Empowering Local Government in Pakistan: Upholding Constitutional Sovereignty through Devolution and Reform

Introduction

Pakistan’s Constitution enshrines a foundational principle that sovereignty belongs to Almighty Allah alone, and the authority to be exercised by the State of Pakistan is a sacred trust delegated through the people’s chosen representatives. This ideal—articulated in the Objectives Resolution (made a substantive part of the Constitution via Article 2A)—establishes that all state power must flow from the will of the people. In practical terms, governance at every level should be conducted by officials elected by and accountable to the public. This is not only a spiritual or philosophical dictate; it is a constitutional command that shapes Pakistan’s federal administrative system. It implies that from the federal tier down to the grassroots, the consent of the governed is the bedrock of legitimate authority. Therefore, local government—being the tier of governance closest to the people—is not a dispensable administrative arrangement, but a constitutional imperative. Article 32 of the Constitution, listed among the Principles of Policy, explicitly urges the state to “encourage local government institutions composed of elected representatives of the areas concerned,” with special representation for peasants, workers, and women. More robustly, Article 140A (added by the 18th Amendment in 2010) makes it obligatory for each province to establish a local government system and devolve political, administrative, and financial responsibility and authority to elected local representatives. In sum, the supreme law of Pakistan envisions governance “through the chosen representatives of the people” at every level, from Islamabad to each tehsil and union council.

Despite these clear constitutional principles, Pakistan’s journey towards effective local government has been fraught with interruptions and resistance. Powerful central and provincial actors—both bureaucratic and political—have often been reluctant to yield real power to the grassroots. Yet history and international experience show that robust local governments are indispensable for responsive public services, participatory democracy, and balanced federalism. This policy paper analyzes the evolution of local government in Pakistan, with a focus on why General Pervez Musharraf’s early 2000s devolution plan is widely regarded as the most effective local government system the country has had to date. It will examine the challenges posed by bureaucratic controls (particularly the colonial-era Deputy Commissioner office) and political opposition to decentralization. It also explores the debate between creating new provinces versus strengthening local governments as the means to improve governance and accommodate Pakistan’s diversity. In doing so, we review insights from Republic Policy’s analyses on local governance and draw on constitutional provisions, case law, provincial data, and international best practices. Finally, we present concrete constitutional, legislative, administrative, and political recommendations to establish a stable, empowered local government structure in line with Pakistan’s constitutional vision and the people’s will.

Historical Evolution of Local Government in Pakistan (A Brief Overview)

Local government in Pakistan has deep roots in the subcontinent’s colonial history. During British rule, local bodies like municipal committees and district boards existed but were tightly controlled by colonial administrators (Deputy Commissioners and Commissioners) who wielded ultimate authority. This legacy set a pattern: local institutions functioned more as extensions of the central authority (a system of deconcentrated administration) rather than as autonomous, democratic units of self-government. At Independence, Pakistan inherited this centralized administrative structure, including the powerful office of the Deputy Commissioner (DC) in each district, which combined executive, judicial, and revenue-collection powers. Early attempts at local self-government were halting until the 1960s, when Field Marshal Ayub Khan introduced the “Basic Democracies” system. Ayub’s Basic Democracies (1959) created elected local councils, but these were intended to provide controlled grassroots legitimacy to his regime rather than genuine autonomous governance; local council members were even part of the indirect electoral college for the President.

Subsequent regimes oscillated on local government. Notably, military governments showed greater interest in local bodies—a trend often attributed to their strategy of bypassing traditional political elites by empowering new grassroots actors. Ayub’s system waned after his rule. In the 1970s, Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto largely suspended local councils, preferring centralization under his populist federal government. General Zia-ul-Haq, after imposing martial law in 1977, revived local councils in the 1980s; he held non-party local elections in 1979 and 1983 as a means to create a controlled political base. Zia’s local governments had limited functions and often served to co-opt a new class of local influentials in support of his regime. With the return of civilian rule in 1988, the focus shifted again to national politics, and local bodies either completed their terms without fresh elections or remained dissolved through the 1990s as provincial governments showed little enthusiasm for empowering them.

A watershed came in 2001 under General Pervez Musharraf, whose regime undertook a comprehensive devolution plan. Musharraf’s Local Government Ordinance 2001 introduced an ambitious three-tier local government system nationwide. Each district, tehsil (sub-district), and union council had elected bodies, with a District Nazim (mayor)  elected to lead the district government. Urban areas had City District Governments with similar tiering (City District, Towns, Union Committees). The Musharraf system included reserved seats for women (33%), peasants/workers, and non-Muslim minorities in all local councils, ensuring broad-based representation. For the first time, administrative and financial powers were meaningfully decentralized to elected local officials: many functions like primary education, basic health, rural development, and municipal services were devolved to district or lower levels, with corresponding funding streams. Crucially, Musharraf abolished the decades-old office of Deputy Commissioner and the divisional tier of commissioners. The DC’s role as overall district administrator was replaced by a District Coordination Officer (DCO), who was a civil servant reporting to the elected Nazim, and by specialized officers heading devolved departments. Similarly, a District Police Officer (DPO) answered to the district’s elected leadership (with Public Safety Commissions for oversight). This was a radical departure from the past: local governments now had a measure of autonomy from provincial bureaucratic control, and provincial interference was legally circumscribed.

Musharraf’s local government system operated from 2001 until about 2008–2009. After Musharraf’s exit, the elected governments that assumed power in the provinces were quick to roll back his devolution reforms. Each province drafted its own local government law during 2009–2013, resulting in divergent structures. Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) under the PMLN & Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and Awami National Party initially passed laws in 2010/2012, but true local empowerment remained limited. Sindh and Balochistan also enacted new local government acts in 2013 following the landmark 18th Amendment (2010) which devolved many subjects to provinces; however, the spirit of Musharraf’s model (particularly the powers of mayors and the abolition of DC’s dominance) was largely reversed. For example, in Punjab, the 2013 Punjab Local Government Act reintroduced the commissionerate system (reviving the role of provincial commissioners and DCs) and provided indirect powers to district chairpersons, diluting the direct accountability to voters. There were instances of regression: in 2019, the Punjab government led by Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) actually dissolved existing elected local councils before their term ended, aiming to replace them with a new system, and restored the old bureaucracy-centric model in the interim. This was later deemed unconstitutional by the Supreme Court (discussed below), but it exemplifies the recurring pattern of new governments undoing their predecessors’ local government framework.

In summary, Pakistan’s local government history has been cyclical. Local bodies have been set up and empowered by certain regimes, only to be crippled or dissolved by succeeding governments. The result is instability and discontinuity in local governance. Citizens have experienced long spells where no elected local representatives were in office (for instance, Punjab had no local councils from 2009 to 2015, and again from mid-2019 to late 2021). Each province’s approach has differed – some experimented with party-based local elections, others with non-party; some gave more financial authority to councils, others kept funds centrally controlled. But the common trend has been an absence of sustained commitment to grassroots democracy. As we turn to the constitutional and legal framework, it becomes clear that this inconsistency and reluctance to empower local government runs contrary to the vision of Pakistan’s Constitution and the requirements of a functional federation.

Constitutional and Legal Framework for Local Government

The Constitution of Pakistan, as amended to date, explicitly protects local government and mandates its empowerment. Two provisions are particularly noteworthy. Article 32, in the Directive Principles (Chapter 2 of Principles of Policy), reads: “The State shall encourage local government institutions composed of elected representatives of the areas concerned, and in such institutions special representation shall be given to peasants, workers and women.” Although the Principles of Policy are not by themselves enforceable in court, they set a guiding obligation on the state. Even stronger is Article 140A, inserted initially by General Musharraf’s Legal Framework Order in 2002 and then affirmed by Parliament in the 18th Amendment (2010). Article 140A(1) is a binding constitutional command that “Each Province shall, by law, establish a local government system and devolve political, administrative and financial responsibility and authority to the elected representatives of the local governments.” Further, Article 140A(2) ensures that “Elections to the local governments shall be held by the Election Commission of Pakistan.”. The inclusion of Article 140A transformed local government from a mere policy preference into a constitutional necessity – no longer can a province simply choose whether to have local councils; they must establish them and devolve powers to them. Notably, the text calls for devolution of political, administrative and financial responsibility – indicating a holistic transfer of governance functions, not token bodies.

Despite this clear mandate, the actual implementation of Article 140A has been problematic. Because the Constitution leaves the details of local government to provincial discretion (“each Province shall, by law, establish…”), provincial governments have exploited this space to enact laws that sometimes undermine the spirit of devolution. For instance, a province might fulfill the letter of 140A by holding local elections, yet structure the local institutions in a way that keeps real power with the provincial bureaucracy or chief minister’s office. The Supreme Court of Pakistan, however, has begun to interpret Article 140A robustly. In a landmark judgment in 2021, the Supreme Court struck down Section 3 of Punjab’s Local Government Act 2019 (under which the provincial government had dissolved elected councils before term) as ultra vires the Constitution. The Court held that elected local governments enjoy constitutional protection of continuity, and that the “absence of local bodies amounts to a violation of Article 140-A”. Chief Justice Gulzar Ahmed ordered the immediate restoration of the local governments in Punjab that were dissolved in 2019, allowing them to complete their term. The Court’s decision underscored that provincial authorities cannot simply send home thousands of elected representatives and replace them with administrators at whim, as that disenfranchises the people and subverts the constitutional scheme. In fact, Justice Qazi Faez Isa, during hearings, noted that around 56,000 elected representatives in Punjab had been sent packing and “substituted by bureaucrats”, which he deemed anathema to democratic governance. The Supreme Court’s intervention reinforced the principle that while provinces oversee local governments, they cannot suspend or abolish elected councils without immediate replacement, nor can they prolong caretaker management of districts by bureaucrats. Such actions, the Court implied, smack of the same anti-democratic arbitrariness as dissolution of Parliament or Provincial Assembly by fiat.

