deviation from Rules of Business was “fatal to the exercise of executive power”, underlining that they must be followed by the executive, but simultaneously the Court stressed that such rules do not by themselves create power – power must stem from law, and rules merely channel how it’s exercised. Indeed, Mustafa Impex invalidated a federal practice whereby the Prime Minister alone was taking decisions that constitutionally had to be taken by the federal cabinet (e.g., giving exemptions in taxation). The Court said Rule 16(2) of the Federal Rules of Business 1973, which allowed the PM to bypass cabinet, was ultra vires the Constitution. By analogy, in provinces, the Chief Minister cannot bypass the provincial cabinet for decisions assigned to “Provincial Government” (defined as CM + Cabinet per Article 130(4)-(6)). Likewise, a Chief Secretary or any individual official cannot usurp the functions of the collective that the Constitution envisages or of the legislature itself. If, for instance, the Punjab RoB allowed the Chief Minister or a Secretary to legislate through rules without assembly involvement, that portion would be unconstitutional.

The Punjab Assembly’s powers under Article 142(c) in conjunction with Fourth Schedule mean the Assembly is supreme in provincial legislative matters. The Rules of Business (made under Article 139) have a limited scope – they are procedural. They cannot be used to take away the Assembly’s “substantive power” to legislate on any subject or to negate a requirement of law. For example, if a law says a certain regulatory framework must be created by statute, the government cannot instead do it via RoB or an executive order. A pertinent example raised in the prompt is: health. Health is a provincial subject (it was in Concurrent List before 2010, now wholly provincial). Suppose the province needs to create a Health Department, define its functions (e.g., managing hospitals, medical education, regulating healthcare providers, etc.), create healthcare service cadres, allocate budget, and make policies on public health. Ideally, the Assembly should enact a Punjab Health Administration Act or similar, detailing these matters. In absence of such an Act, what happened historically is the executive, through RoB, simply assigned health-related subjects to a “Health Department” and started running it. They may issue departmental rules or notifications from time to time to manage specifics. But will that “legislation” not cover all aspects? If the Assembly were to legislate, it could comprehensively cover the creation of the department, its objectives, structure, any subordinate offices, the services (posts) required (tying into Article 240(b) on provincial services), the financial provisions (like empowering health authorities, etc.), and any penalties for violations of health regulations. That would mean all key aspects are debated and decided by representatives. When instead the executive does all this under Rules of Business, the deliberative democratic process is circumvented. One author at Republic Policy pointed out that both political and bureaucratic executives rely on the Rules of Business to create departments and make decisions, calling it “unconstitutional and legislative manipulation.” The executive (Chief Minister, Chief Secretary, etc.) thereby “seeks to bypass legislation, undermining legislative supremacy and accountability.” This is a serious assertion: it implies that the very governance structure of Punjab in many sectors is running on inertia and executive fiats rather than solid legal foundations passed by the Assembly. Such a scenario weakens checks and balances, because if a department acts without a statute, it’s harder for legislators to question it (there is no law to measure its actions against, only general policy or executive directives). It also confuses accountability: the bureaucrats might claim they are just following Rules of Business (which the Assembly didn’t exactly approve, since RoB are issued by executive order), and the ministers might claim they inherited these structures and can’t quickly legislate everything anew – resulting in a democratic deficit.

To concretely answer: How can the Rules of Business under Article 139, with limited scope, violate Article 142(c) read with Fourth Schedule? The Rules themselves do not formally violate it – they are allowed to exist. The violation occurs when the executive uses those Rules to do things that amount to legislating on a matter, without going through the Assembly. If, for example, the Punjab government under RoB 2011 established a new Department of Price Control (hypothetically) and gave it authority to issue binding orders to businesses, that is effectively creating a law (affecting citizens’ rights/obligations) without Assembly approval. That would breach Article 142(c) because only the Assembly can make such law for province. Indeed, very recently in 2025, the Punjab government created via an executive notification a “Price Control and Prevention of Profiteering Department”. If that was not backed by a statute (and it wasn’t initially, to public knowledge), it stands on shaky constitutional ground.

The Mustafa Impex decision gives judicial weight to this critique: it noted that rules of business are important for good governance but cannot control or override primary legislation. It emphasized that any power exercised by the executive must trace back to a law. Thus, “no executive order under any provision can violate the substantive power of [the Assembly] in legislation.” If an executive order (whether a Rule of Business or a directive) contravenes a statute or encroaches on an area that should be regulated by statute, it is invalid. The Lahore High Court’s recent judgment in December 2024 (cited in Dawn) took a slightly different tone, upholding that the Rules of Business have “constitutional backing” under Article 139 and are binding for administrative efficiency. But even that judgment did not say Rules of Business can override legislation; it simply said they must be followed and they guide governance. The same judgment cited Mustafa Impex to show rules are crucial for good governance, but one must note Mustafa Impex actually curtailed the misuse of rules by clarifying the need for collective decisions and statutory basis. Thus, there is no real conflict: rules of business are fine as long as they are within the bounds of law and constitution. Once they are misused to assume legislative functions, they are in violation.

In summary, the Punjab Government Rules of Business 2011 have become a double-edged sword: they are necessary for daily government work, yet their over-extension has resulted in a shadow governance structure not directly accountable to or authorized by the Punjab Assembly. Restoring the correct balance would require the Assembly to proactively legislate on matters currently left to executive discretion and to strictly oversee that the executive’s use of RoB stays within procedural limits.