Another dimension of the constitutional framework is the distribution of powers between the federal government, provinces, and local governments. After the 18th Amendment, local government is clearly a provincial subject – it is not enumerated in the Federal Legislative List (Fourth Schedule of the Constitution), meaning it falls in provincial domain. Therefore, any attempt by the federal government to directly control or re-engineer local/district administration can be seen as unconstitutional. For example, if Islamabad forms a federal committee or issues directives that reshape district-level governance or postings (outside the mechanism of provincial law), it would violate the autonomy granted to provinces and the spirit of Article 140A. Indeed, commentators note that a recent attempt in August, 2025 to restructure district administration via a federal initiative “violates [the] Fourth Schedule and Article 140-A”, amounting to federal encroachment on what should be a local government mandate. Pakistan’s federal architecture is premised on decentralization: the federation handles national matters, provinces manage regional affairs, and local governments are meant to address community-level needs. Centralization of authority at the federal or even provincial level in matters that can be dealt with locally runs against the grain of both the Constitution and effective governance. The Concurrent Legislative List was abolished in 2010 to eliminate overlap and give provinces exclusive control over many functions; likewise, provinces must recognize local councils as the rightful level for local municipal and development functions.

The constitutional promise of local governance also intersects with Pakistan’s commitments to democracy and fundamental rights. The preamble of the Constitution and Article 17 (freedom of association), read together, support the idea of participatory government at all tiers. One could argue that denying or delaying local elections deprives citizens of their right to association and representation in decision-making that affects their daily lives (as Justice Isa remarked, the 2019 law in Punjab had “disenfranchised the people” by ousting their elected local reps). Additionally, Article 140A elevates local government to the status of “government” in its own right – not merely an advisory body. Legal experts have pointed out that Article 140A’s use of the term “local government” (hukumat in Urdu) signals that these institutions are a level of government, not to be treated as subordinate departments. For instance, RP analysis noted that Article 140A calls local government “government,” not the local administration. This wording suggests a qualitative shift: local councils and mayors are not intended to be puppets of the province, but autonomous governing institutions within their sphere.

However, a consensus has been emerging among scholars and civil society that Article 140A, while necessary, is not sufficient on its own to guarantee effective local governments. At a seminar held by the Republic Policy Think Tank, the experts argued that “Article 140-A [is] an inadequate safeguard for local governments” in its current form. They called for a constitutional amendment to further protect the form, tenure, and financial viability of local governments. Suggestions from that forum included: entrenching provisions so that local government laws cannot be changed, or local bodies dissolved without due process or a supermajority approval, requiring provincial legislation to have cross-party consensus (e.g., a two-thirds majority) for any change that could weaken local institutions. Another idea floated was the creation of constitutional courts or mechanisms specifically to adjudicate local government disputes and ensure continuity – reflecting the concern that provincial assemblies, being the very bodies, whose power is constrained by strong local governments, should not have absolute say over their existence. Perhaps most strikingly, it was noted that Members of National and Provincial Assemblies (MNAs and MPAs) have become “unnecessary rivals” to local governments, because they often seek control over local development funds and projects that should be the domain of elected councils. LG experts recommended eliminating legislative development funds (the discretionary funds often given to MPs for constituency projects) and channeling all development budgets to local authorities. This would realign Pakistani practice with the principle that legislators are meant to legislate and oversee, not execute development schemes—that is the job of executive agencies, including local governments.

In terms of statutory law, each province has indeed enacted its own Local Government Act (LGA) pursuant to Article 140A. For example, Sindh has the Sindh Local Government Act 2013 (amended in 2021), Punjab had the Punjab Local Government Act 2013 (replaced by the short-lived PLGA 2019, and now again in flux), Khyber Pakhtunkhwa has the KPK Local Government Act 2013 (amended in 2019 to introduce a new village/neighborhood council system), and Balochistan has the Balochistan Local Government Act 2010. These acts outline the structure, functions, and powers of local councils in each province. A key point is that the effectiveness of local governance “depends upon the quality of the Act passed by the provincial assembly.” If the provincial law is well-crafted—clearly defining the competencies of local governments, securing their fiscal sources, and limiting arbitrary interference—then local institutions can thrive. Unfortunately, many of these Acts have clauses that allow the provincial government to suspend councils, remove mayors, or assume control of certain functions, which undermines autonomy. For instance, some provincial laws enable the Chief Minister to dismiss a mayor or council via the Local Government Commission or on vague grounds of “public interest,” which is ripe for abuse. Moreover, nearly all provinces retain substantial fiscal control: local councils often depend on provincial allocations (Provincial Finance Commissions are set up by law but often delayed or not given constitutional protection), and provinces often control lucrative local services (like urban utilities, building control, or land development authorities) rather than transferring them to city governments. This partial devolution means that, despite Article 140A, local governments in practice remain constrained.

In summary, the Constitution provides a clear direction for a three-tiered federal structure – Federation, Provinces, and Local Governments – working harmoniously with defined responsibilities. The spirit of the Constitution is that people at the local level should govern their own affairs to the maximum extent feasible, as a sacred trust under God’s sovereignty and as a fulfillment of democratic principle. Yet gaps in constitutional detail, coupled with provincial reluctance, have resulted in half-hearted implementation. Strengthening local government in Pakistan may thus require further constitutional reform (to lock in safeguards for local democracy), strict judicial enforcement of Article 140A (to prevent backsliding by provincial executives), and most importantly political will to honor the constitutional pledge that “the State shall exercise its powers and authority through the chosen representatives of the people.”

Pervez Musharraf’s Devolution Plan: Pakistan’s Best Local Government System So Far?

It is a widely held view among many policy analysts that the local government system introduced under General Pervez Musharraf (2001) stands out as the most robust and well-structured in Pakistan’s history. This assessment merits a closer look, as understanding the strengths of Musharraf’s model can inform current and future reforms.

Musharraf’s devolution plan, implemented via the Local Government Ordinances of 2001 in each province, had several innovative features that distinguished it from prior experiments:

• Three-Tier Elected Structure with Direct Elections: The system established elected councils at Union Council, Tehsil (Town), and District levels, ensuring governance at the village/municipal, sub-district, and district scales. Importantly, the heads of the local governments (Nazims) at the district and tehsil levels were directly or indirectly elected by the local populace (district nazims were elected by union councillors initially, but enjoyed executive authority akin to a mayor). This was a shift from earlier systems where district heads were bureaucrats (DCs) or indirectly chosen with heavy provincial say. Direct election (or election by the local councillors, who themselves were directly elected) gave local leaders grassroots legitimacy and accountability.
• Abolition of the Commissioner/DC : Musharraf’s plan boldly eliminated the posts of Divisional Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner as the overarching authorities. The divisional tier of administration was dissolved, and district administration was placed under the purview of the elected District Nazim. The erstwhile powers of the DC were split – some (especially law-and-order and coordination) went to the District Coordination Officer (DCO), a civil servant who functioned as a coordinating secretary under the Nazim; other powers (magisterial, revenue collection) were either assigned to specialized departments or curtailed. This was revolutionary: it ended a 150-year-old colonial hierarchy at the district level. By doing so, it signaled that local governments were the “operational government” for local affairs, while provincial government would have an oversight and supporting role.
• Devolved Functions and Departments: Musharraf’s local governments were granted authority over a wide range of services. District governments managed primary and secondary education, basic healthcare (through district health offices and hospitals), agriculture extension, local roads, water and sanitation, community development, and more. Tehsil governments handled municipal services like water supply, sewerage, street lighting, and town planning. Union councils worked on neighborhood-level needs and community infrastructure. Crucially, many provincial line departments were decentralized – their staff and budgets were placed under the control of district governments. For example, district education officers and health officers answered to the Nazim instead of provincial secretaries. Development funds from provincial and federal sources were, at least on paper, to be channelled to these councils for local development schemes. This administrative devolution meant decisions on schools, clinics, and farms could be made closer to the people they served.
• Financial Empowerment and Revenue Authority: The Local Government Ordinances provided for each tier to have its own budget and revenue sources (like local taxes, fees, and shares in provincial transfers). Provincial Finance Commissions (PFCs) were established to allocate a portion of provincial revenues to local governments via formula, to ensure predictable funding. While in practice the transfers were sometimes insufficient or delayed, the concept was a step toward fiscal decentralization. District governments could approve and execute development projects within their allocated funds, reducing bureaucratic red tape from Lahore, Karachi or Peshawar in small works.
• Inclusive Representation (Women, Peasants, Minorities): As noted, Musharraf’s system broke new ground by reserving 33% of all council seats for women. This brought tens of thousands of women into local politics for the first time, creating possibly the largest cohort of women representatives in Pakistan’s history overnight. Additionally, seats were reserved for peasants and workers (to amplify voices of economically weaker segments) and for non-Muslims in all councils. This policy dramatically improved inclusion: for example, every union council (a body of about 13 members) had four women councillors and a couple of peasants/workers, ensuring that local decision-making tables were not solely occupied by the usual male, landed or elite figures. The empowerment of women at the grassroots had positive side-effects, such as greater attention to social issues like health, sanitation, and family welfare in council deliberations, as well as the emergence of a new tier of women leadership (many provincial and even some national-level women politicians originally started as union council nazims or councillors in the 2000s).
• Community Participation and Accountability Measures: The devolution plan also introduced mechanisms like Citizen Community Boards (CCBs), which were groups of volunteers that could propose development projects and get 80% funding from the council’s budget (with 20% community contribution). This was meant to encourage citizen-driven development. Moreover, the plan had provisions for Public Safety Commissions at district level for oversight of police, and Musalihat Anjumans (reconciliation committees) for alternate dispute resolution in communities. These innovations aimed to improve accountability and service delivery by involving the public directly in governance.

Taken together, these features explain why Musharraf’s local government is lauded as a high-water mark. It created an “engine room of the federation” at the local level, making local councils the frontline providers of services and development. By devolving real authority, it sought to turn Pakistan’s government inside-out: instead of directives coming entirely from the top, many decisions would be made at the district or municipal level, aligning with local needs and preferences. As one Republic Policy commentary put it, “Federal and provincial governments are coordinating governments in a federation, whereas the local government is the operational government.” This means that the higher tiers should set policies and standards and provide resources, but the actual operation – the execution of programs and delivery of day-to-day services – happens through local governments. Musharraf’s model earnestly tried to realize this principle.

Did it work? In many ways, it did show tangible successes. Numerous anecdotal accounts and some studies indicate that during the 2001-2008 period, local infrastructure (farm-to-market roads, water supply schemes, street paving, etc.) saw improvement due to active district and tehsil development spending. Local leaders, being accessible to the public, could respond to issues like teachers absent in schools or broken drains more promptly than distant bureaucrats. The inclusion of women meant issues like girls’ education and maternal health got more attention. There was also capacity-building: a whole generation of local politicians learned governance in that era, some of whom graduated to higher office later. Major city districts (e.g. Karachi, Lahore) under empowered City Nazims undertook big projects (Karachi’s Nazim launched its first CNG bus fleet and signal-free corridors; Lahore’s Nazim initiated park and traffic improvements). Smaller towns benefited from having an advocate (Nazim) to fight for their share of resources.

However, it is also important in an academic analysis to acknowledge criticisms and shortcomings of Musharraf’s local government system. No system is perfect, and Musharraf’s was no exception. Some common critiques include:

• Political Motivation and Legitimacy: Because the system was introduced by an unelected military ruler, it was seen by traditional political parties as a ploy to undermine them. Musharraf bypassed provincial politicians by empowering local figures (many of whom were new entrants or local rivals to established MPAs/MNAs). This bred resentment; mainstream parties accused Musharraf of using local councils to build a loyal constituency (through patronage and development funds) while national-level democracy was sidelined. This political taint meant that when democracy returned in 2008, elected governments had little loyalty to the system and moved to dismantle it. In essence, the sustainability of the reform was hurt by its top-down, non-consensual origin.
• Capacity Issues: Suddenly creating hundreds of local governments and expecting them to manage schools, clinics, finances, etc., was a tall order. Many councilors and even Nazims were inexperienced. The bureaucrats (like DCOs) assigned to assist them sometimes lacked training in working under elected oversight. There were reports of mismanagement and corruption at local levels, as oversight mechanisms (like provincial monitoring or audit systems) were initially weak or confused in the new structure. In some districts, local elites captured the councils and allegedly misused funds. The absence of strong accountability allowed some abuses, which opponents highlighted to discredit the system.
• Insufficient Provincial Support and Parallel Power Centers: While Musharraf altered formal structures, the provincial government (run by his aligned parties, PML-Q at the time) often continued to exert influence. Provincial bureaucracies sometimes dragged their feet in truly empowering local officials. Funds, while allocated, were sometimes delayed by provincial finance departments. There were also parallel bodies like special development project units, or legislators’ schemes that continued, causing overlap. In some cases, provincial interference in postings of DCOs or police undermined the Nazim’s authority. So, the full promise of autonomy wasn’t uniformly realized.
• Social and Structural Challenges: A Republic Policy article notes that local governments were criticized on social, cultural, economic grounds as well. Socially, some felt local bodies did not solve issues like feudal influence or ethnic tensions; a powerful landlord could still dominate a district council and marginalize weaker groups. Culturally, some councils faced resistance in more conservative areas to women taking active roles, or to modern ideas of governance that clashed with traditional power structures (tribal jirgas vs. councils, etc.). Financially, local governments remained dependent on higher-level funding and lacked capacity to generate local revenue, leading to inadequate resources for their ambitious responsibilities. Administratively, unclear delineation of authority sometimes caused conflicts between the district nazim and provincial administration (for example, the District Police Officer answered to the Nazim for law & order, but also had reporting lines to the provincial Inspector-General; this dual accountability created tensions).
• Continuity and Legal Cover: Because the system was created by ordinance, it lacked permanence. After the 2005 local elections (the second cycle under Musharraf), there was no guarantee the next government would keep it. Indeed, it was not constitutionally insulated at the time—Article 140A was inserted but could be, and was, entirely interpreted by new provincial laws later. Only in 2010 did the Constitution explicitly say local governments must exist, but it did not entrench Musharraf’s model of local government. Thus provinces had leeway to reverse key elements (and they did, e.g. reintroducing DCs). This taught a lesson: without broad political buy-in and constitutional safeguards, any local government system can be temporary.

Despite these challenges, one might ask, why still call Musharraf’s the “best” local government Pakistan has had? The assessment hinges on the degree of devolution and local empowerment that was achieved relative to other periods. Musharraf’s system, for all its faults, empowered local representatives with more functions, funds, and freedom than any other system before or since. Contrast it with the status after 2008: for example, under the 2013 Acts, most provinces brought back the DC as the real executive in the district, making elected District Chairmen largely ceremonial (especially in Punjab’s 2013 law). Political parties in power at the province often kept development funds in the hands of MPAs, giving local councils minor roles. Elections were delayed repeatedly (Sindh and Punjab did not hold local elections until compelled by the Supreme Court around 2015). In some cases, local councils were formed but then not given budget or authority (a kind of token compliance with Article 140A). In comparison to this weak implementation, Musharraf’s model stands out for its clarity of vision and tangible devolution. It treated local government as the cornerstone of governance – “the engine room of a federation”, as Republic Policy termed it[29] – rather than an afterthought. It also had a nationwide character (uniformity across provinces, which is rare in Pakistan’s context of diverse local government laws; Musharraf’s ordinance was replicated in each province with minor tweaks, giving a sense of one cohesive system). This meant people in all parts of the country experienced a similar structure of local governance, something that arguably strengthened unity and understanding of grassroots democracy.

Importantly, Musharraf’s era of local government also sparked a debate that continues today: How to reconcile strong local governments with parliamentary federalism? Musharraf’s answer was to subordinate provincial bureaucracy to elected local leaders for local matters. Many in the traditional bureaucracy bristled at this inversion of chain-of-command. But the logic was sound – if MNAs can oversee federal ministries and MPAs oversee provincial departments, why shouldn’t elected mayors oversee municipal administration? This question remains at the heart of reform today. The Musharraf model answered it by saying, yes, the bureaucracy at district level must be answerable to the elected district government just as it is answerable to ministers at higher levels. Any future “best” system will likely need to embrace that principle.

In conclusion, General Musharraf’s local government system is often considered the most effective Pakistan has had due to its unprecedented devolution of authority, inclusion of marginalized groups, and focus on grassroots problem-solving. While implemented under a military regime, its features were largely democratic and progressive in nature for local governance. The task now is to learn from that experience—both its successes and pitfalls—to design a sustainable local government framework that can survive transitions of power and become an integral, permanent part of Pakistan’s federal structure.

Challenges to Effective Local Government: Bureaucratic Hurdles and Political Reluctance

If empowered local governments are so beneficial, one might wonder why Pakistan has struggled to maintain them. The reasons lie in the entrenched interests and power structures that feel threatened by genuine devolution. Two main sources of resistance are bureaucracy and political elites at higher tiers. These often overlapping actors have, over decades, posed significant challenges to the autonomy and effectiveness of local government. Understanding these challenges is key to formulating reforms.

Bureaucratic Centralization and the Legacy of the Deputy Commissioner

Pakistan’s civil service, particularly the elite Pakistan Administrative Service (PAS) (formerly DMG, District Management Group), has historically been the backbone of governance, inheriting the mantle of the colonial ICS. The PAS officers hold most of the policy and executive posts at federal and provincial levels—and crucially, also at the district level as commissioners, deputy commissioners, assistant commissioners, etc. The Deputy Commissioner (DC), in particular, is a linchpin of the unitary bureaucracy structure that runs counter to the spirit of federalism and devolution. The DC (often also vested with powers of District Magistrate in the past) is the administrative head of a district, traditionally responsible for everything from revenue collection to law and order, development projects to disaster response. For the unelected bureaucracy, the DC post has been a coveted position of authority, and for provincial governments, it is the mechanism to extend their direct control into every nook and corner of the province.

However, as noted earlier, the office of the Deputy Commissioner is a colonial-era institution explicitly designed for a time “when provinces lacked elected representatives”. In British India, DCs were the agents of the Raj, concentrating administrative, judicial, and executive powers in one person to enforce the colonial state’s writ. In a democratic Pakistan, the need for such a centralized office is questionable. The DC system inherently devolves nothing – it is a system of de-concentration, meaning the province (or previously, the colonial center) merely posts its officer in the locality to act on its behalf. It does not empower the local populace; rather, it sidelines them. The Musharraf reform abolished the DC precisely to break this “steel frame” of central authority, replacing it with a more diffuse and accountable structure. Yet, all provinces (and Islamabad) eventually restored the DC office in some form after 2008. Why? Because for the bureaucratic cadre and many provincial politicians, having a DC means having a ready lever of top-down control – a one-person channel through which orders can be sent and compliance ensured without the messy unpredictability of local councils.

This bureaucratic inertia and protectiveness of power manifest as a major challenge to local government. Even when local councils exist, a strong DC can undermine them. For instance, if funds are released from province but the DC (acting as accounting officer) is not cooperative, spending can be stalled. If a Nazim or Mayor gives instructions that the DC doesn’t favor, he might leverage his connections with the provincial hierarchy to delay or circumvent them. In many cases, DCs continued to chair or dominate important committees at district level (e.g., the coordination committees for health or education) even when they were supposed to answer to elected heads. Effectively, the DC often remained “the boss” in the district in eyes of lower officials, given his career incentives aligned with pleasing the provincial government, not the Nazim. This shadow authority eroded the effectiveness of local governments. It is telling that provincial governments of all political stripes agreed in 2016-17 to restore DCs’ erstwhile magisterial powers (e.g., under the CrPC, to control local magistrates and conduct judicial inquiries), a move criticized by reformers as turning back the clock on accountability and giving DCs quasi-judicial authority that could be misused.