Delegated Legislation: Necessary Evil and its Abuse

Modern governance is complex, and legislatures often pass laws that delegate detailed rule-making to the executive. This is known as delegated legislation – rules, regulations, by-laws, etc., made by the executive under authority given to it by a statute. Delegated legislation itself is not undesirable; it allows technical details to be filled in and adjusted without enacting a new law for every minor change. However, there are two concerns: (1) delegation without proper limits or guidelines can lead to the executive effectively making policy choices that the legislature should have made; and (2) worse, sometimes the executive issues regulations without any proper parent law, essentially acting ultra vires.

In Pakistan, delegated legislation is common in both federal and provincial contexts. A classic example is a law that says “the government may make rules to carry out the purposes of this Act.” Under such a clause, ministries and departments draft rules that have legal force (once published, often in the official gazette). These rules can affect rights and obligations, so they are quasi-legislative. Ideally, delegated legislation should be within the confines of authority granted by the Act – if rules go beyond or against the Act, courts can strike them down as ultra vires. The legislature is supposed to supervise this by perhaps inserting requirements like laying rules before the Assembly, or having sunset clauses.

The abuse happens when either: – Overbroad Delegation: Laws that give excessively broad powers to the executive to issue any rules, sometimes even to amend schedules or impose penalties, etc., without further reference to the legislature. This can blur the line of separation, making it easy for the executive to assume essentially legislative powers. In Pakistan, laws have occasionally given blanket powers to issue “orders” that are treated like law (for instance, the Defence of Pakistan Rules under emergency laws, or recent pandemic-related orders under the Epidemic Diseases Act which was very short and left almost everything to executive orders).

• Delegation Without Law: This refers to scenarios we discussed under Rules of Business, where the executive acts with no supporting statute at all. For example, if a provincial government starts a new policy programme and ‘orders’ something to citizens (like restrict business hours) without any law empowering it, that is legislation without legislature. The judiciary has sometimes quashed such orders for lack of lawful authority, but other times if not challenged, they persist.

In Punjab’s case, delegated legislation with law can be seen in numerous Acts where rule-making power is given (say, the Food Authority Act allows government to make regulations on food hygiene). If those regulations overstep (like banning something not banned by the Act), then it’s a usurpation of legislative intent. Delegated legislation without law is akin to what we described with departments or the case of the federal notification on district administration – no law authorized it, so it is unlawful.

One prominent outcome of Mustafa Impex is the insistence that even delegated legislation must get proper approval (by cabinet) and must be rooted in a statute. The SC noted that many fiscal SROs (Statutory Regulatory Orders) in taxation were issued just on minister or official’s whim, but going forward, because those affect the public, they should come through collective decision and within scope of law. The judgment also triggered amendments requiring many such orders to get parliamentary assent post-facto. This indicates a move to re-empower the legislature even in delegated matters.

In context of Punjab Assembly: it should ensure that if it delegates rule-making to the executive in any Act, it also establishes checks – for instance, requiring that rules be placed before the Assembly or a committee for review (some laws do have “rules to be laid on table for x days and subject to modification by Assembly” type clauses). If the Assembly doesn’t assert this right, the bureaucracy will fill the void with rules that can substantially shape the law’s effect – effectively usurping the Assembly’s right to determine the law’s intent and limits.

One may argue that the real authority as per Constitution is legislative authority – the Executive only carries out what the legislature enacts. Article 137 (provincial executive authority extends to matters Provincial Assembly can legislate) implies if there is no legislation on a matter, the provincial executive’s power to act is at best implicit or constrained. It cannot, for example, impose a new tax or fee or create a crime or penalty without a law. If it tries to, that action is void for want of authority. Thus, whenever an administrative department in Punjab makes rules or decisions not grounded in any law passed by the Assembly, it violates constitutional principles and infringes on the Assembly’s domain.

Judicial Overreach into Legislative and Executive Domains

An equally significant challenge to parliamentary supremacy in Pakistan is the judiciary’s interaction with legislation. The higher judiciary – especially the Supreme Court – has in recent years been very active in public affairs, often through suo motu notices and expansive interpretation of fundamental rights under Article 184(3) of the Constitution. While judicial review is essential to check unconstitutional laws or executive abuses, concerns arise when courts start to substitute their wisdom for that of the legislature, or when they venture into making policy via judgments.

Instances of perceived judicial overreach include:

• Striking Down Laws and Amendments: The superior courts have struck down parliamentary acts on various grounds (violating fundamental rights, etc.), which is within their mandate, but sometimes controversially. For example, the Supreme Court nullified parts of the 18th and 21st Amendments related to judges’ appointment and military courts respectively in 2015, albeit upholding the main provisions but asserting the power to review even constitutional amendments in certain extreme cases. This was seen by some as the Court claiming the role of ultimate arbiter beyond what the text explicitly allowed, since the Constitution did not have a clear “basic structure doctrine” clause. If courts frequently invalidate laws, it can create a perception that judges, not elected lawmakers, have the final say on policy. Of course, if laws do infringe rights or the Constitution, the courts must act – but the balance is delicate. The key is that courts shouldn’t encroach on policy choices simply because they think differently, unless a legal breach is clear.
• Interpreting “Intent of Legislature”: Courts often say their job in interpretation is to effectuate the intent of the legislature. However, when intent is not clear, judges may inject their own views. The user’s question pointedly asks, “How can [the Supreme Court] dissect the intent of the legislature? They don’t legislate laws, so how can they interpret them?” The answer in theory: interpretation is a judicial function; courts are trained to interpret language of statutes. But the criticism arises when courts possibly go beyond interpretation into re-writing. For instance, if a law is ambiguous, the court may choose an interpretation that effectively creates new obligations not expressly stated, arguably making new law. A notable case was the Supreme Court’s interpretation of election laws and the Constitution to insert a “Sadiq and Ameen” (honest and righteous) standard for lifetime disqualification of lawmakers under Article 62(1)(f) – something not clearly defined by the legislature. The result was several politicians barred for life by judicial decree, which some legal scholars felt was the judiciary overstepping, since Parliament itself had not stipulated the length of disqualification. Similarly, the superior courts occasionally issue policy directives (e.g., ordering traffic reforms, policing measures, environmental regulations, etc.) in the absence of legislation, citing constitutional provisions of “right to life” etc. While motivated by genuine issues, this can be seen as courts doing the job of legislatures or executives, which muddies accountability – bureaucrats may follow the court order as if it’s law, circumventing the usual legislative process. Indeed, it’s said in Pakistan that “Supreme Court judgments are taken as law more effective than constitutional and legislative law”. This is an exaggeration (since a judgment cannot actually overturn the Constitution or a statute unless it declares the statute unconstitutional), but it reflects a feeling that when the SC issues a directive (for example, banning commercial activities in parks, or requiring certain educational curriculum changes), the government and society implement it more readily than they would a statute, perhaps out of fear of contempt. Thus, judicial decisions sometimes have de facto more force than a law passed by Assembly, especially if the law is not enforced but the court monitors its orders strictly. This upsets the expected order where the legislature’s enacted law should be supreme so long as it is constitutional.
• Intrusion into Parliamentary Privilege or Executive Prerogative: Although Article 69 bars courts from questioning parliamentary proceedings, there have been instances where courts indirectly involved themselves. For example, during political crises, courts have been asked to adjudicate on the validity of Assembly rulings (e.g., the Supreme Court in 2022 intervened when the National Assembly Deputy Speaker dismissed a no-confidence motion on dubious constitutional grounds; the Court declared that act unconstitutional and restored the Assembly). One can argue that was actually upholding the Constitution and hence supporting parliamentary democracy (preventing an executive-led attempt to dissolve the Assembly illegally). However, other instances, like High Courts entertaining petitions against parliamentary committee investigations or summoning lawmakers for judicial inquiries, have raised eyebrows. Generally, Pakistani courts have respected Article 69, but there’s a fine line when, say, legislatures misuse privilege to shield actions – courts then have to ensure fundamental rights aren’t breached.

In terms of legislative supremacy, the bottom line is: Judges interpret laws; they don’t make them. But if the legislature is passive or dysfunctional, the judiciary might fill the void, which is not ideal for democracy. The correct approach in a healthy democracy is for the legislature to proactively address issues via law, leaving less room for judicial interventions. When the judiciary, through activism, starts becoming the go-to problem solver, it inadvertently diminishes the stature of the legislature and may discourage lawmakers from taking initiative (some might prefer the court to handle a hot potato issue). For example, instead of Parliament passing robust laws on accountability, courts and accountability agencies end up trying to manage via interpretations of existing law – often leading to inconsistent outcomes.

To reconcile these tensions, it’s important to reaffirm: the law as passed by the legislature is supreme, and courts must interpret it faithfully. If the legislature disagrees with a court’s interpretation, it has the power to amend the law or even amend the Constitution (within broad limits) to clarify the intended meaning. This dynamic ensures that in the long run, the democratically elected representatives have the final say on what the law shall be.

Pakistani Parliament has occasionally exercised this power – e.g., after some court decisions on anti-terrorism laws or the scope of certain constitutional provisions, Parliament passed amendments or new laws addressing the points. The tussle is ongoing, but if Parliament remains active and assertive, the balance can be maintained. On the provincial level, provincial assemblies too can respond to High Court decisions that interpret provincial statutes in an unintended way by amending those laws.

In conclusion on this point: the judiciary plays a vital checking role but must be careful not to encroach on legislative terrain. The best solution to avoid judiciary legislating from the bench is for the legislature to do its job comprehensively, and for the judiciary to exercise restraint and respect the policy choices made by the law-makers unless they clearly violate constitutional mandates.

Having identified how both the executive and judiciary can encroach on legislative supremacy, the next part of this analysis zeroes in on the Provincial Assembly of the Punjab, illustrating concretely how its constitutional powers have been challenged by these encroachments and what can be done about it.

The Punjab Assembly: Powers, Encroachments, and the Struggle for Supremacy

The Provincial Assembly of the Punjab is the largest provincial legislature in Pakistan and, under the Constitution, wields extensive powers over Punjab’s affairs. As established earlier, Article 142(c) grants the Punjab Assembly exclusive legislative competence over matters not on the federal list – which covers a vast array of subjects critical to governance and daily life in the province. Additionally, the Assembly has control over provincial finance (budget, taxation for provincial subjects, borrowing within constitutional limits), oversight of the provincial executive, and the ability to shape the civil service structure of the province (per Article 240(b)). In theory, the Punjab Assembly should be the uncontested supreme law-giver for Punjab, with the provincial government executing its laws and the courts ensuring legality.