Why is it essential to abolish or reform the office of the Deputy Commissioner for strong local government? In a nutshell, because you cannot serve two masters. A district administration cannot simultaneously be accountable to an appointed DC (who reports to the provincial government) and an elected local council representing the people. One of them must have primacy. In the current setup (except during Musharraf’s reform period), the DC and provincial administration have primacy; the local government is effectively subordinate or advisory on key matters. This defeats the purpose of devolution. As one Republic Policy analysis argued, district administration should be a local government mandate, not a federal/provincial bureaucracy outpost. Imposing federal or provincial control over district administration not only violates the constitutional design but also Pakistan’s “hard-won federal consensus” achieved in the 18th Amendment. That consensus was about decentralizing power; re-centralizing through the DC system is a “regression” from it.

A concrete example of bureaucratic overreach is the recent formation of a federal-level committee to ‘reform’ district administration, which was criticized as unconstitutional. The attempt to redesign local administration from Islamabad was seen as an encroachment on provincial autonomy and local self-rule. Another example: the posting of Chief Secretaries and IGs by the federal establishment division, which some argue should be provincial decisions. The Association of Provincial Civil Services has even contended that the Chief Secretary’s appointment by the federal government (under old CSP rules) is unconstitutional after the 18th Amendment, since the CS is a provincial post. By analogy, if the principle is that the top provincial bureaucrat should be chosen by the province (and not federals), then similarly, should not the top district administrator be effectively chosen by the local government, or at least wholly accountable to it, rather than to the province? The spirit of federalism would suggest yes.

To strengthen local government, many experts propose either abolishing the DC office entirely or transforming it into a new role that is subordinate to elected officials. One vision is to establish a career local government service/cadre separate from the federal & Provincial PAS & PMS, whose officers could serve under local councils (for example, a city manager or chief officer hired on contract by the local council). This would eliminate the conflict of interest that a PAS officer (eyeing career progression via provincial/federal postings) faces when asked to serve local representatives. Another recommendation (as advocated by the RP think tank) is that provincial and local governments’ functions should be clearly delinked—the province makes laws, policies, and standards, while local elected governments execute and implement at the district/town level. In such a schema, the DC’s generalist coordination role is redundant; coordination can be done by the elected mayor’s office. The provincial administration would still have its devolved department officers for monitoring and ensuring compliance with broader laws, but they would coordinate with their counterparts in local government rather than boss over them.

It is worth noting that some countries have eliminated the equivalent of the DC system to great effect. For example, India under its Panchayati Raj reforms did not entirely abolish the District Collector (DC equivalent), but significantly curtailed their direct role in local decision-making by empowering elected District Panchayat chairpersons. Bangladesh recently (in 2022) introduced new local government reforms aiming to give more power to mayors over district administrators. These examples reflect a recognition that the colonial-style district officer model is anathema to local democracy. Pakistan’s persisting DC model is one of the last vestiges of colonial administrative control, and its presence has consistently been used to undermine or control local bodies.

In conclusion, the bureaucratic challenge can be summarized as a struggle between an old centralized administrative culture and the demands of democratic devolution. To overcome it, Pakistan will need to “constitutionalize” its bureaucracy in line with federalism, meaning aligning the civil service’s structure with the three-tier government structure. This may involve tough decisions like pruning the authority of PAS officers, creating local services, and unequivocally placing district administration under elected councils. Demolishing or fundamentally reforming the office of the Deputy Commissioner is crucial – not out of spite for the bureaucracy, but to remove an institutional incompatibility. A system wherein bureaucrats implement policies at federal and provincial levels under elected ministers (which is accepted), but then suddenly act as de-facto rulers at district level over elected councillors (which is illogical), cannot hold. Just as the Chief Minister and Cabinet lead the province with secretaries reporting to them, the District Mayor and Council should lead the district with administrators reporting to them. Anything less will perpetuate confusion, conflict, and the emasculation of local governments.

Political Reluctance and Power Rivalries

On the political front, local governments often fall victim to a power rivalry between local representatives and higher-level politicians (MPAs, MNAs, ministers). Elected members of the National and Provincial Assemblies frequently view robust local governments as competitors for influence and credit in the eyes of the electorate. This is a well-documented phenomenon in Pakistan’s political culture: MPs fear that if mayors and union councilors start delivering tangible improvements in people’s lives, they (the MPs) will lose relevance, since citizens might then rely on their local councillor for problem-solving rather than beseeching the MPA/MNA. Moreover, many legislators have treated the allocation of development funds to their constituencies as a primary means to maintain popularity. Strong local governments threaten to divert those funds to local bodies, thereby depriving MPs of patronage resources. It is telling that in Pakistan, local elections have often been delayed or avoided by democratically-elected federal/provincial governments, whereas military regimes, ironically, have held them more regularly.

Consider the chronology: after the Musharraf-introduced local governments completed their term in 2009, the incoming PPP and PML-N governments at center and provinces took years to hold new local elections. In Punjab and Sindh, no local polls occurred from 2009 until 2015, until court orders compelled provincial governments to act. Even then, the elections were delayed multiple times (a Republic Policy analysis notes that “postponing local government elections” became a pattern reflecting the broader political culture where democracy’s principles are often trumped by expediency). The reluctance stemmed from the ruling parties’ focus on consolidating power at the center and province first, and worries that opposition parties might gain foothold via local contests. Indeed, in Punjab 2015 local elections, the opposition (PTI) managed to win in some urban centers, which possibly validated the fears of the incumbent PML-N that empowering local governments could hand their rivals a platform. In Sindh, the ruling PPP diluted the powers of Karachi’s city government in its 2013 Act precisely because the opposition MQM was strong in Karachi; they preferred to keep city agencies under provincial departments rather than under an MQM mayor. This politicization undermines service delivery for citizens.

Another aspect is the tussle within provincial politics: Chief Ministers and their cabinets often want a firm grip over district administration (via Commissioners/DCs and via party loyalists as administrators) because it aids in political management. Many MPAs traditionally act as intermediaries between their constituents and the state for local issues – a role they guard jealously. If local councillors or mayors can directly solve those issues (like fixing drains, approving local development schemes, addressing policing matters in community), the MPAs lose their brokerage role. Some observers have called this an “empire of patronage” that lawmakers are unwilling to surrender. Thus, when local governments are in place, MPAs sometimes attempt to sabotage them or co-opt them. An infamous example was after the 2015 local elections in Punjab: the PML-N government delayed empowering the elected councils for over a year, then made them functional in 2016 but ensured the mayors/chairmen had very constrained authority and funds, effectively neutralizing any threat to the MPs’ clout.

The direct conflict over development funds is a particularly zero-sum game. As highlighted earlier, experts like Hamid Khan have argued that development budgets should bypass MPs and go straight to local governments. In Pakistan’s current practice, each MNA/MPA often expects “funds” (through schemes like the PSDP or provincial ADPs) to spend on roads, schools, etc., in their constituency. These discretionary funds not only fuel corruption but also blur the line between executive and legislature. Politicians often oppose local government because if all local development was done by mayors and councils, MPs would have little to show for to voters except their legislative work (which unfortunately is not highly valued by voters expecting tangible benefits). This systemic flaw incentivizes MPs to keep local governments weak or nonexistent. The resulting vacuum is then filled by provincial departments or ad-hoc administrators, which often are less responsive. The devastating floods in recent years exemplified this: Without elected local councils in place in many areas, the emergency response and relief distribution were left solely to the district administration and ad-hoc arrangements, which struggled to meet the challengeConversely, if local governments had been active, councillors and mayors could have mobilized community networks, ensured fair distribution, and been held accountable by their neighbors for any lapses. Thus, political delays in restoring local governments have real costs for citizens.

There is also the partisan calculus: parties in power fear losing local elections to opponents, while opposition parties often demand local polls (hoping to gain grassroots strongholds). For instance, from 2018-2022, PTI as ruling party in center and Punjab showed limited interest in quickly holding local elections (aside from KPK which had polls in 2021, possibly because PTI was confident there). After PTI’s ouster in 2022, suddenly PTI began demanding fresh local elections in Punjab where PML-N was then in charge – the tables turned. This indicates that commitment to local democracy has sadly been opportunistic for many politicians.

The challenge of political reluctance also extends to legal and constitutional neglect. While the 18th Amendment was a high point of political consensus on provincial autonomy, the same political class did not similarly fortify local autonomy in the Constitution—likely because provincial politicians did not want to tie their own hands. They kept Article 140A’s language broad. Even after seeing how easily local systems can be uprooted, there has so far been no major move in Parliament to amend the Constitution to, say, set a minimum tenure or mandatory powers for local councils. It was left to civil society and HRCP conferences to raise the demand for such an amendment[20]. This indicates a gap between rhetoric and action: all political parties’ manifestos talk about empowering people at grassroots, but in power, most have delayed or diluted local governance.

Finally, consider the attitudinal challenge: a mindset that “villagers are not ready” or “local representatives lack capacity” still prevails in some bureaucratic and political circles as a justification to keep power central. This is a paternalistic view that is self-fulfilling—if you never give local leaders real power, how will they ever build capacity? Indeed, the performance of local governments has varied, but many have done well when given a chance. Yet mistakes or corruption at local level get highlighted to tarnish the concept of local government (even though federal and provincial levels have similarly seen mistakes and corruption, but their existence is never questioned wholesale). This double standard is a hurdle. Building trust between provincial leadership and local governments is essential. The provinces should see local bodies not as rivals, but as partners that can help share their governance burden and improve public satisfaction (which ultimately benefits the ruling party too).