However, in practice, the Punjab Assembly’s mandate has been violated or usurped by various actors and factors. Let us enumerate what powers the Punjab Assembly has, which of those are being usurped or undermined, and how:

Legislative Powers of the Punjab Assembly (and Their Constitutional Basis)

1. General Legislation for Province: The Punjab Assembly can make laws on all subjects except those items on the Federal Legislative List. This includes criminal law and procedure (concurrently with Parliament), civil law governing contracts, property, family law, etc. (now mostly provincial after the end of the concurrent list), and all socio-economic sectors like health, education, agriculture, irrigation, local government, etc. (Fourth Schedule + residuary powers). Article 141 states a Provincial Assembly can make laws “for the Province or any part thereof”. Article 143 clarifies if a provincial law conflicts with a valid federal law on a federal or concurrent subject, the federal law prevails. But on pure provincial subjects, the provincial law is supreme in that jurisdiction.
2. Power of the Purse (Financial Legislation): The Punjab Assembly has the sole authority to authorize provincial expenditures and taxation. As at the federal level by Article 77, at the provincial level Article 118-119 establish the Provincial Consolidated Fund, comprising all provincial revenues. Money can only be withdrawn from this Fund under an appropriation made by the Assembly through a budget or supplementary grants (Articles 120-124). Article 115 requires that Money Bills (like budget, tax laws) originate in the Provincial Assembly and cannot be introduced without the Governor’s recommendation (similar to federal process with President) but ultimately it is the Assembly that must pass the budget. Article 123 allows for votes on account if budget is delayed, but again by the Assembly. No new tax or duty can be levied by the province except under the authority of provincial law (implied by reading Article 77 with 142 and 137). In summary, the Assembly controls taxation and expenditure – the executive cannot tax citizens on its own, nor spend public money without legislative approval in a budget law. This “power of the purse” is a cornerstone of legislative supremacy since the days of the Magna Carta – it ensures government’s plans must have the consent of the people’s representatives, especially on matters of public funds.
3. Provincial Civil Service and Appointments: Article 240(b) we have discussed, which explicitly says appointments to and conditions of service of persons in connection with affairs of a province (which includes provincial civil servants, officers, etc.) shall be determined by or under an Act of the Provincial Assembly. This is a critical power. It means how the bureaucracy of Punjab is hired, promoted, disciplined, and what posts exist is ultimately to be decided by provincial law. To implement this, Punjab has the Punjab Civil Servants Act and related statutes, but many details are left to rules (delegated to the executive). Still, any major changes or creation of new services should get legislative sanction. Importantly, if Punjab wanted to establish its own higher civil services, it could legislate to do so (subject to not violating any federal law on All-Pakistan Services).
4. Privileges and Immunities: The Punjab Assembly has inherent privileges akin to Parliament (via Article 127 referencing Article 66, 69, etc.). It can enact its own Privileges Act. In fact, Punjab in 2022 enacted a new Provincial Assembly of the Punjab Privileges Act, 2022, which spells out privileges of members (e.g., freedom from arrest in certain days around a session except with Speaker’s permission, etc.). The Assembly can also punish for contempt or breach of privilege. These powers are there to ensure the Assembly can function independently and not be impeded by the executive or any external force.
5. Oversight and Other Functions: While not exactly “powers” in a legal sense, the Assembly has a role in executive formation (electing the Chief Minister, who must report to it), and oversight through questions, motions, committees, etc. It doesn’t administer but through these tools it can influence policy and hold the government accountable to the people’s will under article 130 (6).

Encroachments and Violations of Punjab Assembly’s Powers

Now, how are these powers being usurped or undermined?

1. Executive Dominance in Lawmaking: As touched upon, if the ruling party holds a majority, the legislative initiative often lies with the executive (Cabinet drafts most bills). That alone is normal in parliamentary systems, but in Punjab there have been instances of lawmaking via Ordinances without urgent need, thereby cutting out the Assembly’s debating role. Also, sometimes significant agreements or policies (with financial implications) are made by the Punjab government without prior approval of the Assembly – for example, entering into long-term agreements, giving sovereign guarantees or commitments that ideally should get Assembly ratification. This informal encroachment means the Assembly is confronted with faits accomplis. A classic example is how provincial budgets get crafted largely by the Finance Department and approved by Cabinet, then presented to Assembly where ruling party ensures passage with few changes. If opposition is weak or cut out of the process, the Assembly’s power of the purse diminishes to formality. In recent times, supplementary budgets (expenditures beyond original budget) in Punjab have sometimes been huge, reflecting that the government spent money first and only later sought Assembly approval en bloc – which again is technically legal if they present it as supplementary budget, but it prevents meaningful legislative control as the money has already been spent.
2. Federal Usurpation of Provincial Domain: The recent case of the district administration notification by the federal government exemplifies direct violation. District administration (essentially the local implementation of law and order and development) is a provincial subject. If Islamabad issues any directives or creates any structure for districts (like federal-controlled district setup), it’s acting ultra vires of Article 97’s limitation and Article 142. For example, suppose the federal government tried to place federal officers in charge of district administration (reviving something like the former “Deputy Commissioner” system under federal control). That would encroach on Punjab’s right to administer its own areas. The Constitution provides one mechanism for joint action on some subjects: the Council of Common Interests (CCI) under Articles 153-154 for subjects in Part II of Federal List (which require concurrent management). The CCI includes the Chief Ministers and equal federal ministers, so Punjab’s CM is a member and can represent Punjab’s interests. However, even in CCI, if a decision is taken, say about a Part II subject like electricity or railways, the implementation might still be via federal or provincial legislation as appropriate. The user’s prompt complains that CCI decisions are taken without endorsement of the Punjab Assembly. Indeed, there is no formal requirement for a provincial assembly to ratify a CCI decision; once the CCI (a constitutional body) makes a decision (by majority), it is binding on both the federation and provinces (Article 154(7)). This could be viewed as undermining the provincial assembly if the CCI agreed to a policy that requires provincial action. For example, if the CCI decided on a new water distribution accord or a curriculum scheme, Punjab’s CM might agree, but the Punjab Assembly wasn’t consulted. Ideally, a wise CM would brief the Assembly or get a resolution to strengthen his mandate, but it’s not mandatory. Here again, the executive (CM) could bypass the Assembly by committing to policies in CCI. Perhaps a remedy could be to amend rules so that provincial CMs seek Assembly approval for major CCI decisions, but that’s not currently required. So this is another subtle reduction of Assembly’s supremacy – inter-governmental decisions taken by executives collectively overshadow the legislature’s role.
3. The Civil Service Appointments and Cadre Issue:

 “How can the federal Establishment Division reserve provincial posts? How can federal PAS, PSP and PAAS work on provincial posts? Is this not taking powers of the Punjab Assembly?”

The posting of PAS, PSP, and PAAS officers on provincial posts is unconstitutional as it directly violates Article 240(b) of the Constitution, which grants the exclusive prerogative of regulating services and posts of a province to the respective Provincial Assembly. The very concept of “reservation of posts” — a colonial-era scheme through which specific cadres monopolized the most lucrative positions across federal, provincial, and local governments — was abolished by the Indian Independence Act of 1947, upon the recommendation of Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah. Section 10 of that Act ended the practice to allow the newly independent states to develop their own civil services. Unfortunately, this discredited scheme was revived in 1954 through the creation of the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) by an extra-legal agreement, which was resisted by East Bengal and Sindh on the grounds that it undermined provincial autonomy. The scheme essentially empowers a centralized cadre to dominate posts beyond its constitutional domain, placing PAS officers as federal and provincial secretaries, commissioners, and other positions meant for provincial cadres. This arrangement not only breaches administrative and constitutional boundaries but also weakens local governments and denies provinces their legislative mandate. Article 240(b) clearly states that posts “in connection with the affairs of a province” must be regulated only “by or under Act of the Provincial Assembly.” Similarly, Articles 97 and 137 confine federal executive authority, preventing it from extending to provincial matters. Thus, no statutory regulatory order (SRO) or customary practice can legally reserve provincial or local government posts for a federal service. The persistence of this colonial-inspired arrangement represents a fundamental violation of Pakistan’s federal and parliamentary constitutional framework.

One could argue an indirect encroachment: the Chief Secretary and IG (Inspector General of Police) being federal appointees owe allegiance to federal government more than provincial elected leadership. This was evident in the 2022 episode where during the Governor’s rule controversy, the Punjab Chief Secretary and IG followed federal instructions, not the (removed) Chief Minister’s, leading commentators to dub it a “federal coup” in Punjab. That scenario demonstrated that when push comes to shove, a federal government can use these officers to undermine a provincial government’s writ, which also means undermining the Assembly’s choice (since the Assembly elects the CM, and if bureaucrats help remove or defy the CM, they indirectly defy the Assembly’s mandate). Thus, the Assembly’s supremacy is eroded if its chosen executive head is countermanded by officers not accountable to that Assembly. Hence, all provincial posts and civil services are constitutional prerogative of the Punjab assembly, and federal government can not override the legislative powers of the Punjab assembly.

1. Encroachment by Provincial Executive – Punjab Cabinet and Chief Minister vs Assembly: Within Punjab, the political executive sometimes oversteps legislative authority. For example, if the Chief Minister issues directives or uses discretionary funds in ways not approved by law, or the Cabinet makes decisions that effectively change existing laws without consulting Assembly. There was the example of Mustafa Impex at the federal level; similarly at provincial level, originally often Chief Ministers took solo decisions (one-person show) ignoring their cabinets, until courts started insisting on collective responsibility (Article 130(6) – the provincial cabinet is jointly responsible to Assembly). A Republic Policy article titled “Chief Minister, Not Chief Secretary, is Executive” argued that the Constitution leaves no ambiguity that the elected Chief Minister (and Cabinet) should wield executive power and be accountable to the Assembly, not unelected officials. It emphasized Article 130(6) which indeed says “the Cabinet shall be collectively responsible to the Provincial Assembly”. If the CM by-passes the Assembly or the Cabinet by relying on just the Chief Secretary or a coterie of advisers, he weakens the chain of accountability that runs from bureaucracy -> minister -> Assembly. Under proper parliamentary norms, every significant decision of government should be defensible on the Assembly floor by the responsible minister, and if not, the government faces criticism or motions. When decisions instead come as edicts from on high or from bureaucracy without even ministers knowing, the Assembly cannot effectively oversee. In Punjab, some Chief Ministers (notably in the past like Shahbaz Sharif) were known for centralized style – running administration via the Chief Secretary and a few officers, and relying more on personal monitoring than institutional processes. While efficiency might have been a motive, the trade-off was legislative input was minimal in those initiatives (e.g., large development projects were conceived and executed by the executive with Assembly simply asked to approve budget).
2. Breach of Legislative Privileges by Executive Agencies: A glaring violation is when law enforcement or agencies subject lawmakers to harassment or obstruction in a manner violating Article 66/127 privileges. The Punjab Assembly has, for instance, faced incidents where police entered the Assembly Hall (as discussed for 16 April 2022 incident). Members have been arrested or intimidated during budget sessions or crucial votes (sometimes on federal level too, as seen in past no-confidence motions where opposition alleged members were coerced). While being an MPA does not give blanket immunity from criminal law, the Privileges Act and customs say if a session is ongoing, any arrest should have Speaker’s approval or at least intimation. Law enforcement’s disregard for this is an affront to the Assembly’s supremacy. In one case, Punjab Police even registered FIRs against some MPAs for ruckus in Assembly – something arguably internal to Assembly that should be dealt with by privilege committee, not police. Such interference clearly undermines the Assembly’s autonomy. The Tribune news about IGP being called by privilege committee indicates the Assembly asserting itself in that regard.