In sum, political challenges to local government revolve around power-sharing: convincing incumbent power-holders to share authority and resources with a lower level is hard. It requires enlightened leadership to see the bigger picture—that democracy and service delivery improve when you bring government closer to the people. The absence of such vision has kept Pakistan’s grassroots democracy weak. However, there are encouraging signs: the Supreme Court’s firm stance on Article 140A, public fatigue with poor local services (leading to grassroot demand for empowered city governments, etc.), and cross-party voices (even within major parties) calling for reform. The way forward must address the incentives: perhaps by removing development funds from MPs’ purview (so they have less stake in hoarding local power) and by legally guaranteeing local governments so that even when politicians grudgingly concede to hold polls, they cannot easily reverse them later. Ultimately, for local government to flourish, provincial and national politicians must embrace it as an integral part of the federal system, not a competing camp. They must remember that under the Constitution, sovereignty belongs to the people – and that means all governance (local included) is an expression of the people’s will.

Federalism, Devolution, and the Debate on New Provinces vs. Strong Local Governments

Pakistan’s governance challenges are often framed in terms of federalism and centralization. For decades, a major question has been how to balance power between the center and the provinces (a tension that the 18th Amendment tried to resolve in favor of provincial autonomy). Now, a further question looms: how to balance power within provinces – between provincial capitals and the diverse districts and communities that make up each province. Two different solutions are frequently proposed: create new provinces or strengthen local governments. This section examines that debate and argues, in line with Republic Policy’s analysis, that while new provinces may be justified on identity grounds, the more immediate and administratively sensible solution is to push devolution down to the district and municipal level rather than carving more administrative units without such devolution.

The Case for Devolution to Districts (Over Creating Administrative Provinces)

Pakistan’s current provincial structure (four provinces) is often criticized for various imbalances. Punjab houses about 50% of the population, dwarfing the others – this raises concerns of domination in federal affairs. Some regions within provinces feel neglected by distant provincial governments (e.g., South Punjab, rural Sindh vs. Karachi, Pashtun areas in Balochistan, etc.). To address this, calls for creating new provinces – such as a Saraiki province in South Punjab, a Hazara province carved out of KP, or restoration of Bahawalpur province – have surfaced repeatedly. Proponents of such administrative provinces argue that smaller provinces mean governance closer to the people, better resource allocation, and more equitable representation. On face, this argument has merit: a province one-fifth the size of the current Punjab, for instance, might indeed be easier to govern efficiently due to shorter bureaucratic chains and focused administration.

However, as Republic Policy’s editorial “Provinces or Local Governments: The Federation’s Dilemma” insightfully notes, “this overlooks a critical reality: administrative, financial, and political powers are inherently the domain of local governments”. If the real issue is that people lack access to decision-makers and services, empowered local governments can resolve that without needing to alter provincial boundaries. For example, the demand for a new “South Punjab” province is largely driven by perceptions that Lahore-centric governments neglect southern districts. But if those districts had strong local governments managing local development and having a say in provincial resource distribution (through PFC awards, etc.), the sense of alienation could diminish. Indeed, the absence of strong municipal systems creates the demand for new provinces on administrative grounds. People ask for a new province mostly when they feel that’s the only way to get control over local affairs. Give them local control directly, and the clamor for separate province might reduce.

Moreover, creating new provinces is not a trivial task – it requires constitutional amendments with two-thirds majority and the consent of the concerned province’s assembly (Article 239(4)). It can also be politically explosive, stirring ethnic or linguistic tensions. By contrast, strengthening local government is constitutionally and politically easier (needing mostly ordinary provincial legislation and executive action), and it can be done incrementally without zero-sum fights over territory. As the editorial emphasizes, “Instead of multiplying provinces, Pakistan needs robust local governments with clear jurisdictions, adequate resources, and institutional autonomy.” When local governments are empowered, “they provide the most direct, responsive, and accountable system of governance.” A resident’s primary interaction is with local officials – for water, waste, schooling, policing – so if those officials are answerable to a local council, the citizen feels heard. Whether that local council is in a new province or an old one matters far less to the citizen than whether it is effective.

There’s also a cost argument. New provinces mean new layers of bureaucracy: new governor, new provincial assembly, new secretariat, etc. They shift the center of power, but do not guarantee power will reach down to villages. Pakistan could end up with, say, 8 or 10 provinces but still highly centralized governance inside each (a mini-Lahore in Multan, a mini-Karachi in Sukkur, etc.). That would not solve the fundamental disconnect between government and governed. On the other hand, investing in local governments can achieve the benefits of small provinces (proximity, manageability) without the heavy overhead. Already, each district in Pakistan is akin to a small province in many countries – for example, Lahore district (11 million people) is larger than many countries’ population, and Tharparkar district (20,000 sq.km) is geographically vaster than some U.S. states. If we empower these districts, we essentially create “provincettes” in terms of governance reach.

Cultural Identity and the Role of Provinces

That said, the Republic Policy editorial draws an important distinction: provinces in a federation aren’t just administrative units; they also embody cultural, linguistic, and historical identities. Across the world, successful federations often align provincial/state boundaries with identity groups (e.g., ethnicity or language), which can strengthen national unity by giving recognition and autonomy to those groups. In Pakistan’s context, the current four provinces largely correspond to major ethnolinguistic groups (Punjabis, Sindhis, Pashtuns in KP, Baloch in Balochistan – although all have minorities too). Demands for new provinces based on identity – like a Seraiki-speaking province, a Hazara (Hindko-speaking) province, or even calls in urban Sindh for an “Urdu-speaking” province – are fundamentally about recognition. They argue these distinct cultural communities need their own provincial set-up to feel fully empowered and preserve their heritage.

The editorial suggests that “if new provinces are to be created, they must be based on cultural preservation and identity rather than temporary administrative convenience.” This is a crucial point. Creating a province just because “it’s too hard to govern X from Y” may be a shortsighted fix; but creating one because “the people of X have a distinct identity and desire self-government” has a stronger rationale in federal theory. It’s essentially the difference between carving districts out for efficiency versus acknowledging nations within a state. True federalism, the piece argues, thrives by respecting identities while ensuring local governments deliver services. Thus, a Hazara province might be justifiable if Hazara residents overwhelmingly feel culturally distinct and want that recognition. On the other hand, splitting a province solely to reduce its size (like splitting Punjab into North and South for administrative ease) could be counter-productive if it doesn’t address local empowerment and could even fragment governance further without solving the root problems.

The recommendation is clear: focus on strengthening local governments now, and reserve new provinces for when there is a compelling identity-based case. “Only where genuine cultural or historical identities require representation should the federation consider creating new provinces,” says the editorial, otherwise “anything less risks fragmenting governance without addressing the real issues.” In essence, if people demand a province primarily because roads are poor and officials unresponsive, give them a responsive local government rather than a new province with the same old style of governance. Conversely, if a people demand a province because they feel culturally alienated or politically dominated by another group, that is a separate debate grounded in rights and identity (and even there, strong local governments could alleviate some grievances by giving autonomy in local affairs).

One can add that the existence of vibrant local governments could actually ease the process if ever new provinces are to be created on identity grounds. Because local institutions would be functioning, the transition in governance would be smoother and the risk of power vacuum lower. In fact, local governments act as a glue in federations with many units – consider India, which has 28 states and 3 dozen territories, but also has constitutionally mandated local panchayats and municipalities in each state. The local layer keeps governance running and citizens engaged even if state boundaries shift or state governments change.

In summary, federalism in Pakistan should now progress to the third tier*. The 18th Amendment addressed the center-province imbalance; the next step is to address *province–local imbalance. This doesn’t require new constitutional units (except possibly in exceptional identity-driven scenarios); it requires political will to implement the devolution already promised in the Constitution (140A). Centralization has been Pakistan’s bane – it fueled grievances in East Pakistan (former Bengal), it has led to under-development of remote areas, and it often correlates with authoritarian tendencies. Devolution to districts and cities is the logical continuation of the federal principle, bringing governance to the grassroots and making the system more resilient by distributing power widely.

Federalism is sometimes described as “unity in diversity.” In Pakistan’s case, embracing diversity means empowering culturally distinct regions (hence the identity-based province argument) and empowering diverse communities at the local level to run their own affairs (the local government argument). These are complementary, not mutually exclusive, but in terms of priority and feasibility, bolstering local government should take precedence. It directly improves governance and service delivery now, and it upholds the constitutional command that sovereignty is exercised by people through their representatives at all levels. As Republic Policy succinctly put it, “True federalism thrives not on multiplying administrative divisions, but on respecting identities while ensuring that local governments remain the true custodians of democratic service delivery.”