Another facet is intelligence or accountability agencies surveilling or arresting legislators under charges which may sometimes be seen as politically motivated. While accountability is good, if it’s selective or timed to influence legislative proceedings (like detaining an opposition leader right before a key vote), it crosses into privilege territory. Article 66 was meant to guard against exactly the Crown or government arresting MPs to affect parliamentary votes (a tactic used in old British kings’ times). Pakistan has seen echoes of that when opposition lawmakers have been incarcerated during important sessions, weakening the opposition’s vote count.

1. Judicial Interference in Provincial Legislation: We have covered how judiciary can encroach. Specific to Punjab: the judiciary (Lahore High Court or Supreme Court) has sometimes stayed implementation of provincial statutes or projects. For instance, the LHC struck down a law or two passed by Punjab Assembly on grounds of legislative competence or rights (e.g., laws on local government or on a provincial authority). If done rightly under constitution, that’s their role, but executive agencies often then comply more with court orders than heed Assembly resolutions. Also, sometimes when Assembly’s privilege is breached and they try to punish someone (like a bureaucrat or journalist for contempt of house), the courts intervene under fundamental rights to protect that person. That creates a conflict between judicial enforcement of rights and legislative privilege. In 2021, for example, the Senate’s privilege motion against journalists led to court stay orders, reflecting this tension. In Punjab, the new Privileges Act 2022 was challenged in court by journalists as it had jail terms for breach of privilege by media; the court suspended some clauses. These are sensitive issues requiring balance, but from the Assembly’s vantage, its decision was halted by judiciary. The resolution lies in dialogue or amending problematic clauses, but it shows the Assembly cannot act in absolute supremacy if courts see a constitutional violation. That said, this is check-and-balance, not purely usurpation.

Reclaiming the Punjab Assembly’s Powers: Recommendations and Strategies

Given the analysis above, it is evident the Punjab Assembly’s constitutionally granted powers have been compromised over time. What can be done to restore and ensure the Assembly’s rightful supremacy in provincial governance? The solutions span legal, institutional, and political realms:

1. Assert Legislative Authority through New Laws: The Punjab Assembly should pro-actively pass legislation in areas that have been left to executive discretion. For example:
2. Pass a Provincial Government Organization Act that formally establishes each department of the Punjab government, along with its functions and how its secretary is appointed. This would give a statutory basis to departments currently just listed in Rules of Business. It can also clarify limits – e.g., no department can issue regulations with penal consequences without Assembly’s consent.
3. The Provincial Assembly of Punjab must ensure the strict implementation of Article 240(b) of the Constitution. This provision explicitly safeguards the legislative autonomy of the province in matters relating to the terms and conditions of provincial services. However, the federal government, acting through the Establishment Division, continues to violate this constitutional mandate by unilaterally posting officers from federal services such as PAS, PSP, and PAAS against purely provincial posts. Such actions amount to an encroachment upon the exclusive legislative authority of the Punjab Assembly. By issuing federal notifications for appointments on provincial posts—including the appointment of the Chief Secretary and Inspector General—the federal government effectively usurps the constitutional domain of the province. This not only undermines Article 240(b) but also contravenes the Punjab Civil Services Act, 1974, which was legislated to regulate provincial services in line with provincial autonomy. Furthermore, the reservation of provincial posts for so-called “All Pakistan Services” has no constitutional or legal basis after the enactment of Article 240(b) and the PCS Act, 1974. It represents a continuation of a centralist and colonial scheme that is directly in conflict with the federal structure enshrined in the Constitution. Accordingly, the Standing Committee of the Punjab Assembly on Services and General Administration Department (S&GAD) must exercise its oversight role and call into question all federal notifications relating to provincial posts. The Assembly is legally and constitutionally empowered to assert its exclusive jurisdiction over provincial services and to ensure that the federal government refrains from undermining the province’s legislative authority under Article 240(b).

4. Enact a Delegated Legislation Scrutiny Act, requiring that any rule or regulation made under a Punjab Act must be laid before the Assembly (perhaps in a committee) within a certain period, and the Assembly can amend or annul it via resolution. Some countries and even the Senate of Pakistan have committees on delegated legislation for this purpose. Such a mechanism in Punjab Assembly would keep bureaucratic rule-making in check and ensure legislative oversight on the content of delegated legislation.