International Best Practices in Local Government

To further bolster the case for strong local governments, it is useful to consider how other countries manage local governance, especially federations and democracies with comparable challenges. Around the world, effective local government is often associated with better public services, enhanced democratic participation, and more cohesive societies. Pakistan can learn from these examples to design reforms that suit its context. Below are a few international best practices and models:

• Constitutional Protection and Continuity: Many countries enshrine local government in their constitutions to guard against arbitrary suspension. For instance, India passed the 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendments (1992-93) which mandate regular five-year elections for rural panchayats and urban municipalities, reserve at least one-third of seats for women, and establish State Finance Commissions to ensure funding for local bodies. These amendments have led to over 3 million elected local representatives in India (almost half of them women) and have given local councils a stable legal status. While challenges remain in India (states vary in devolution depth), the constitutional backing prevents state governments from abolishing local institutions altogether. South Africa is another example: its post-apartheid Constitution (1996) recognizes local government as a distinct sphere with rights and requires equitable sharing of national revenue with municipalities. This has professionalized local administration and improved services in many cities. Lesson for Pakistan: consider constitutional amendments or federal guidelines to set minimum standards (like election frequency, financial transfers) for local governments, much as other democracies have done.
• Fiscal Decentralization Models: Scandinavian countries (like Sweden and Norway) are unitary states but have some of the world’s strongest local governments in terms of fiscal power. Swedish municipalities levy income taxes and are responsible for key services (schools, elderly care, utilities). Because they raise revenue, they are answerable to taxpayers and can tailor spending to local needs. Germany, a federation, guarantees “municipal self-government” (Kommunale Selbstverwaltung) in its Basic Law, which means cities and counties have constitutionally assured rights to manage local matters and levy certain taxes. German local governments play a major role in services like housing, zoning, utilities, and they cooperate in federal programs. The United States (a very large federation) has a tradition of strong city governance; although local governments are creatures of state law, many states grant “home rule” to cities enabling them to pass ordinances and manage local finances with minimal state interference. Critically, in the U.S., many local positions (mayors, school boards, sheriffs) are directly elected, which increases accountability. The European principle of “subsidiarity” (decisions taken at the lowest effective level) guides the EU countries – this principle is akin to what Pakistan needs to adopt in spirit.
• Local Government as Service Delivery Engine: Japan and South Korea are examples in Asia of unitary states that heavily rely on local governments for delivering education, health, and infrastructure. Japan’s municipalities and prefectures handle most public services; the national government sets standards and provides funding, but local elected governors and mayors have discretion in implementation. This ensures uniformity with flexibility. Indonesia undertook a “big bang” decentralization in the early 2000s, shifting many powers from central ministries to elected regencies and municipalities, which improved public participation and defused separatist tensions. These examples show that even historically centralized states can successfully devolve when there is commitment.
• Grassroots Participation and Transparency: One noteworthy practice is participatory budgeting, pioneered in cities like Porto Alegre, Brazil. Citizens directly engage in council budget decisions, deciding local spending priorities. This not only improves targeting of resources to citizen needs but also enhances trust in local authorities. Some Indian cities have experimented with “Area Sabhas” (neighborhood assemblies) feeding into ward councillors, ensuring two-way communication. Civil society oversight is institutionalized in some places – e.g., the UK requires local councils to publish detailed accounts and undergo public audit, and has mechanisms for community petitions to trigger council debates on local issues. Emulating such measures in Pakistan (like empowering community committees, requiring local governments to proactively disclose budgets and plans) could strengthen performance and trust.
• Urban Metropolitan Governance: A challenge Pakistan faces is managing large metropolitan areas (Karachi, Lahore) where multiple jurisdictions and agencies overlap. Internationally, solutions include metropolitan councils or authorities that coordinate at the metro level. London (UK) has a Mayor and Assembly for the city-region on top of borough councils, handling citywide transport and planning. Istanbul, Turkey and Tehran, Iran have metropolitan municipalities with strong mayors overseeing citywide services (though Turkey has seen recentralization trends). New York City consolidates five boroughs under one mayor and council, allowing economies of scale. The idea is that for big cities, you often need a two-tier local government: borough/district level for local matters and a citywide government for metropolitan services. Pakistan’s experience in 2001-2008 with City District Governments was along these lines, and international practice supports re-instituting such models (e.g., a Greater Karachi Metropolitan Authority with the Mayor at top and town councils under, rather than the fragmented system now).

Not every international practice is directly transferable, but some common principles emerge: devolution improves outcomes when local governments have (a) clearly defined functions, (b) sufficient financial resources or revenue authority, (c) autonomy to make decisions, and (d) accountability mechanisms (elections, audits, citizen participation). Countries that have embraced these principles tend to have better service delivery at the local level. For instance, Canada and Australia (federations) treat municipalities as non-partisan service providers; they invest in local capacity and infrastructure, and local elections are fought on managerial competence rather than patronage, which leads to pragmatic city governance. Nepal, after a new 2015 constitution, actually enshrined a three-tier federation (federal, provincial, local) and held nationwide local elections that empowered village and municipal councils as quasi-governments with significant devolved powers – in effect leapfrogging Pakistan by giving constitutional recognition to local level similar to provinces.

From the international lens, Pakistan actually appears anomalous for a country of its size: a population of 240+ million with only around 150-200 substantial local governments (districts and large municipalities) and frequently dissolved councils. Comparable countries by population – e.g., Indonesia, Brazil, Nigeria – have thousands of functioning local governments that are integral to the governance system. Brazil, for instance, has over 5,500 municipalities; each directly elected, many raising local taxes, and even small towns have mayors who are the linchpin for local development. These local governments in Brazil were empowered after the end of military rule to deepen democracy. Nigeria’s constitution guarantees a “local government system by democratically elected local councils” with a specific number of councils per state – a provision quite similar to Pakistan’s Article 140A, but Nigerian states, despite issues, generally keep councils running as they tie into federal revenue sharing. Lessons for Pakistan: enduring local governance comes when all levels of government see it as part of the state structure, not an optional experiment. Institutionalizing it – through law, constitution, and norms – is key. Also, tailoring best practices: for example, adopting an open meeting law (requiring local council meetings to be public and minutes published) could increase transparency; establishing local government training academies (as India has in every state for panchayat training) could enhance capacity; implementing intergovernmental transfers based on transparent formula (like Canada’s equalization grants to provinces and in turn to municipalities) would ensure fairness and reduce ad-hocism.

In conclusion, international models strongly validate that local problems are best solved locally. Whether it’s a snowy road in Sweden or a broken pipe in Brazil, having an empowered local council makes government more responsive. Pakistan’s quest for good governance and true democracy can significantly benefit from adopting these global best practices, adapted to local conditions. Fortunately, Pakistan is not starting from scratch – the 2001 devolution showed a glimpse of what is possible, and the legal framework via Article 140A exists. By learning from others and our own past, Pakistan can design a local government system that is modern, democratic, and effective.

Recommendations and Way Forward

Having analyzed the issues, this paper now turns to specific recommendations to establish strong, effective local governments in Pakistan. These recommendations are categorized under constitutional, legislative, administrative, and political measures, aligning with the need for a multi-pronged approach. The overarching theme is to align Pakistan’s governance structure with its constitutional promise: sovereignty exercised by the people at all levels, and an administrative system that serves the public at the grassroots as a sacred trust.

Constitutional Recommendations

1. Amend the Constitution to Further Protect Local Government: Introduce an amendment to strengthen Article 140A. This could include specifying a minimum tenure (e.g. 4 years) for local councils and prohibiting their premature dissolution except under clearly defined conditions (such as through a constitutional court order). It should also consider requiring that any change in the local government system by provincial law must not curtail the mandate of elected councils mid-term. In addition, the amendment could mandate a timeline for elections (e.g. within 120 days of expiry of term or dissolution) to prevent gaps. Essentially, make the existence of elected local governments continuous and not at whim of provincial executives.
2. Elevate the Status of Local Government in the Federal Structure: The Constitution could recognize local government as a third tier of the federation in a formal sense. For example, include a provision that local governments are a part of the state for purposes of Article 7 (definition of “State”). This would clarify that local bodies are not inferior administrative units but part of the state’s representative governance structure, making fundamental rights enforceable against them but also safeguarding their existence (as the state is obligated to have them). Some constitutional experts already argue local government is implied in Article 7 via inclusion in “other authorities”, but an explicit mention would remove doubt.
3. Constitutional Finance Commission Clause: Add a clause (perhaps in Article 140A or Chapter on Finance) requiring each province to establish a Provincial Finance Commission (PFC) that periodically (e.g. every 3 years) determines the share of provincial revenues to be transferred to local governments based on population, needs, etc. The Constitution of Kenya, for example, guarantees a minimum percentage of national revenue to counties. Pakistan could similarly guarantee, say, that a significant portion (maybe 30%) of provincial development budget must go to local governments. This ensures financial responsibility is devolved in practice, not just in principle.
4. Clarify Administrative Control: The Constitution could include a principle that the bureaucracy serving at local levels shall function under the administrative control of elected local governments, akin to how civil servants are under the control of respective federal/provincial governments in their domain. This might be a new article or an amendment to Article 240 (which deals with civil service appointment framework) stating that appointment terms of local officials shall be as determined by provincial law consistent with the autonomy of local government. The aim is to constitutionally acknowledge that district administrations are not independent of local elected authorities. Accordingly, local government service, LGS may be inserted in the article, 240 of the constitution of Pakistan, which deals the services of Pakistan.
5. Cultural Province Criteria: Although not immediately pressing compared to the above, if new provinces are to be created in the future, a constitutional guideline should be considered that such reorganization must be based on cultural/linguistic/historical considerations and widespread local consensus (e.g., a referendum in the affected area). This could be a non-binding resolution or a clause that Parliament “shall take into account linguistic, cultural homogeneity” when considering bills for new provinces. This is to ensure that administrative expediency alone doesn’t redraw maps without addressing identity issues. Then, administrative devolution will only carry out through local governments.
6. Republic Policy Think Tank also strongly recommends that schedule IV of the constitution of Pakistan, may enumerate the provincial and local government powers from residuary powers of the provinces. It will provide local governments greater constitutional power, and these will not depend upon the legislative powers of the provincial assemblies.
7. The constitution of Pakistan may also determine the terms and conditions of the legislative assemblies of local governments on the pattern of Parliament and provincial assemblies.