1. Strengthen local governance through legislation so that certain decisions shift closer to people (e.g., empower elected local councils to oversee district administration). This doesn’t directly enlarge Assembly’s power, but it aligns with democratic dispersion of power, reducing the monopoly of bureaucrats. Also, by statute, define the limits of policing powers in Assembly premises – codify that police cannot enter without Speaker’s request, etc., to prevent future breaches like April 16 incident. (Though that’s already in Rules of Procedure likely, a statute would give it more teeth).
2. Amend the Rules of Business via Assembly Pressure: While Rules of Business are made by executive, the Assembly can pass a resolution or communicate suggestions for changes to ensure they don’t undermine legislative authority. For instance, Punjab Assembly could demand that under RoB 2011, any proposal for new legislation must be shared with relevant Assembly committee in draft form before approval by Cabinet – increasing input from legislators. It could also insist that Rules of Business include a provision that any significant policy decision of a department be reported to the Assembly (even if not legally required, as a convention). The Assembly’s Standing Committees should scrutinize departmental activities regularly and can recommend changes to how departments operate – these recommendations, if taken seriously by the government, could lead to amendments in RoB or new laws. Essentially, through committee reports and resolutions, the Assembly can shine light on where bureaucracy is overstepping and call for correction. And, lastly, if rules of business, bypass the legislative authority of the Punjab Assembly, the Punjab assembly may legislate on the usurped powers. The Punjab Assembly can legislate a Regulation of ROB act.
3. Enhance the Role of Assembly Committees: A vibrant committee system is the “engine room” of a legislature. Punjab Assembly should empower its committees to summon any departmental officials, demand papers, and question policy implementation in depth. If a department is functioning without a law (e.g., “Department X exists only in RoB, no Act”), the committee can flag this and urge legislation. The Public Accounts Committee (PAC) should be strong to catch any off-budget spending or misappropriation (which if addressed, prevents executive from doing things without approval). Committees on Privileges can take up breaches quickly and assert Assembly’s rights (though as seen, they tried with IGP but ended up withdrawing notice under pressure; perhaps next time handle it more deftly or get political consensus before such confrontation).
4. Improve Executive Oversight Mechanisms: The Assembly can use tools like Question Hour, Call Attention Notices, Adjournment Motions effectively to keep the government answerable. If, for example, an MPA asks, “Under what law is Department of XYZ operating?” it forces the government to either cite one or concede none and perhaps commit to bringing a law. Repeated questioning of bureaucratic actions can deter unilateral moves. Additionally, requiring the Chief Minister to regularly attend Assembly QA sessions (in the UK, PM’s Question Time is a big accountability moment) could be instituted as a norm. The CM answering directly about executive actions underscores that the executive is subordinate to the Assembly, not aloof.
5. Political Consensus on Institutional Interests: Perhaps the most challenging but crucial remedy – members of the Assembly, across party lines, need to sometimes rise above partisan loyalties to protect the institution’s prerogatives. Often, treasury benches don’t mind executive dominance because it’s “their” government, and opposition alone can’t push back effectively. But all MPAs have a vested interest in preserving the Assembly’s authority (since one day roles can reverse; also individually they get more respect if the Assembly is powerful). For instance, both government and opposition members could agree on certain bipartisan measures: passing the laws discussed above, jointly resisting federal encroachments regardless of which party rules in Islamabad, and upholding privileges (no member should support unlawful arrest of another just because he’s opposition). If backbenchers act as legislators first, not as mere party foot soldiers, they can influence their leadership to value the Assembly. This might mean sometimes saying no to their own Chief Minister if he bypasses the house. Admittedly, party discipline is strong, but within party caucuses, members can voice concerns. We’ve seen in some democracies, even ruling party MPs insist on more say – Pakistani legislatures need that culture. Without internal push from MPAs, reforms will be half-hearted.
6. Judicial Respect for Legislative Domain: On the other side, the Assembly can also engage with the judiciary to delineate boundaries. If the Punjab Assembly feels courts are too frequently striking down its acts or staying its privilege actions, it could file references or petitions in Supreme Court to seek clearer demarcation of privilege vs rights, etc. Also, the Assembly can ensure its laws are well-drafted and within power, to withstand judicial review. Perhaps create a Legislative Research and Legal Affairs Unit in the Assembly secretariat that vets bills for constitutional compliance and monitors court cases affecting Assembly laws. By being legally robust, the Assembly’s output will face fewer interventions.
7. Utilize Constitutional Forums: The Assembly can formally address grievances through constitutional forums – for instance, if federal actions are impinging on provincial autonomy (like that district admin notification), the Punjab Assembly (or government) can take it to the Council of Common Interests or even to the Supreme Court under Article 184(1) original jurisdiction for inter-government disputes. Successful pushback in those forums would set precedents deterring future interference. The Assembly can also pass resolutions appealing the federal government to refrain from encroachment or to consult provincial assemblies on certain matters (like when formulating national policies that touch provincial subjects). While resolutions aren’t binding, they make a political statement.
8. Public Outreach and Transparency: A rather indirect but vital strategy – make the workings of Punjab Assembly more transparent and known to public. If citizens understand that their welfare issues hinge on decisions in the Assembly (and not just on bureaucratic orders or court cases), they will value the Assembly’s role. A public that values its legislature will pressure the executive and judiciary to respect it. The Assembly could publish yearly reports of how many laws passed, areas where executive didn’t comply, etc. Local media and civil society should be engaged to highlight instances of executive overreach in Punjab. This creates a narrative where taking power away from Assembly is seen as denying people’s rights. Conversely, when Assembly asserts itself to improve governance, celebrate those wins publicly.

In summary, the Punjab Assembly can take back its inherent powers through a combination of robust lawmaking, stricter oversight of the executive, inter-institutional assertiveness, and political unity on institutional integrity.

It is worth noting that this is not just a power struggle for its own sake – it is about good governance and the will of the people. When the Assembly is supreme and functioning, governance tends to be more accountable and aligned with public needs. Bureaucratic or judicial rule, however well-intentioned, lacks direct public input and can become unresponsive or high-handed.