Legislative and Policy Recommendations (Provincial Level)

1. Enact Comprehensive Local Government Laws with Clear Devolution of Powers: Each province should review its Local Government Act to ensure it truly devolves functional authority. The Acts should contain schedules listing subjects devolved to local governments (e.g., primary & secondary education, primary healthcare, local roads, water and sanitation, agriculture extension, libraries, parks, etc.) and should formally transfer those departments to the local councils. Any subjects not devolved should have a justification. The law should minimize vaguely defined concurrent responsibilities that lead to turf battles. A clear division of functions fosters accountability: citizens know which level is responsible for what service.
2. Limit Provincial Interference: Local Government laws should remove or strictly limit provisions that allow provincial government to suspend or overrule local councils. For example, repeal sections that let Chief Ministers dissolve councils unilaterally. Instead, include only narrow provisions for intervention, such as if a local government is failing in its duties and after due inquiry a council may be suspended, but even then an administrator can only be appointed for a short interim until a new election is held – similar to Article 58 conditions for dissolving assemblies. Also, any oversight bodies (like Local Government Commissions) should have representation from the local councils themselves and be quasi-judicial, not just provincial secretaries, to prevent bias.
3. Abolish the “Deputy Commissioner” in Current Form via Law: Provinces need to legislate to either eliminate the DC office or transform it. One approach: Amend the land revenue and criminal procedure laws to remove the DC’s judicial powers (which some provinces already did under devolution but later revived) and to transfer coordination roles to an elected District Mayor (Nazim). The administrative coordination tasks could be handled by a Chief Municipal Officer who reports to the Mayor. Alternatively, if DCs are retained for a transition period, the law must clearly subordinate them to the elected head: e.g., requiring DCs to act as secretaries of the District Council, implementing Council decisions, and prohibiting them from bypassing the Mayor when communicating with province. This flips the chain of command. In tandem, establish a Local Government Service Cadre under provincial law, as allowed by Article 240(b) of the Constitution for provincial services. This cadre’s officers would fill administrative posts in local governments, reducing reliance on PAS officers.
4. Strengthen Local Councils’ Financial Autonomy: Update local government laws and finance rules to give councils more revenue tools. For instance, allow urban municipal corporations to levy urban immovable property tax (currently often collected by province) or a share of GST on services generated in their jurisdiction. Rural councils could get agricultural market fees, etc. Local taxation must be done judiciously, but without some independent revenue, councils remain beggars. Also, ensure timely constitution of Provincial Finance Commissions by statute (some provinces already mandate a PFC every few years, but enforcement is lax). The law should fix a formula for sharing divisible pool funds to local governments and require the province to budget accordingly each year.
5. Mandate Transparency and Citizen Participation: Provincial laws should institutionalize best practices like open council meetings, mandatory public disclosure of budgets, development plans, audit reports, and citizen grievance mechanisms at local level. Provision for instruments such as referendum or recall at local level (perhaps if a significant percentage of residents petition) can be considered to enhance accountability. The Local Government Act can also empower councils to form neighborhood/village councils or committees to involve community members in decision-making (KP’s recent village councils are an example of devolution within devolution, which has shown promise in engaging rural communities).
6. Intergovernmental Forums: Legislate for fora like a Provincial-Local Government Council where provincial authorities and representatives of local councils meet annually to discuss policy, resolve disputes, and align development plans. This could reduce the adversarial relationship and make coordination cooperative.

Administrative Recommendations

1. Capacity Building: Improving local government performance requires building capacity of local elected officials and staff. The provincial governments (and federal where possible) should invest in training programs for mayors, chairpersons, councilors, and local government officers. Establish or strengthen Local Government Training Academies in each province (some exist, like in Punjab and Sindh, but need rejuvenation). Training should cover budgeting, project planning, council procedures, law, and IT skills. Donors and civil society can partner to provide technical assistance.
2. Strengthen Local Bureaucracies with Right Skills: In the immediate term, even if DCs remain, provinces should empower Municipal Administrators / Chief Officers with technical expertise (town planners, engineers, finance officers) and make them answerable to elected councils. Over time, create a dedicated Local Service Commission to recruit professionals (municipal cadre) who build careers in local governance. Redress the current incentive problem where competent officers avoid local postings due to career stagnation; instead, make local postings attractive and prestigious by offering promotion pathways within the local government service.
3. Use Technology for Good Governance: Deploy e-governance solutions at the local level to enhance efficiency and transparency. For example, implement online complaint management systems for municipalities (so citizens can log issues like garbage not collected, which get tracked and resolved with oversight from councilors). Use GIS mapping for municipal assets and service coverage to better plan expansion of facilities. Crucially, implement online budgeting and accounting systems shared with provincial authorities to monitor funds usage in real-time, reducing opportunities for misappropriation while respecting autonomy. Technology can also help small councils that lack human expertise by standardizing processes.
4. Decentralize Service Delivery Departments: As part of administrative reform, provincial governments should complete the process of transferring devolved departments’ control to local entities. This means redefining roles of provincial line departments: they should shift from implementation to regulation and support. For example, the provincial Education Department should not run schools directly in district X; instead, the District Education Offices under the district council run them, while the provincial dept sets curriculum standards, does monitoring and provides funds. This mindset shift – province as enabler, local as doer – must be operationalized in civil service rules and departmental structures.
5. Monitoring and Evaluation: To ensure accountability without infringing on autonomy, set up neutral monitoring mechanisms. For instance, an independent provincial Local Government Commission (composed of retired judges, civil society, and equal nominees of government and opposition) can evaluate local bodies’ performance annually and publish reports. This can highlight issues (financial mismanagement, service delivery gaps) that need addressing through capacity building or legal tweaks, rather than through sacking councils. Such transparency can also build public pressure on underperforming local officials, complementing electoral accountability.
6. Pilot Innovative Projects: Administratively, provinces could pilot innovations with willing local governments – e.g., participatory budgeting in one district, or women-led “Deputy Mayor” positions as suggested by some scholars to increase women’s executive role[7]. Successful pilots can then be scaled. Similarly, encourage urban local governments to partner with private sector for smart city solutions, and rural ones to work with NGOs for community development projects, demonstrating that local councils can be effective coordinating hubs.

Political and Cultural Recommendations

1. Political Parties’ Commitment: All major political parties in Pakistan must include clear pro-local government agendas in their manifestos and then follow through. Party leadership should encourage their legislators to see local bodies as complementary. One concrete step: parties can internalize local government by actively participating in local elections on party tickets (as has been mandated in most provinces now) and treating success in those as important as general elections. When parties have skin in the game at local level, they are less likely to neglect or abolish those institutions because it would mean losing their own grassroots base.
2. Redefine Legislators’ Role and Incentives: A big political shift needed is to move MPs away from petty local development roles towards lawmaking and oversight. The federal and provincial governments can help by instituting alternative modes for constituency service: for example, establish Constituency Development Committees that include local council representatives, to advise MPAs on needs rather than MPs individually executing projects. If development funds allocation to MPs is discontinued (as recommended earlier), the political culture will gradually adapt: MPs will then find electoral advantage in championing policies (including robust local governments) that deliver results, rather than in distributing patronage. In parallel, build awareness that if a drain is clogged or streetlight off, people should blame/expect the local councilor or mayor, not the MPA; and the MPA likewise should guide people to hold local officials accountable instead of micromanaging. This culture shift can be nudged by media narratives and party directives.
3. Public Awareness and Demand Creation: Citizens often are not fully aware of what local government can do for them, given the long gaps in its functioning. A concerted effort by civil society, media, and educational institutions is needed to educate the public on the importance of local governance. Media campaigns and talk shows can highlight success stories where local governments improved lives (e.g., a town that fixed its water supply because the local council acted, or a city that became cleaner due to an active mayor). Similarly, academic curriculum in public administration and civics courses should emphasize local government’s role (currently it’s often glossed over). When people understand that, per the Constitution, “the state’s authority is to be exercised by them through their chosen representatives” at all levels, they will hopefully demand local elections and resist future abrogation. The 2022 HRCP conference aptly called local governments “schools of democracy” for citizens– this idea should be popularized so that the public sees every local election as a vital civics lesson and opportunity, not a low-turnout secondary event.
4. Cross-Provincial Learning and Non-Partisan Platforms: Politically, it may help to create non-partisan knowledge sharing among local government practitioners. For example, reestablish or strengthen the Association of Local Governments at national or provincial level where mayors and chairpersons from all parties can come together to share experiences and collectively lobby for their interests (much like how provincial governments united for the Council of Common Interests issues). Such unity can reduce the vulnerability of local govt when provincial politics shift.
5. Gradualism and Consistency: Politicians and bureaucrats should recognize that capacity and trust in local governments will only grow with consistency. So even if initial results are imperfect, stay the course. Do not suspend councils because of a few scandals; instead improve oversight. Do not delay elections because last batch underperformed; choose better candidates and let the voters decide. This patience is a political recommendation: inculcate a norm that local democracy is to be respected just as we expect national democracy to be. Over time, as local leaders prove themselves (and many will, given the chance), political parties will also start proudly claiming credit for their mayors’ achievements, creating a virtuous cycle of support.
6. Abolish Parallel Structures: Politically, commit to abolishing or refraining from creating parallel bodies that undermine elected locals. This means no more non-elected “development committees” led by MPAs, no ad-hoc task forces for local services that bypass councils, no new cantonments or authorities without integrating them with local elected boards. Everything local should, as far as possible, come under the purview of local government or coordinate with it. For example, instead of a separate development authority for a city run by provincial appointees, make it answerable to the city council. Such steps require political will to cede control, but yield accountability and efficiency.

By implementing these recommendations, Pakistan can move decisively toward a system where local governments are empowered, capable, and durable. The benefits would be manifold: better public service delivery (since local needs are addressed locally, with less bureaucratic delay), increased citizen satisfaction and trust in government, enhanced inclusion of marginalized groups in governance, and reduced burden on provincial/federal officials who can then focus on policy and regulation rather than minor works. It would also strengthen national unity: when people see that the state, at the most immediate level, listens and responds to them, alienation and extremism find less fertile ground.

Most importantly, such reforms would fulfill the constitutional vision that Pakistan’s sovereignty (ultimately Allah’s authority entrusted to the people) is exercised at all levels of governance. Elected local representatives are not a threat to the state’s integrity; they are an expression of it. When Article 140A says political, administrative and financial responsibility shall be devolved to local governments, it is effectively echoing the Objectives Resolution at a micro level – that government is a trust of the people to be discharged by their chosen representatives in every village, union, town and city.

Pakistan stands at a crossroads where it can either continue a cycle of centralization and ad-hoc local bodies, or it can entrench a democratic third tier and reap the rewards of grassroots governance. The evidence from our own history and around the world strongly favors the latter path. It is time our policy and law-makers take bold steps to demolish outdated relics, build new local institutions, and truly empower the people in whose name all power is held. A strong local government system, protected by law and sustained by political support, will not only improve daily life for citizens but also strengthen Pakistan’s federal democracy for generations to come.

References:

[^1]: Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Article 2A (Objectives Resolution) – “Sovereignty over the entire Universe belongs to Almighty Allah alone and the authority to be exercised by the people of Pakistan within the limits prescribed by Him is a sacred trust. The State shall exercise its powers and authority through the chosen representatives of the people.”[57]

[^2]: Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Article 32 – “The State shall encourage local Government institutions composed of elected representatives of the areas concerned and, in such institutions, special representation will be given to peasants, workers and women.”

[^3]: Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Article 140A – “Local Government: Each Province shall, by law, establish a local government system and devolve political, administrative and financial responsibility and authority to the elected representatives of the local governments; and elections to the local governments shall be held by the Election Commission of Pakistan.”

[^4]: Republic Policy – “The Significance of Local Government System for Pakistan”, Dr. Ahmed Rizwan (Nov 11, 2023) – Highlights Musharraf’s 2001 local government as one of the best systems with three-tier structure, direct elections and reserved seats, and notes that local government in Pakistan is protected by Articles 32 and 140A but has faced frequent interruptions[58][5].

[^5]: Republic Policy – “Importance of Local Government”, Areeb Khawar (Mar 17, 2024) – Emphasizes that decentralization leads to true democracy; cites examples of effective local governments in Canada, Germany, Sweden, Japan, Norway, India (Karnataka, Kerala) and notes Pakistan needs more constitutional protection for local government. Also discusses how provincial acts post-18th Amendment sometimes restricted local councils (e.g., Punjab 2019 act restoring commissioner system) and argues for strengthening local government to improve service delivery[59][60][61]. Provides a multi-pronged strategy (legislative, administrative, political) to empower local bodies[52][46].

[^6]: Republic Policy – “Provinces or Local Governments: The Federation’s Dilemma” (Editorial, Aug 19, 2025) – Argues that demands for new provinces for administrative reasons stem from weak local governments. States “when local governments are empowered, they provide the most direct, responsive, and accountable system of governance. The absence of strong municipal systems is what creates the demand for new provinces on administrative grounds.” It recommends robust local governments instead of multiplying provinces, and suggests new provinces, if any, should be based on cultural/identity factors, not convenience[62][50][51].

[^7]: Dawn News – “SC orders restoration of LG institutions in Punjab”, by Nasir Iqbal (Published March 26, 2021) – Reports Supreme Court’s decision declaring Section 3 of Punjab LGA 2019 (dissolving local bodies) unconstitutional. Quotes the judgment: “absence of local bodies amounts to violation of Article 140-A”. Notes Justice Isa’s remarks that 56,000 elected representatives were sent home and replaced by bureaucrats, disenfranchising people[13][14]. Chief Justice observed that while laws can change structure or powers, “local government institutions could not be dissolved just like that.”[54].

[^8]: Dawn News – “Experts seek constitutional amendment to protect local governments”, by Ikram Junaidi (Published Nov 24, 2022) – Summary of HRCP-FNF conference on local govt. Dr. Umair Javed said “Article 140-A was an inadequate safeguard for local governments”, calling for delinking provincial municipal and legislative roles[19]. Hamid Khan noted MPAs/MNAs have become “unnecessary rivals” to local gov and suggested development funds go only to local bodies[23]. Other speakers urged requiring 2/3 majority in assemblies to change local laws[21], non-token women’s participation, etc., and termed local governments “schools of democracy”[56].

[^9]: Republic Policy – “District Administration: A Local Government Mandate, Not Federal Bureaucracy” (Desk report, Sep 2025) – Criticizes attempts by federal authorities to control district administration. States “The attempt to re-engineer district administration through a federal committee is unconstitutional, violating Schedule Four and Article 140-A”, and that such central interference represents a regression from the federal consensus of devolution[17]. Reinforces that district administration should be under local government per Article 140A’s intent, not under distant bureaucratic control.

[^10]: Republic Policy – “Is Posting of Chief Secretary by the Federal Government Unconstitutional?” (Desk report, 2025) – Shares letter by Association of Administrative Federalism arguing that appointing provincial Chief Secretaries by federal government violates provincial autonomy. Notes “the role of Chief Secretary was instituted during the colonial era when provinces lacked elected representatives. In a democratic Pakistan, the need for such an office is questionable.”[63]. By extension suggests that colonial-era bureaucratic offices (CS, DC) should be reformed to align with elected governance. Emphasizes that Pakistan’s bureaucracy structure remains unitary and needs constitutional alignment with federal principles[35].

[^11]: Academic Article – “Article 140A of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973”, Journal of Xi’an University (Jan 2023) by Mohsin Kamran et al. – Analyzes local govt framework. Notes General Musharraf’s local government system reserved 33% seats for women at all three tiers (District, Tehsil, Union)[7]. Suggests further reforms like having deputy mayors/chairpersons be women to ensure women’s participation in executive roles. Advocates amending Constitution to clarify local govt functions to avoid confusion and strengthen Article 140A[64].

[^12]: Wikipedia – “Objectives Resolution” (accessed 2025) – Provides text of the Objectives Resolution: “Sovereignty over the entire Universe belongs to Allah… authority delegated to the State of Pakistan through its people … is a sacred trust,” and “the State shall exercise its powers and authority through the chosen representatives of the people.”[57]. (This underpins the constitutional philosophy cited in introduction.)

[^13]: Wikipedia – “Pakistan Administrative Service” (accessed 2025) and Dawn Archives – various news on DC office restoration – Document the abolition of the Commissioner/DC offices in 2001 and their later restorations. E.g., Dawn report “Resurrecting DC’s office; CM and his team in a fix” (2016) notes “The colonial office of deputy commissioner-cum-district magistrate was abolished after Gen Musharraf introduced his local government system in 2001”[65] and provincial governments later decided to restore DC with some magisterial powers by 2017[39].

[^14]: Commonwealth Local Government Forum (CLGF) – “Local Government System in Pakistan” (2017) – Describes Pakistan’s local government structures post-2013 in each province and notes challenges such as limited fiscal decentralization and provincial dominance. Also provides comparative data on number of local councils and their functions in Pakistan vs other Commonwealth countries[34][66].

[^15]: Republic Policy – “Floods Expose Need for Local Governments” (Editorial, Sep 12, 2025) – Observes that recent floods revealed the tireless efforts of agencies (Rescue 1122, etc.) but also the vacuum of elected local leadership, implying that disaster response and coordination suffered due to lack of local governments. This underscores how absence of grassroots elected bodies affects crisis management and underscores need for their presence[45].

[1] [2] [57] Objectives Resolution – Wikipedia

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Objectives_Resolution

[3] Constitution of Pakistan, Article 32: Promotion of local Government institutions

https://www.infopakistan.pk/constitution-of-pakistan/article/32-Promotion-of-local-Government-institutions

[4] article 140a local government – Pakistanconstitutionlaw | Top Replica Rolex Swiss Made Direct | Fake Rolex Daytona, Submariner Watches

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[5] [6] [8] [10] [11] [24] [25] [28] [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] [58] [66] The Significance of Local Government System for Pakistan – Republic Policy

https://republicpolicy.com/the-significance-of-local-government-system-for-pakistan/

[7] [64] xisdxjxsu.asia

https://www.xisdxjxsu.asia/V19I01-151.pdf

[9] [46] [52] [59] [60] [61] Importance of Local Government – Republic Policy

https://republicpolicy.com/importance-of-local-government/

[12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [53] [54] SC orders restoration of LG institutions in Punjab – Pakistan – DAWN.COM

https://www.dawn.com/news/1614662

[17] [40] District Administration: A Local Government Mandate, Not Federal …

https://republicpolicy.com/district-administration-a-local-government-mandate-not-federal-bureaucracy/

[18] [55] [PDF] Political Parties and Devolution of Power in Punjab after the 18th …

https://research.aston.ac.uk/files/204791582/Political_Parties_and_Devolution_of_Power_in_Punjab_after_the_18th_Amendment.pdf

[19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [43] [56] Experts seek constitutional amendment to protect local governments – Newspaper – DAWN.COM

https://www.dawn.com/news/1722726

[26] Deputy commissioner (Pakistan) – Wikipedia

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deputy_commissioner_(Pakistan)

[27] [PDF] Structural Issues in Musharraf’s Devolution of Power Plan

https://plhr.org.pk/issues/v6/2/exploring-the-derailing-factors-of-local-governments-in-pakistan-structural-issues-in-musharraf-s-devolution-of-power-plan.pdf

[29] Local Governments: The Engine Room of a Federation

https://republicpolicy.com/local-governments-the-engine-room-of-a-federation/

[35] [36] [41] [42] [63] Is Posting of Chief Secretary by the Federal Government Unconstitutional? – Republic Policy

https://republicpolicy.com/is-posting-of-chief-secretary-by-the-federal-government-unconstitutional/

[37] No homework done to restore an ‘effective’ DC office – Dawn

http://www.dawn.com/news/1203958

[38] [39] Curious consensus: A decade on, DCs set for a ‘magisterial’ comeback

https://tribune.com.pk/story/487697/curious-consensus-a-decade-on-dcs-set-for-a-%E2%80%98magisterial%E2%80%99-comeback

[44] Political Reluctance and Institutional Inaction Delay Local …

https://republicpolicy.com/political-reluctance-and-institutional-inaction-delay-local-government-elections-in-pakistan/

[45] Republic Policy | Islamabad – Facebook

https://www.facebook.com/republicpolicy/

[47] [48] [49] [50] [51] [62] Provinces or Local Governments: The Federation’s Dilemma – Republic Policy

https://republicpolicy.com/107019-2/

[65] Resurrecting DC’s office; CM and his team in a fix – Newspaper – Dawn

https://www.dawn.com/news/1302681