Conclusion

Parliamentary democracy, as enshrined in Pakistan’s Constitution, rests on the bedrock of legislative supremacy. The genuine concept of democracy we began with – that the people govern themselves through chosen representatives – means that those representatives in the legislature must hold the ultimate authority to shape laws and policy. In a parliamentary system, the legislature’s supremacy is balanced by a responsible executive and an independent judiciary, but neither of those branches can usurp the law-making power or the representative accountability that the legislature embodies.

Our exploration of Pakistan’s constitutional framework (particularly Articles 1–7 and other key provisions) revealed a clear design: sovereignty belongs to Almighty Allah but is a trust exercised by the people through their representatives[1], Pakistan shall be a Federation with autonomous provincial legislatures, and no organ of state may transcend the limits set by the Constitution and the law. The legislature (Parliament or a provincial assembly) is the source of law, the executive carries it out, and the judiciary guards the constitutional boundaries – a classic separation but with the legislature at the core. Pakistan’s history, however, shows that maintaining this equilibrium is an ongoing challenge, with frequent tilts in power dynamics.

Focusing on the Punjab Assembly as a microcosm, we identified how its legislative sanctity has been challenged by executive overreach – both by the federal level, and by the provincial bureaucratic frameworks – and by a judicial assertiveness that at times stepped into legislative shoes. We discussed how Rules of Business became a tool for bypassing statutory processes, how the posting of a federal Chief Secretary and other officers in Punjab diluted provincial autonomy, and how even well-meaning judicial interventions could inadvertently diminish the role of elected lawmakers. These issues underscore a fundamental truth: no other power can take the sanctity of legislation in a constitutional democracy, without causing a democratic deficit.

However, reclaiming and reinforcing legislative supremacy is possible and indeed imperative. The Punjab Assembly (and other legislatures) must use the instruments at their disposal – legislation, oversight, privilege, and political consensus – to reassert their rightful role. We suggested concrete measures: enacting laws to fill gaps left to the executive, supervising delegated legislation, demanding accountability of bureaucrats, and uniting across party lines to defend the institution’s authority. These steps, coupled with a judiciary that respects the demarcation of powers and an executive that honors the rule of law, can restore a healthier balance.

In practical effect, a supreme Parliament/Assembly does not mean an arrogant or unchecked body – it means the final decisions on policy lie with those who directly answer to the people. That is how it should be in Pakistan under the 1973 Constitution. The checks and balances ensure that while the legislature is supreme in law-making, it cannot act arbitrarily either (it is constrained by the Constitution’s guarantees and the courts’ review). But within its domain, the legislature’s voice must be decisive.

For Punjab, an empowered Assembly exercising its full powers would translate into better governance: laws reflecting local needs, civil services that operate under clear statutes and answer to representatives, financial decisions made with transparency and debate, and fewer confrontations among institutions because each knows its limits. It would address the current paradox where sometimes court judgments or bureaucratic rules are treated as higher law than the Acts of Assembly – a situation that is constitutionally the reverse of what should be.

Ultimately, the sovereignty of the people of Pakistan – declared in Article 2A – can only be realized when their elected parliament and assemblies function as supreme policymaking forums. All other institutions take secondary, albeit important, roles in service of that popular will. To achieve this, all stakeholders must accept that strengthening Parliament and provincial assemblies is in the national interest. The road to that involves legal reforms, but more so a change in political culture: legislators must step up to their role, executives must accept oversight, and judges must exercise restraint where democratic processes are adequate to resolve issues.

If the Punjab Assembly (and others) succeed in taking back their inherent powers through legislation, oversight, and unity, it will bode well for Pakistan’s democracy. It will mean that no matter which party or persons are in power, the system’s integrity – with the legislature as custodian of the people’s trust – remains intact. In the long run, that is the surest safeguard against authoritarianism, misrule, or injustice: a functioning legislature that represents and serves the people. Strengthening parliamentary democracy in letter and spirit, therefore, is not just about institutional ego or turf – it is about fulfilling the constitutional promise to the citizens of Pakistan that their will, expressed through their representatives, shall be the fundamental guide of the nation’s destiny.

References (Footnotes):

1. Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Article 2A (Objectives Resolution) – affirming people’s sovereignty exercised through elected representatives.
2. Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Article 97 – limiting federal executive authority to subjects Parliament can legislate on, and not intruding into provincial domain.
3. Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Article 137 – similarly limiting provincial executive to subjects of provincial legislative competence.
4. Mustafa Impex v. Pakistan (PLD 2016 SC 808) – Supreme Court judgment holding that rules of business are merely procedural and cannot confer substantive power absent statutory backing.
5. Kamran Adil, “The Mustafa Impex Case: A Radical Restructuring of the Law?” – analysis noting that all subordinate legislation requires conferment by statute; executive decisions must trace to law.
6. Dawn (News report, Dec 19, 2024), “LHC strengthens secretary’s authority in Punjab govt rules case” – LHC acknowledges Rules of Business have constitutional basis under Article 139 but also cites Mustafa Impex on their significance for good governance.
7. Republic Policy Think Tank commentary – highlighting that Punjab’s departments created merely by Rules of Business lack legitimacy and should be put on statutory footing by the Assembly; also stating that executive (CM & CS) bypassing legislation undermines accountability.
8. Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Article 240(b) – stipulating that provincial services and posts must be regulated by or under an Act of the Provincial Assembly.
9. Tribune (News report, May 7, 2022), “PA Secretariat withdraws notice against IGP” – provides details of the Punjab Assembly privilege motion against police entering Assembly without authorization, and the legal tussle that ensued.
10. Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Article 66 & 69 – granting freedom of speech and immunity to legislators and barring judicial interference in legislative proceedings.

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